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has been talking to his lawyer, Bittman, not to be as desperate today as he was yesterday but to still be on the brink, or at least shaky. What's made him shaky is that he's seen McCord bouncing out there and probably walking out scot free." (WHT 326-27) On April 16, 1973, the President and Dean again discussed the Hunt demand. Dean said that Mitchell had told him, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, on March 22, 1973, that the problem with Hunt had been solved. The President expressed his satisfaction it had been solved "at the Mitchell level." He also said, "I am planning to assume some culpability on that [unintelligible]." 18 (HJCT 194–95)

On April 8, 1973, Dean, and on April 13, 1973, Magruder, began meeting with the prosecutors. (Book IV, 538, 610) On the afternoon of April 17, 1973, Haldeman pointed out to the President that one problem was that people would say the President should have told Dean on March 21, 1973, not that the blackmail was too costly, but that it was wrong.19 (WHT 1035)

In mid-April, 1973, the President tried to diminish the significance of his March 21 conversation with Dean. He tried to make the payments appear innocent and within the law. On April 14, 1973, the President instructed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to agree on the story that payments were made, not "to obstruct justice," but to "help" the defendants.20

This evidence clearly establishes that pursuant to the President's plan of concealment, surreptitious payments of substantial sums of money were made to the Watergate defendants for the purpose of obtaining their silence and influencing their testimony. The evidence also clearly establishes that when the President learned that Hunt was going to talk unless paid a substantial sum of money, and that Mitchell and LaRue were in a position to do something about Hunt's demand he approved of the payment to Hunt rather than taking steps to stop it from being made.

18 The edited White House transcript reads, "That assumes culpability on that, doesn't it?" (WHT 798)

19 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

10 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

FAVORED TREATMENT OF DEFENDANTS AND

PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANTS

I

DISCUSSIONS OF CLEMENCY FOR HUNT

On July 8, 1972, while walking on a beach at San Clemente, the President and Ehrlichman discussed possible clemency for the Watergate defendants. Ehrlichman has said that he told the President that "presidential pardons or something of that kind inevitably would be a question that he would have to confront by reason of the obvious political aspect of this." (Book III, 182-83) The President's response, according to Ehrlichman and the President's own public statement, was that no one in the White House should "get into this whole area of clemency with anybody involved in this case and surely not make any assurances to anyone." (Book III, 189, 195) At the time of this conversation, Ehrlichman knew that Liddy and Hunt and three of those arrested at the Watergate had been involved in the break-in of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. The President has said that he did not learn of that break-in until more than eight months later, or 'farch 17, 1973.1 (Book VII, 1877)

On December 31, 1972, Hunt wrote to Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President, complaining about his "abandonment by friends on whom I had in good faith relied" and suggesting that he was close to breaking down. (Book III, 458) Hunt's trial was scheduled to begin on January 8, 1973. (United States v. Liddy, CR 1827-72, docket) Colson forwarded Hunt's letter to Dean with a note, "Now what the hell do I do." (Book III, 457)

On January 3, 1973, Colson, Dean and Ehrlichman discussed the need to reassure Hunt about the amount of time he would have to spend in jail. (Book III, 460; Colson Exhibit No. 17, 3 HJC 307) Subsequently, on April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman reported his conversation with Colson to the President. "[Colson] said, 'What can I tell [Hunt] about clemency.' And I said 'Under no circumstances should this ever be raised with the President.'" (WHT 421)

Later on January 3, and again on the following day, Colson met with Bittman, Hunt's attorney. Bittman discussed Hunt's family problems since December 8, 1972, when Hunt's wife had died. He said that because of his children Hunt was very worried that Judge Sirica

1 The President's awareness of Hunt's previous activity is shown in his instructions to Haldeman on June 23, 1972, with respect to the investigation:

"Of course, this Hunt, that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further." (WHT, June 23, 1972, 10:04-11:39 a.m., 6)

