31 ernment trapped him into perjured testimony, etc.-cannot resolve to the Committee's satisfaction the contradictions between his interview statements and grand jury testimory on the one hand, and his post-indictment testimony on the other. Judge Nixon conceded in his subcommittee testimony that he "didn't know" what question could have been asked of him in his interview and grand jury testimony that would have elicited the truth. He also told the subcommittee that in the grand jury he deliberately chose not to reveal Wiley Fairchild's blackmail allegations, the meeting at Holmes' farm and the telephone call. His stated justification-that he believed the blackmail complaint was "nonsense," hand been "resolved" and that it would have been "irresponsible" for him to reveal his knowledge to the grand jury-is inadequate. Judge Nixon consciously decided what portion of the truth federal investigators and the grand jury were entitled to hear. No witness, including a federal judge under investigation, may parcel the truth to serve his own purposes. VI. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT ARTICLE I Article I charges Judge Nixon with giving false or misleading testimony during his appearance before the grand jury on July 18, 1984. During his grand jury testimony Judge Nixon denied, without qualification of any kind, that Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes ever discussed the Drew Fairchild case with him. This specific testimony was the subject of Count III of the criminal indictment against Judge Nixon. After hearing evidence the Mississippi jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Judge Nixon's testimony on this point was intentionally false. The Committee finds clear and convincing evidence that Judge Nixon made false or misleading statements to the grand jury regarding his conversations with District Attorney Holmes about the Drew Fairchild case. Even if one ignores the testimony of Bud Holmes concerning his conversations with Judge Nixon and the subsequent cover-up of the Judge's involvement, it is impossible to reconcile Judge Nixon's own version of the events in his trial and subcommittee testimony with his qualified denial in the grand jury in response to this question. Judge Nixon claims that his testimony was true because he and Bud Holmes talked about Wiley Fairchild's complaint about "blackmail" in connection with the Drew Fairchild case, not about the "case" itself. Judge Nixon concedes that the alleged "blackmail" was about Drew Fairchild's case, that his talk with Holmes "related to" the case, and that certain details about the case, such as the terms of Drew Fairchild's plea agreement, were the subject of the conversation. Judge Nixon's other principal defense in connection with this Article, both in his judicial proceedings and before the subcommittee, was that the word "discuss" is ambiguous. The Committee does not find this semantic argument to be persuasive. In the Committee's view Judge Nixon's conversation with Holmes was sufficiently a "discussion" for the Judge, having been sworn to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, to reveal fully his dialogue with 32 Mr. Holmes. Judge Nixon's failure to do so was a deliberate effort to mislead the grand jury. Having found clear and convincing evidence that Judge Nixon testified falsely under oath about his contacts with Bud Holmes concerning Drew Fairchild's case, the Committee concludes that such conduct by a federal judge warrants his impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate. ARTICLE II Article II charges Judge Nixon with giving false or misleading testimony during his closing statement to the grand jury on July 18, 1984. This specific testimony was the subject of Count IV of the criminal indictment, and was found to be false beyond a reasonable doubt by the Mississippi jury. The Committee finds clear and convincing evidence that Judge Nixon made false and misleading statements to the grand jury regarding his involvement in the Drew Fairchild case. In contrast to his defenses on Article I, Judge Nixon cannot claim that the question was "ambiguous," because the prosecutor simply asked Judge Nixon if he had anything else to tell the grand jury. Moreover, in his subcommittee testimony Judge Nixon revealed for the first time that his closing remarks to the grand jury were not angry, spontaneous utterances as first suggested by his counsel, but rather a prepared statement written prior to his grand jury appearance. It is not necessary to credit the testimony of Bud Holmes, Wiley Fairchild or Carroll Ingram in determining whether Judge Nixon's closing remarks to the grand jury were truthful. The committee has compared Judge Nixon's trail and grand jury testimony and finds the two irreconcilable, particularly given the Judge's admission that he in fact recalled his "blackmail" meeting with Wiley Fairchild, his meeting with Mr. Holmes and the telephone call from Mr. Holmes' farm at the time of his