64 committee. Uh, as, as this case has been all along, you can spin out horribles that, uh, you, you can conceive of, and so we just don't do that. I stopped doing that about, uh, two months ago. PRESIDENT. Yeah. DEAN. We just take one at a time and you deal with it based on— DEAN. NO. PRESIDENT. about it all the time, thinking, "The worst may happen," but it may not. So you just try to button it up as well as you can and hope for the best. And, DEAN. Well if Bob PRESIDENT. and remember that basically the damn thing is just one of those unfortunate things and, we're trying to cut our losses. DEAN. Well, certainly that's right and certainly it had no effect on you. That's the, the good thing. HALDEMAN It really hasn't. PRESIDENT. [Unintelligible.] HALDEMAN. No, it hasn't. It has been kept away from the White House almost completely" and from the President totally. The only tie to the White House has been the Colson effort they keep trying to haul in. (HJCT 13–14) There is no evidence to suggest that any member of the Patman Committee knew or should have known that the President was attempting to interfere with this congressional investigation. But that is not the point. The point is that the President attempted to block the investigation in order to avoid the risk of disclosure of who was responsible for the Watergate break-ins, illegal campaign contributions, unlawful use of campaign funds, and the illegal prior White House activities of Hunt and Liddy. The President elaborated on how the plan must be carried out. He explained that a Congressman had to know that it came from the top but that the President could not talk to him himself. (HJCT 15-16) PRESIDENT. I think maybe that's the thing to do [unintelligible]. This is, this is big, big play. I'm getting into this thing." So that he-he's got to know that it comes from the top. HALDEMAN. Yeah. PRESIDENT. That's what he's got to know, DEAN. Right. PRESIDENT. and if he [unintelligible] and we're not going to-I can't talk to him myself-and that he's got to get at this and screw this thing up while he can, right? DEAN. Well, if we let that slide up there with the Patman Committee "it'd be just, you know, just a tragedy to let Patman 13 have a field day up there. PRESIDENT. What's the first move? When does he call his wit-,witnesses? (HJCT 16) Dean also reported that Congressman Garry Brown had written a letter to Kleindienst saying that the Committee hearings were going to jeopardize the criminal cases against the Watergate defendants. The President approved of this. Dean told the President, "we can keep them well briefed on the moves if they'll, if they'll move when we provide them with the strategy." (HJCT 16) Dean reported that they would use the Stans libel suit and the abuse of process suit to take depositions of DNC officials. 10 The words "almost completely" do not appear in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 70) The words "I'm getting into this thing." do not appear in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 72) The words "with the Patman Committee" do not appear in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 72) 13 In the edited White House transcript "Them" appears instead of "Patman." (WHT 72) ކ 65 HALDEMAN. We can take depositions on both of those? DEAN. Absolutely. PRESIDENT. Hell yes. HALDEMAN. [Laughs] (HJCT 18) After the September 15, 1972 meeting, and a consultation with Haldeman, Dean took the necessary steps to implement the President's decision to stop the Patman hearings. (Dean testimony, 3 SSC 960–62) He contacted Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and urged Petersen to respond to Congressman Brown's letter of September 8, 1972 to Kleindienst. Petersen wrote to Chairman Patman and stated that the proposed hearings could prejudice the rights of the seven Watergate defendants. (Dean testimony, 3 SSC 961, 1194–99) On October 2, 1972, the same day the Petersen letter was sent to the Committee, the Committee released the names of the persons it expected to call to testify during its hearings. The list included the names of Magruder, Sloan, Caulfield, Mitchell, Stans, Dean, Mardian, LaRue, Porter and MacGregor. (Dean testimony, 3 SSC 961, 1190-93) The next day, the House Committee on Banking and Currency voted 20 to 15 to withhold from its Chairman, Congressman Wright Patman, the power to issue subpoenas for the purpose of investigating the financing of the Watergate break-in. (Dean testimony, 3 SSC 962) Unknown to the Congress, the efforts of the President, through Dean, his counsel, had effectively cut off the investigation. All of this was part of the President's plan to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of the Watergate break-in, to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible, and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities. Through