On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

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would give him a long jail sentence. (Bittman testimony, 2 HJC 2024; Colson testimony, 3 HJC 302-04, 313-15; Colson Exhibit No. 17, 3 HJC 308) According to Colson, Bittman said he thought Hunt might be able to survive the prospect of a reasonable term, perhaps a year. Bittman also mentioned that he understood Dean and Mitchell had discussed plans for electronic surveillance prior to Watergate. (Colson Exhibit No. 17, 3 HJC 308-09) Colson assured Bittman of his friendship for Hunt, of his understanding of Hunt's need to be out of jail, and of his willingness to do whatever he could to assist Hunt. Colson

has said:

In addition, I may well have told Bittman that I had made "people" aware that, if it were necessary, I was going to come back to the White House to speak for Hunt. Indeed, since I wanted to do all I could to comfort Hunt, it is most probable that I did say this. I do not know how Bittman evaluated my position and influence at the White House, but despite my insistence that I could do no more than try to help Hunt as a friend, Bittman might have inferred that if Hunt received an unreasonably long sentence, my willingness to go to bat for Hunt would result in Hunt's sentence being reduced by executive action of some sort. (Colson Exhibit No. 17, 3 HJC 311)

On January 3, 1973, Colson reported to Ehrlichman and Dean on his conversation with Bittman, and said he wanted to speak to the President regarding Hunt. (Colson Exhibit No. 17, 3 HJC 310; Book III, 461) Dean testified that Colson told him on January 5, 1973, that he had given assurances of clemency to Bittman and he had spoken with the President about clemency for Hunt. (Dean testimony, 2 HJC 286-87; Book III, 461) The President told Haldeman and Ehrlichman on April 14, 1973, that he had had a conversation with Colson about clemency for Hunt.3

On January 9, 1973, Hunt withdrew a motion, which he had filed on October 11, 1972, for the return of items that had been recovered from his EOB office and that had not been inventoried by the FBI. (United States v. Liddy, motion, January 9, 1973; Book II, 425) Among the documents encompassed by the motion were two notebooks that had been taken from Hunt's safe and kept by Dean. (Book II, 425; Dean testimony, 2 HJC 236) On December 22, 1972, Petersen had questioned Dean about the notebooks and told him he would be called as a witness in the hearing on Hunt's motion. (Petersen testimony, 3 HJC 75-76; Book II, 422-23, 425) In January, 1973, Dean shredded the notebooks. (Dean testimony, 2 HJC 287-88) Colson was also a potential witness. During Bittman's meeting with Colson on January 3, 1973, Bittman had discussed Colson's prospective testimony. (Bittman testimony, 2 HJC 21-22; Book III, 472-74) The withdrawal of the motion made it unnecessary for Dean and Colson to appear as witnesses. (Petersen testimony, 3 HJC 76) It also avoided the possible disclosure of such compromising documents in Hunt's safe as fabricated State Department cables and documents related to the Plumbers. Two days after the withdrawal of his motion, Hunt pleaded guilty to charges arising out of the Watergate break-in. (Book III, 484)

On May 30, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to the two conversations Charles Colson had with the President on January 5, 1973. The President refused to produce these recordings.

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II

PRESIDENT'S RECOLLECTION OF CLEMENCY DISCUSSIONS

On February 28, March 21 and April 14, 1973, the President spoke of his recollection of a discussion of clemency for Hunt. On February 28, 1973, speaking to Dean about the Watergate defendants' expectations of clemency, the President asked, "What the hell do they expect, though? Do they expect that they will get clemency within a reasonable time?" Dean said that he thought they did. The President asked whether clemency could be granted "in six months." Dean replied that it could not because, "This thing may become so political." (HJCT 40) There was no specific mention of Colson's assurances to Hunt. The President did allude to Hunt's personal situation, and to the death of his wife. (HJCT 40)

On March 21, 1973, after Hunt had increased his demands for money (Book III, 968), Dean told the President that Caulfield had spoken about commutation with McCord. Dean added, "as you know Colson has talked to, indirectly to Hunt about commutation." Dean said these "commitments" were problems because they were the sort of thing the Senate would be looking for, but that he did not think the Senate could find them. The President agreed that it would be "pretty hard as far as the witnesses are concerned." (HJCT 91)

After Haldeman joined the meeting, the President said, "You know Colson has gone around on this clemency thing with Hunt and the rest." Dean added, "Hunt is now talking in terms of being out by Christmas." The discussion continued:

HALDEMAN. By Christmas of this year?