grand jury appearance. Contrary to the grand jury testimony set forth in Article II, Judge Nixon did indeed have "unofficial" involvement in the Drew Fairchild case and talked to three persons-Bud Holmes, Wiley Fairchild and Carroll Ingram--about the case. Moreover, according to Messrs. Holmes, Fairchild and Ingram, Drew Fairchild's case was passed to the files only after the Judge became involved. Mr. Holmes testified that he passed the case to the files in part because of Judge Nixon's influence, and Mr. Fairchild told Judge Nixon he was "satisfied" during the telephone call from Mr. Holmes' farm after Judge Nixon's intervention. Indeed, Judge Nixon acknowledged that he had exerted a "positive" influence over Drew Fairchild's case when he advised Mr. Ingram of his involvement. Judge Nixon's denials in the grand jury were a deliberate effort to conceal his involvement and avoid any adverse publicity and embarrassment that might flow from the revelation that a federal Judge had played a role in a state criminal case, particularly the drug-smuggling prosecution of the son of a prominent businessman who had provided the Judge with lucrative oil investments. The Committee finds that Judge Nixon's false or misleading statements under oath before the grand jury warrant his impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate. 33 ARTICLE III Article III charges Judge Nixon with undermining public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, betraying the trust of the people of the United States, disobeying the laws of the United States and bringing disrepute on the Federal courts and the administration of justice through his behavior during the federal investigation. This Article charges Judge Nixon with a series of fourteen false or misleading statements given during his April 19, 1984 interview and his July 18, 1984 grand jury testimony that, taken as a whole, conclusively establish his conscious and deliberate effort to conceal his conversations with Wiley Fairchild, Carroll Ingram and Bud Holmes concerning the criminal drug prosecution of Drew Fairchild. Some of the statements set forth in Article III-i.e., that Mr. Holmes never "talked" to Judge Nixon about the Drew Fairchild case; that "nothing was ever mentioned about Wiley Fairchild's son"; that Judge Nixon "did not know of any reason" he would have met with Wiley Fairchild after the investment was finalizedare perhaps even more untruthful than the grand jury testimony in Articles I and II that led to the perjury convictions. Judge Nixon's interview answers were false. His denials of any involvement in the Drew Fairchild case were repeated in response to questions that reasonably should have uncovered the truth. Three months passed between the interview and his grand jury appearance. In his grand jury appearance, Judge Nixon repeated his falsehoods under oath before the grand jury. He again chose to make repeated, unqualified denials of any involvement in or knowledge of the Drew Fairchild matter, rather than reveal the truth. Judge Nixon's interview statements and grand jury testimony fell far short of the standard of truthfulness required of any ordinary witness, much less a man privileged to wear the robe of a federal judge. The Committee finds that such conduct justifies Judge Nixon's impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate. VII. CONCLUSION The impeachment process protects our society by ensuring that those favored with high positions of public trust are held accountable for their actions. This is especially true of federal judges who, but for the rare instance of impeachment, enjoy life tenure in office. By providing federal judges with life tenure, the Constitution insulates the federal judiciary from political pressure. The Constitution, however, does not permit abuse of office. The evidence before the Committee establishes that Judge Nixon lied to federal investigators and gave false testimony under oath to a federal grant jury. Such conduct impugns the integrity of the judiciary and renders Judge Nixon unfit to hold a high office of trust that daily requires him to judge credibility and seek the truth. Judge Nixon's decision to hide the truth and the predictable conse quences of his conduct-his indictment, conviction, incarceration and suspension from the practice of law-stand as an embarrassment to the federal judiciary. The Committee's role is not to punish Judge Nixon, but simply to determine whether articles of impeachment should be brought. 34 Under our Constitution, the American people must look to the Congress to protect them from persons unfit to hold high office because of serious misconduct that has violated the public trust. Where, as here, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that a federal judge has committed impeachable offenses, our duty requires us to bring articles of impeachment and to try him before the United States Senate. VIII. OVERSIGHT FINDINGS No oversight findings were made by the Committee. O |