20

The testimony of other witnesses before the Committee, John Dean, Charles Colson, and Herbert Kalmbach, corroborates Butterfield's description of how President Nixon conducted his office. There are some differences, notably Colson's testimony as to the direct relationship Colson had developed with the President by 1972. But Colson testified that Haldeman had a practice of asking to screen anything that went to the President and obtained from the few senior staff members who had access to the President copies of documents sent to the President. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 412) Colson acknowledged that he himself was answerable to Haldeman. (Colson testimony, 3 HJC 468)

President Nixon preferred to receive information and reports from Haldeman and to communicate his decisions through him. Haldeman had no independent schedule. (Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2871) He ordinarily spent several hours a day with the President- a "good six to seven times as much time with the President as anyone else." (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 40) Except for daily press summaries, virtually all written material addressed to the President was screened and transmitted through Haldeman. (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 36-37) When the President made a decision, he authorized one of his aides, almost always Haldeman, to see that it was carried out.1 (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 42) Butterfield testified:

[The President] communicated by telephone with a great many people at night, in the evenings, and during the day. But his normal communications, oral and in writing, were just to Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Kissinger. It would be quite unusual for him to communicate with anyone else—perhaps a few times to Colson during that 1972 campaign year. But almost always with Haldeman, almost always with Haldeman. (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 66)

The President's procedure for implementing a policy decision is illustrated in his approval, in 1970, of the Huston Plan for domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering. The President created an ad hoc intelligence committee consisting of representatives of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA and the FBI. After the committee prepared a report, Tom Charles Huston, a Presidential staff assistant and White House representative to the committee, sent the report and a covering memorandum to Haldeman. (Book VII, 438-44) Haldeman in turn brought it to the President's attention. The President decided to accept certain of Huston's recommendations. Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston stating that the President had approved the recommendations and instructed Huston to prepare and distribute a formal Presidential decision memorandum. (Book VII, 447-48) Huston prepared and distributed the decision memorandum. (Book VII, 454-61)

Butterfield testified that Haldeman was an "implementer." All important information in Haldeman's possession was relayed to the President; the President made all decisions of consequence. Butter

1 Haldeman had his own staff. Lawrence Higby, Haldeman's personal aide and chief administrative assistant, supervised the flow of persons, papers, telephone calls and correspondence to Haldeman. Gordon Strachan served as Haldeman's principal political assistant he regularly prepared Political Matters Memoranda for Haldeman on the status of the 1972 election campaign. His principal assignment was to follow up on the details of Presidential decisions communicated to him by chief of staff Haldeman. Dwight Chapin acted as the President's Appointments Secretary and reported directly to Haldeman on matters concerning the President's schedule and travel. Bruce Kehrli, the White House Staff Secretary. who oversaw the day-to-day flow of papers within the White House, worked under Haldeman and Butterfield. Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 14-16)

21

field testified that it would have been "altogether out of character" for Haldeman to have decided anything more important than minor questions of staff management. He also testified:

Mr. JENNER. Was there any occasion during all of the time that you were at the White House that there came to your attention that Haldeman ever did anything without the knowledge of the President?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No, never.

Mr. JENNER. Dealing with White House affairs?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No; never, nothing unilaterally at all. He was essentiallyI may have said this—but an implementer. Mr. Haldeman implemented the decisions of the President as did Mr. Ehrlichman but perhaps to a lesser extent. But Haldeman especially was an implementer, because the President ran his own personal affairs. He was not a decision maker. . . . I can hardly recall the decisions, any decisions that he made, unless that it was that the White House staff mess personnel would wear jackets or something along that line. He implemented the President's decisions. The President was the decision-maker. The President was 100 percent in charge. (Butterfield testimony 1 HJC 69-70; see also Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2872)

Mitchell's testimony was to the same effect in response to questions by Representative Thornton:

Mr. THORNTON. Did you ever check to determine whether or not the information relayed to you through Mr. Haldeman was a correct reflection of the President's instructions?

Mr. MITCHELL. There may have been occasions, Congressman, but I would have to say that in most all instances that I can recall, Mr. Haldeman's representations to me of the President's position were truthfully and fully stated.

Mr. THORNTON. Did you ever check with the President to determine whether information you had passed toward him through Mr. Haldeman had been received by him?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, I don't believe I did, but I think there again, the record of actions coming from such line of communication would indicate that they were fully and faithfully conveyed. (Mitchell testimony, 2 HJC 209-10)

V

THE RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Haldeman's responsibility extended to the President's re-election campaign. During the summer and fall of 1971, Haldeman personally reviewed and supervised plans for the development of the re-election committee and the assignment of staff to it. Ĥe established rules and procedures for the transfer of employees from the White House staff to the re-election committee, waiver of these rules required his personal approval. (Political Matters Memorandum, 12/6/71, 52) In March, 1971, Hugh Sloan and Harry Flemming, members of Haldeman's staff, left the White House to become the first members of the staff of a predecessor of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CRP). (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 25; HJC, BackgroundWhite House/CRP 5) In May, 1971, Jeb Magruder (hired by Haldeman for his staff and then transferred by Haldeman to White House Communications Director Herbert Klein's office) transferred from the White House to become the acting campaign director of the CRP. (HJC, Background-White House/CRP 3)

During 1971 and 1972 Strachan prepared 28 of these memoranda and sent them to Haldeman for review and decisions. The Committee has received 21 of these documents from the White House. Seven of the memoranda are published in the Statement of Information. The remainder currently are in the Committee's files.