DEAN. Yeah.

HALDEMAN. See that, that really, that's very believable 'cause Colson,
PRESIDENT. Do you think Colson could have told him—'

HALDEMAN. Colson is an, is an—that's, that's your fatal flaw, really, in Chuck, is he is an operator in expediency, and he will pay at the time and where he is PRESIDENT. Yeah.

HALDEMAN. Whatever he has to, to accomplish what he's there to do.
DEAN. Right. (HJCT 115–16)

The President acknowledged that he had discussed clemency for Hunt:

Great sadness. The basis, as a matter of fact [clears throat] there was some discussion over there with somebody about, uh, Hunt's problems after his wife died and I said, of course, commutation could be considered on the basis of his wife, and that is the only discussion I ever had in that light. (HJCT 93)

On April 14, 1973, the President acknowledged that, contrary to Ehrlichman's direction, Colson had in fact raised with him the question of clemency in a tangential way. The President said: "As I remember a conversation this day was about five thirty or six o'clock that Colson only dropped it in sort of parenthetically, said I had a little problem today, talking about Hunt, and said I sought to reassure him, you know, and so forth. And I said, Well. Told me about Hunt's wife. I said it was a terrible thing and I said obviously we will do just, we

This line does not appear in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 226) On May 30, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to a Presidential conversation about granting clemency to Hunt on the basis of his wife's death. The President refused to produce this recording.

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will take that into consideration. That was the total of the conversation." (WHT 419)

In the conversations on March 21 the President acknowledged his predicament on the issue of clemency for Hunt; the President feared that any action that seemed to Hunt a repudiation of assurance of clemency would lead Hunt to "blow the whistle." (HJCT 125) On the other hand, the President was aware that clemency for Hunt by Christmas, 1973, would be politically impossible because it would require direct and public action by the President. (HJCT 103–04, 115)

On the afternoon of March 21, 1973, when the President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean, he continued to assess the risk Hunt posed to the cover-up. The President asked what should be done about Hunt. He agreed with Ehrlichman's answer that "Hunt's interests lie in getting a pardon if he can." The President said that "He's got to get that by Christmas time," and Ehrlichman suggested that Hunt's "indirect contacts with John" about it "contemplate that, that, that's already understood."

PRESIDENT. I know.

HALDEMAN. That's right.

EHRLICHMAN. They think that that's already understood.
PRESIDENT. Yeah. (HJCT 133)

Although the President knew Hunt was relying on a belief he would get a pardon, the President did not authorize or intimate to anyone to tell Hunt that a pardon would not be possible.

In a meeting on March 27, 1973, with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler, the President again discussed the issue of clemency for the Watergate defendants after the 1974 elections. The President considered appointing a "super panel" of distinguished citizens to study the Watergate case. Haldeman said that the idea had the advantage that it would drag out the investigation until after the 1974 elections, when the President could pardon everyone, and the "potential ultimate penalty anybody would get hit in this process could be about two years." 8 (WHT 338-42)

III

MITCHELL, MAGRUDER AND DEAN,

The President considered clemency not only for the seven Watergate burglars, but also for three of his closest associates, Mitchell, Magruder and Dean, who were involved in the cover-up.

By the middle of April, 1973, the President knew that the cover-up was threatened by Magruder and Dean, who were talking to the pros

On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation on April 14, 1973. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript. Colson testified before the Committee that he recalled his conversation with the President as follows: "I was going to say someday I may want to come talk to you about Hunt. Half way through that sentence the President interrupted and he said, he said oh, I just can't believe, Chuck, in the circumstances you have just described, with his wife in that shape and his kids, he said. I just can't believe that he will go to jail. He said I just can't believe any judge would do that. I just am sure he won't, and don't worry about it, and relax and don't let it get you down." (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 318)

This statement was attributed to Dean in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 133)

On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.