172 order to prevent his close subordinates from interfering with investigations into criminal or improper conduct carried on in his behalf.1 I ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND THE FIELDING BREAK-IN— The Committee found clear and convincing evidence that the President failed to act, contrary to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, with respect to activities by his close subordinates, for his benefit and on his behalf, which interfered with the Ellsberg trial. Among the activities of his subordinates (previously reviewed in connection with Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article) are the following: 1. Ehrlichman's concealment of the wiretap files and logs, which interfered with the Ellsberg trial. 2. Patrick Gray's misleading testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in its hearings on his nomination to be Director of the FBI, suggestion that there had been no FBI wiretaps of newsmen and White House personnel. 3. Concealment of the Fielding break-in, which interfered with the Ellsberg trial. The President was told of the break-in on March 17, 1973 by Dean and on March 21 by Ehrlichman, but he did not act on these disclosures. On April 18 he directed Petersen to stay away from the break-in on the pretext that it was a national security matter. II OBSTRUCTION OF WATERGATE INQUIRIES The Watergate break-in and cover-up involved the President's closest subordinates. It is clear that both the break-in and the cover-up were carried out for the President's benefit. On numerous occasions the President was told of their unlawful attempts and actions to impede and frustrate investigations aimed at uncovering the facts of the Watergate matter. The President repeatedly failed to remedy or prevent unlawful acts of obstruction by these subordinates. The instances are fully reviewed in connection with Article I. For example: 1. The President's failure to act to prevent obstruction of the investigation after Haldeman told him on June 30, 1972 that as of the moment there was no problem, but that there were risks for the future-informing the President of a policy of concealment and cover up. 1 Like Article I, Paragraph (4) focuses on interference with the due administration of justice. However, Paragraph (4) differs from Article I in two important respects: First, Article I charges that the President engaged in a course of conduct or plan to obstruct justice. By contrast, Paragraph (4) relates to obstruction of justice by the President's close subordinates for his benefit and a failure by the President to supervise these subordinates so as to stop their misconduct. Second, Paragraph (4) reaches not only the Watergate cover-up, but also interference with lawful inquiries into other matters. Specifically, it reaches interference with lawful inquiries into the ITT settlement (the Kleindienst confirmation hearings), the Ellsberg trial (by concealing the wiretaps and by authorizing and then concealing the Fielding break-in), and lawful inquiries into illegal campaign financing practices of the Committee for the Re-election of the President. 173 2. The President's failure to respond to the warning by Acting FBI Director Gray on July 6, 1972, that the President's close subordinates were trying to mortally wound him. 3. The President's failure to act in response to Ehrlichman's raising the question on July 8, 1972, of executive clemency for those involved in Watergate, though Ehrlichman raised the issue two months before an indictment was returned and six months before trial. 4. The President's praise of John Dean on September 15, 1972, after Dean told him seven people had been indicted, including two former White House aides. The President told Dean that a lot of this stuff went on and that Dean had been very skillful, putting his fingers in the dikes every time leaks had sprung here and sprung there. 5. The President's failure to act on March 13, 1973, when Dean told him that Strachan had knowledge before June 17, 1972 of the electronic surveillance at the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee and that Strachan had stonewalled FBI investigations and would continue to do so in the future. 6. The President's failure to act on March 21, 1973, when Dean confessed his own involvement in obstructing the Watergate investigation and told the President that Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell had also been involved in the obstruction of justice and that Porter and Magruder had committed perjury. 7. The President's failure to act when Haldeman and Ehrlichman told him that they had known of the payments to Watergate defendants in the summer of 1972 and had referred Dean to Kalmbach to arrange these payments. 8. The President's failure to disclose the information he had about the obstruction of justice by his subordinates when he met with Kleindienst and Petersen on April 15, 1973, and with Petersen during the following weeks. 9. The President's failure to reveal information about the unlawful obstruction of justice by his subordinates that he learned of, by his own admission, on and after March 21, 1973. 