the election the plan worked, but then it faced new threats, one of which was Hunt's demands for money. Although a program of payments had commenced shortly after the break-in, Hunt's demands escalated as his trial approached. PAYMENTS I PAYMENTS PRIOR TO ELECTION Before the Watergate break-in, Gordon Liddy had given Howard Hunt $10,000 to use in case of need. Hunt had placed the money in a safe in his EOB office. Immediately after the arrests at the Watergate, Hunt went to his office and withdrew the money. In the early morning hours following the break-in, Hunt delivered the money on behalf of those arrested to Douglas Caddy, an attorney who had agreed to represent the Watergate defendants. (Book II, 76–77) On June 20 or 21, 1972, Liddy told LaRue and Mardian that promises of bail money, support and legal assistance had been made to the defendants, and that Hunt felt it was CRP's obligation to provide bail money to get the five men out of jail. Liddy also told LaRue and Mardian of his and Hunt's prior involvement in the Fielding break-in, and of Hunt's interview with Dita Beard, in the ITT matter. (LaRue testimony, 1 HJC 197; Book III, 91, 93-95) Mardian and LaRue reported to Mitchell on Liddy's request for money. (Book III, 98–99; Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1673) They also transmitted to Mitchell Liddy's statement that he, Hunt and two of those arrested had also participated in the Fielding break-in. (Book III, 98-99, 102) Mitchell told Mardian that no bail money would be forthcoming. (Book III, 99) Between June 26 and 28, 1972, after discussions with Mitchell and Ehrlichman, Dean met twice with CIA Deputy Director Walters, to ask that the CIA provide bail and salaries for the arrested men. Walters rejected this request. (Book III, 125, 137-38) On June 28, 1972, Haldeman and Ehrlichman directed Dean to contact Herbert Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal attorney and political fundraiser, to ask Kalmbach to raise funds for the Watergate defendants. (Book III, 149, 152; WHT 494-96) Kalmbach flew to Washington that night; the following morning he met with Dean (Book III, 152, 154–55) and LaRue (Book III, 176–77. 179–80) to discuss procedures for making payments. Kalmbach thereafter transferred to Anthony Ulasewicz campaign donations he had received in cash from CRP officials, Stans (Book III, 167) and LaRue, (Book III, 257-58) and from a private contributor. Kalmbach had told the private contributor that he could not reveal the use intended for the contribution. (Book III, 282–83, 286–87) Between July 7, 1972 and September 19, 1972, Kalmbach directed Ulasewicz to make payments totalling $187,500 for the Watergate defendants. (Book III, 208–17, 259–60, 284–85, 378-79) Ulasewicz made the deliveries by sealing cash in unmarked envelopes and leaving the envelopes at various drops such as airport lockers. (Book III, 22228) In communicating with each other, Ulasewicz, Kalmbach, LaRue (66) 67 and the recipients of the payments used aliases. (Book III, 173, 17677, 225–26, 229) Soon Kalmbach became concerned about the covert assignment. On July 26, 1972, he met with Ehrlichman, who assured him that they, while the money payments were necessary and legally proper, they had to be kept secret. (Book III, 268–70) In September, 1972, Kalmbach told Dean and LaRue that he could "do no more." Kalmbach transferred the remainder of the funds to LaRue, met with Dean and LaRue in Dean's office to report on the total payments, and then put his notes of the payments in Dean's ash tray and burned them. (Book III, 378-82) II PAYMENTS FOR HUNT PRIOR TO MARCH 21, 1973 Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt were involved in both the Fielding and the Watergate break-ins. They knew the identity of White House and CRP officials who had authorized those activities. Liddy remained silent. From the outset, Hunt made demands for others and for himself. (Book III, 88–95) During the summer and fall of 1972, prior to the November election, Hunt received payments amounting to over $200,000 for other defendants and for himself. (Book III, 218-19, 223, 233, 383, 386-89) Shortly after the November, 1972 election, Hunt telephoned Colson. (Book III, 411) Hunt told Colson that "commitments that were made to all of us at the onset have not been kept," and that "... the people who were paralyzed initially by this within the White House could now start to give some creative thinking to the affair and some affirmative action for Christ sake." (Book III, 408) Hunt continued: ... we're protecting the guys who are really responsible, but now that's . . . and of course that's a continuing requirement, but at the same time, this is a two way street and as I said before, we