22

By April, 1972, seventeen of the twenty-three senior CRP staff members were former members of the Administration or the White House staff. (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 53; HJC, BackgroundWhite House/CRP 5)

John Mitchell claimed to have been in charge of day-to-day operations of the campaign committee by mid-1971. He remained as Attorney General until March 1, 1972. Haldeman reviewed the hiring of key personnel (Political Matters Memoranda, 8/13/71, 4; 9/18/71, 3-4; 1/18/72, 4, and 1/7/72 attachment; Book VI, 899); reviewed proposed budgets for CRP departments and divisions (Political Matters Memoranda, 2/16/72, 78; 9/18/72, 4); gave the final approval to CRP advertising and campaign materials (Political Matters Memoranda, 2/16/72, 4; 9/18/72, 5; Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2878); supervised the expenditure of funds for polling (Political Matters Memoranda, 2/1/72, 1; 5/16/72, 2; Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2878); and reviewed CRP regional operations in key states. (Political Matters Memoranda, 5/16/72, 7; 12/6/71, 1; 1/18/72, 2–4; 7/29/72, 3; 8/11/72, 6)

Moreover, Haldeman and other members of the White House staff were active in formulating campaign strategy. A "political group,” consisting of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Clark MacGregor, Bryce Harlow, Charles Colson, Mitchell, and Harry Dent, met regularly at the White House to discuss the highest level decisions on campaign tactics and domestic policy. (HJC, Background-White House/CRP 6)

In addition, White House personnel handled other areas of the campaign. A White House group headed by Colson frequently prepared CRP press releases and speeches to be made by supporters of the President. (Political Matters Memoranda, 5/16/72, 5-6, and attachment; 3/3/72 attachment) Counsel to the President John Dean handled such legal matters for CRP as establishing finance committees (Political Matters Memorandum, 2/1/72, 1); preparing the defense to a law suit (Political Matters Memorandum, 11/16/71, 5); and transferring the Republican Convention site from San Diego to Miami Beach. (Political Matters Memorandum, 5/16/72,5)

A copy of each document submitted to the CRP campaign director (first Mitchell and then MacGregor) was normally given to Haldeman's assistant, Gordon Strachan, who summarized the documents for Haldeman in "Political Matters Memoranda." (Political Matters Memorandum, 3/3/72, 5) The memoranda covered the entire range of activities in the campaign. Butterfield testified that Strachan's memoranda "would not go to the President under normal circumstances," but Haldeman "would relay the information when he spoke to the President next." (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 111) After reviewing the memoranda, Haldeman would write approvals, disapprovals and notations to Strachan, his deputy, with specific instructions for actions to be taken. Haldeman left no doubt that he was issuing directions and speaking for the President.3

3 For example in item 14 of Magruder's Projects in a Political Matters Memorandum dated February 16, 1972, Strachan reported that Magruder and Colson were increasingly at odds about whether Muskie should be personally attacked for his war stand. Strachan reported that Magruder planned to seek authority from the Attorney General to be the only control with the spokesmen to the express exclusion of Colson. Haldeman replied, "This is not acceptable Colson is acting under express instructions. Tell Magruder to talk to me if he has a problem. H" (Political Matters Memorandum, 2/16/72, 6; Book I, 89)

23

Strachan would then contact the appropriate CRP and White House personnel to carry out Haldeman's directions. (See Strachan's marginal notes, Political Matters Memoranda) Haldeman was regularly informed of even the most minor administrative decisions, including the rental of office space (Political Matters Memoranda, 6/29/72, 5; 11/16/71, 3; 12/16/71, 4); consideration of press requests for interviews with campaign staff (Political Matters Memoranda, 8/11/72, 6); and the development of CRP's field organizational plan. (Political Matters Memoranda, 2/1/72, 6; 7/29/72, 8) Haldeman met with Campaign Director Mitchell on a weekly basis to discuss such subjects as campaign financing, personnel and strategy. (Mitchell testimony, 2 HJC 202) In February, 1972, Haldeman directed that $350,000 in campaign funds be placed under his control and Strachan picked up the cash from CRP prior to April 7, 1972. (Book I, 78, 84, 90)

The President was attentive to the operation of his re-election campaign. On April 30, 1973, the President said that in 1972, for the first time in his 27-year-political career, he had left management of his campaign to others, concentrating instead on his duties as President. ("Presidential Statements," 4/30/73, 16) However, the transcript of a conversation on April 4, 1972, edited and released by the White House in June, 1974, shows that the President was fully aware of the detailed decisions of the campaign, and that he actively participated in them. For example, the President discussed with Haldeman and Mitchell details of a site for the 1972 convention: the President decided it would be changed to Miami Beach. The President also discussed the Wisconsin Democratic primary; the prospects for various Democratic Presidential candidates; a letter of support for the President from columnist William F. Buckley; the campaign of Representative Ashbrook for the Republican presidential nomination; various individuals and their duties in the President's re-election campaign; and the President's prospects and campaign organizations in Wisconsin, California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Texas, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Massachusetts and Vermont. (President's submission, Book I, 104-16) Similarly, the Political Matters Memoranda reveal that the President fully discussed campaign matters with Haldeman, Mitchell, Dent and Harlow. (Political Matters Memoranda, 10/27/71, 2; 6/6/72; 6/29/72; 9/18/72)

Butterfield testified that the President "made the big decisions," that "anything having to do with strategy would emanate from the President." (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 111) Butterfield testified that the Committee for the Re-election of the President "was pretty much an extension of the political White House." (Butterfield testimony, 1 HJC 52) The Political Matters Memoranda, transcripts of Presidential conversations, the structure of the campaign committee, and the mass of other evidence before the Committee fully corroborate this testimony.

On the basis of this evidence the Committee concluded that the President, acting primarily through Haldeman, controlled and directed the Committee for the Re-election of the President and its activities during the 1972 Presidential Campaign.

• Haldeman has testified that Mitchell also attended the regular morning White House staff meeting. (Haldeman testimony, 7 SSC 2878)