10. The President's endeavor to conceal the existence of the White House taping system and his refusal to comply with requests by the Special Prosecutor for access to relevant and material tapes and documents. 11. The President's failure to report to the authorities Haldeman's false testimony about the March 21, 1973, conversation before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. III OBSTRUCTION OF INQUIRIES INTO CAMPAIGN FINANCING PRACTICES AND USE OF CAMPAIGN FUNDS The President learned in June and September, 1972, and in February, March and April, 1973, that the Committee for the Re-Election of the President had engaged in unlawful campaign financing practices and his aides were endeavoring to obstruct lawful investigations into these practices and the use of campaign funds. As demonstrated by the 174 following examples, the President took no action to inform authorities of his subordinates' conduct: 1. The President failed to inform the authorities when Dean explained to the President on March 13, 1973, the method used by Allen and Ogarrio to make illegal campaign contributions. 2. The President failed to stop plans to interfere with the proposed hearings of the House Banking and Currency Committee (the Patman Committee) on campaign financing practices of the Committee to Re-elect the President, which Dean discussed with the President on September 15, 1972. 3. The President failed to report Herbert Kalmbach's use of $75,000 in campaign funds received from Stans and Haldeman's use of $350,000 in surplus cash campaign contributions to make payments or have payments made to Watergate defendants. 4. The campaign activities of Donald Segretti were the subject of specific inquiry by the Watergate Grand Jury and FBI in August, 1972, and again by the Watergate Grand Jury in April, 1973. On February 28, March 2, 13 and 14, 1973, the President discussed with Dean the extent of White House involvement with Segretti, who had been recruited by Chapin and Strachan to disrupt campaigns of Democratic presidential candidates, had been paid $45,000 for salary and expenses by Kalmbach pursuant to Haldeman's authorization, and had committed repeated violations of federal campaign laws in fulfilling his assignment. On March 21, 1973, Dean warned the President that Chapin could be charged with a felony for violating the civil rights statute in connection with Segretti's activities. On April 14, 1973, the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman discussed Haldeman's involvement with Segretti, the White House having been informed oy Chapin that Haldeman's name had been mentioned in connection with the hiring of Segretti during Chapin's April 11 appearance before the Grand Jury. IV KLEINDIENST CONFIRMATION HEARINGS During the hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Richard Kleindienst's nomination to be Attorney General in 1972, both Kleindienst and former Attorney General John Mitchell gave false testimony regarding the President's involvement in the ITT antitrust cases. Clearly, Kleindienst and Mitchell were protecting the President. The President followed Kleindienst's confirmation hearings closely, but took no steps to correct the false testimony and continued to endorse Kleindienst's appointment. Because the President's conduct in the Kleindienst matter has not previously been discussed in this Report, the facts are summarized here. On February 15, 1972, the President nominated Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to succeed John Mitchell as Attorney General of the United States. Beginning on February 29, 1972, columns by Jack Anderson were published which alleged that a pledge by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation of financial support for the 1972 Republican National Convention was connected with the settlement by the Department of Justice of three antitrust suits 175 against ITT, and that Mitchell and Kleindienst were involved. (Book V, 634-36, 640) Kleindienst requested that his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which had approved his nomination, be resumed to investigate the charges. On March 2, 1972, the Committee's hearings were reconvened. (Book V, 678-79) During the course of the resumed Kleindienst confirmation hearings both Mitchell and Kleindienst repeatedly gave false testimony with respect to the role of the President in the ITT cases. On March 2, 1972, and again on the following day, Kleindienst testified that he had not received directions from the White House about the handling of the ITT cases. (Book V, 680, 732) In fact, on April 19, 1971, the President had ordered Kleindienst to drop an appeal in the ITT-Grinnell case.2 (Book V, 312, 315-16) On March 3, 1972, when asked why an extension of time to appeal the ITT-Grinnell case was obtained, Kleindienst testified, "I do not recollect why that extension was asked." (Book V. 734) In fact, the extension had been obtained because of the President's order. Four days later, on March 7, 1972, Kleindienst read a prepared statement describing in detail circumstances surrounding the request for an