think that now is the time when a move should be made and surely the cheapest commodity available is money. (Book III, 409) Colson tape-recorded this conversation and gave it to Dean. (Book III, 417) Dean testified that he played the recording for Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On their instructions, Dean flew to New York and played the recording for Mitchell. (Book III, 418-19) Mitchell confirmed this, describing the tape as a lot of self-serving statements by Colson. (Mitchell testimony, 2 HJC 134-35) In late November, 1972, Dean reported to Haldeman the need for additional funds to pay the defendants. At that time, Haldeman had control of a cash fund of $328,000, the remainder of $350,000 in campaign funds which he had ordered placed under his control in February, 1972. (Book I, 78, 84) Strachan had picked up the cash from CRP and on April 7, 1972, on Haldeman's instructions, relayed through Strachan, Butterfield had delivered the cash to a personal friend of his for safekeeping. (Book I, 97; Butterfield testmony, 1 HJC 53-54) After Dean informed Haldeman of CRP's need for 1 On May 30, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this meeting among Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The President refused to produce this recording. 68 money for the Watergate defendants, Haldeman approved the transfer of the fund. (Book III, 430-35) In late November, 1972, Butterfield picked up the cash and delivered it to Strachan. (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 55) On Haldeman's orders, in December Strachan delivered between $40.000 and $70,000 to La Rue, who handled the cash with rubber gloves and refused to furnish Strachan with a receipt. Shortly thereafter, LaRue delivered $40,000 in cash to Hunt's attorney. (Book III, 436-48) In January, 1973, Hunt made additional demands for money. (Book III, 458) At Haldeman's direction, Strachan delivered the remainder of the funds to LaRue. As before, LaRue would not give him a receipt. (Book III, 437-41; LaRue testimony, 1 HJC 220-24) Prior to March 21, 1973, LaRue disbursed $132,000 from the fund for the defendants, including $100,000 to Hunt's attorney, William Bittman. (Book III, 436-38, 500, 518-19; LaRue testimony, 1 HJC 203-04) On February 28, 1973, the President acknowledged to Dean his knowledge of Kalmbach's role in providing money to Hunt. Dean told the President that the Senate Select Committee had subpoenaed Kalmbach's records, but that Kalmbach was "hunkered down" and "ready to handle it." The President replied that "it'll be hard for him, he―, 'cause it'll, it'll get out about Hunt." 2 (HJCT 43) The only connection between Kalmbach and Hunt was the clandestine payments. On March 16, 1973, Hunt met with Colson's law partner, David Shapiro. (Book III, 925) Hunt told Shapiro that if certain financial commitments that had been made to him were broken the Republicans would lose the 1974 election, and probably the 1976 election as well; but if the commitments were met none of his men would “blow.” Shapiro's memorandum of the meeting reads: Hunt stated that several persons should be terribly concerned were he to testify before the Ervin Committee (where he said he presently proposed to invoke the 5th Amendment). These persons he identified as John Dean, Bud Krogh, Pat Gray, John Mitchell and one or two others whom I can't remember (I did not take notes). Hunt said he knew he was risking the possibility of an obstruction of justice charge when he convinced those who pleaded guilty to do so, but is also convinced that if the commitments made to him are kept, no one in his "operation" will "blow." (Colson Exhibit No. 19, 3 HJC 327) On March 19, 1973, Shapiro met with Colson and related the substance of his March 16 conversation with Hunt. Shapiro advised Colson not to tell anyone at the White House about Hunt's message because he might "unwittingly become a party to an obstruction of justice." (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 331) Colson, former Special Counsel to the President, and his close political associate and friend, said he had a telephone conversation with the President on March 19, but did not tell the President about this. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 332) On either March 16 or 19, 1973, Hunt told Paul O'Brien, an attorney for CRP, that he required $130,000 before being sentenced. Hunt said he had done "seamy things" for the White House and that if he were not paid he might have to reconsider his options. (Book III, 902-04, 906-07, 910-13; O'Brien testimony, 1 HIC 125) O'Brien conveyed Hunt's message to Dean. (Book III, 947) Dean told O'Brien that both 2 The words 'he cause it'll, it'll get out about Hunt" do not appear in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 106) |