extension. He did not mention the President's telephone call ordering that the appeal be dropped. (Book V, 753-54) Again on March 8, 1972, Kleindienst denied having received directions from the White House about the handling of the ITT cases. (Book V, 765) On March 14, 1972, John Mitchell appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee. (Book V, 772) Mitchell twice testified that there had been no communication between the President and him with respect to the ITT antitrust litigation or any other antitrust litigation. (Book V. 772-74) In fact, Mitchell had met with the President on April 21, 1971, and persuaded the President to rescind his order not to appeal the ITT-Grinnell case. (Book V, 372-76) The President took a direct interest in the Kleindienst confirmation hearings. In early March, 1972, he established a White House task force to monitor the hearings. Colson kept the President informed on the work of the task force. (Colson testimony, HJC 381-82, 400; Book V, 765) On the evening of March 14, the day Mitchell testified falsely that he and the President had not communicated regarding the ITT litigation, the President had a telephone conversation with Mitchell. (Book V, 775) On March 24, 1972, the President held his only press conference during the period of the resumed Kleindienst confirmation hearings. He said: as far as the [Senate Judiciary Committee] hearings are concerned, there is nothing that has happened in the hearings to date that has in one way shaken my confidence in Mr. Kleindienst as an able, honest man, fully qualified to be Attorney General of the United States. (Book V, 801; 8 Presidential Documents 674) During late March, 1972, the President was urged to withdraw the Kleindienst nomination by Colson and Clark MacGregor. The President on March 27, 1972, discussed with Colson, and on March 28, 1972, 2 During the April 19 conversation the President brusquely ordered that the appeal be dropped and demanded that Antitrust Division Chief Richard McLaren be dismissed if this was not done. (Book V, 315-16) Colson has testified that in March, 1972, Haldeman, who did not witness the April 19, 1971 conversation, assured the President that he spoke to Kleindienst about policy and not about the ITT cases. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 383) 176 discussed with Colson, Haldeman and MacGregor, whether the Kleindienst nomination should be withdrawn. On March 29, 1972, Haldeman told Colson and MacGregor that the President was going to meet with Kleindienst to determine whether his nomination should be withdrawn. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 384-85) On the morning of March 30, 1972, Haldeman told White House aides Colson and MacGregor that the President had met with Kleindienst and talked with Mitchell by telephone the day before, and had decided not to withdraw Kleindienst's nomination. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 392–95, 397; Book V, 805-09) Colson wrote a memorandum to Haldeman stating his opposition to continuing the Kleindienst nomination. (Book V, 803-05) His reasons included the possibility that documents Colson had reviewed would be revealed and reflect that the President had discussions with Mitchell about an ITT case in 1971, thereby contradicting statements made by Mitchell under oath during the Kleindienst hearings. The President said he would read the memorandum, and Colson testified that assuming normal White House practice was followed, the President received the memorandum. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 397) On April 27, 1972, Kleindienst. again testified that no one in the White House had called him and instructed him on the handling of the ITT cases. (Book V, 852) On June 8, 1972, Kleindienst's nomination was confirmed. (Book V, 903) At his swearing-in ceremonies on June 12, 1972, the President expressed his great confidence in Kleindienst's honesty, integrity and devotion to law. He said that the Senate confirmation proceedings had in no way reduced that confidence. (Book V, 904) At no time did the President act to correct the false testimony of his Attorney General designate. Instead, he permitted Kleindienst's nomination to be confirmed and appointed him Attorney General. The Committee finds that the President knew or had reason to know that Kleindienst testified falsely before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This conclusion is supported by the facts that: (1) Colson's March 30, 1972, memorandum to Haldeman reported that certain documents contradicted Mitchell's sworn testimony with respect to, among other things, the President's involvement in the ITT cases; (2) the Kleindienst confirmation hearings received extensive press coverage; (3) a White House task force monitored the hearings and the President was kept informed of its work; (4) the President and senior members of his staff maintained a keen interest in the progress of the hearings; and (5) the President has failed to comply with the Committee's subpoena for tape recordings and other material related to Presidential conversations during the hearings. |