P He will testify that he sent materials to the White House?

H If he is asked, he will, yes.

P He'll be asked-is that something he will say he sent to the White House. What would Strachan say?

H Strachan has no problem with that. He will say that after the fact there are materials that I can now surmise were what he is referring to but they were not at the time identified in any way as being the result of wiretaps and I did not know they were. They were amongst tons of stuff. Jeb makes the point. He said, I am sure Gordon never sent them to Bob because they were all trash. There was nothing in them. He said the tragedy of this whole thing is that it produced nothing.

P Who else did he send reports to-Mitchell?

H I don't know. The thing I got before was that he sent them either to— that one went to him and one went to Strachan.

P

What our problem there is if they claim that the reports came to the White House-basically to your office-what will you say then?

H They can. This doesn't ever have to come out." (WHT 520-21; see also WHT 537, 592)

Haldeman explained that even if the question were asked before the Grand Jury, Grand Jury proceedings are secret. (WHT 521) On the night of April 14, 1973, the President telephoned Haldeman. He told Haldeman that before Strachan appeared before the Grand Jury he should be told what Magruder had told the United States Attorneys. The President asked Haldeman if Strachan were smart enough to testify in a way that did not indicate that he knew what Magruder had said. The President also said that Strachan has to be prepared and that Ehrlichman should speak to Strachan and "put him through a little wringer." 22 The President said Ehrlichman should be the one to do it because he was conducting an investigation for the President. (WHT 639–41, 646-47) On the afternoon of April 16, 1973, Ehrlichman told the President that Strachan had stonewalled, that although the prosecutors "really worked him over" and "[d]espite considerable fencing, he refused to discuss the matter and was excused by the prosecutors." 23 (WHT 933)

3. Haldeman

On April 25, 1973, the President directed Haldeman to listen to the taped conversation of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting among the President, Dean and Haldeman. (Book IX, 108-11) Haldeman requested and received twenty-two tapes of Presidential conversations held in February, March and April, 1973. (Book IX, 114–15, 123-25) On the afternoon of April 25, 1973, Haldeman listened to the March 21 morning conversation, made twenty pages of detailed notes, and reported to the President on the contents of the tape. (Book IX, 116) The President ordered Haldeman to listen to the March 21 tape again.

On April 11. 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

On April 11. 1974. the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tane recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

21 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

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On April 26, 1973, Haldeman again listened to the March 21 tape and reported to the President. On April 26, 1973, the President and Ħaldeman met for approximately five hours, beginning at 3:59 p.m., and concluding at 9:03 p.m. (Book IX, 126) 24

On June 4, 1973, the President told Alexander Haig and Ziegler that Haldeman could "handle" the March 21 conversation. (Book ÏX, 177– 78, 193)

PRESIDENT. . . . . Well, as I told you, we do know we have one problem : It's that damn conversation of March twenty-first due to the fact that, uh, for the reasons [unintelligible]. But I think we can handle that.

HAIG. I think we ca—, can. That's, that's the—

PRESIDENT. Bob can handle it. He'll get up there and say that-Bob will say, "I was there; the President said—”.

PRESIDENT. Okay. The twenty-first and the twenty-second. Uh, uh, twentytwenty-first I've got to Bob already. The twenty-second [unintelligible]. ZIEGLER. [Unintelligible]

PRESIDENT. Well-no, if you can-I don't think you can. He's, he's got it all in our file and I don't-let's just forget it. I think after the twenty-first we forgot what the hell-What do you think? (Book IX, 177–78, 193)

Haldeman subsequently testified before the SSC about the meeting of March 21, 1973, specifically citing the following statement:

(a) That the President said, "[T]here is no problem in raising a million dollars, we can do that, but it would be wrong." (Book IX, 440)

(b) That "There was a reference to his [Dean's] feeling that Magruder had known about the Watergate planning and break-in ahead of it, in other words, that he was aware of what had gone on at Watergate. I don't believe that there was any reference to Magruder committing perjury." (Haldeman testimony, 8 SSC, 3144)

On August 22, 1973, the President said that Haldeman's testimony regarding the President's statements during the conversation was accurate. ("Presidential Statements," 8/22/73, 49)

4. Ehrlichman

On April 17, 1973, the President met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and Secretary of State Rogers. (Book IV, 1423) After a brief discussion of Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's future,25 the President spoke of his former personal attorney, Herbert Kalmbach, saying that it was "terribly important that poor Kalmbach get through this thing." (WHT 1201) The President asked if Dean had called Kalmbach about fundraising. Haldeman replied that Dean had. Ehrlichman said that Dean had told Kalmbach what the money was to be used for. The President suggested that Ehrlichman testify otherwise.

E Dean told me that he told him what it was for. I don't believe him. Herb said that he just followed instructions, that he just went ahead and did it and sent the money back and—

P They said they need it for?

24 On May 30, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this

recording.

On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

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E I don't even know if they told him what for. It was an emergency and they needed this money and I don't know whether he can get away with that or if it's more specific than that.

P If Dean is the accuser, you can say that he told you on such and such a date that he did not tell Herb Kalmbach what the money was for. (WHT 1201) 5. Colson

On April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman reported to the President about his conversation with Magruder, in which Magruder had told Ehrlichman what he was telling the prosecutors. (WHT 582-87) 26 The President, concerned that Colson would be called before the Grand Jury (WHT 602), instructed Ehrlichman to warn Colson about what Magruder had told the prosecutors.

P We'll see. We'll see. Do your other business, etc. John, [Dean] too. I wonder if we shouldn't reconsider, if you shouldn't, I mean you have to consider this rather than having Colson go in there completely blind, give him at least a touch up or do you think that is too dangerous.

E Say that again—I didn't quite hear it.

P Colson-rather than just saying nothing to him, if it isn't just as well to say-look you should know that Magruder is going to testify, etc., or is that dangerous according to Kleindeinst?

E I'm not so sure. I have to call him anyway tomorrow. He has an urgent call in for me. Ah, I don't think I want to say anything at all to him about John. John, incidentally, I understand, was on CBS News and just hardlined them.

P Oh, I agree on John.

P On Magruder that is what I meant.

E Well, I can say something very brief. I don't need to indicate that he said anything to me.

P Yeah, that you understand that he has talked. I mean, not to the Grand Jury but to

E Yeah, I think I could safely go that far.

P And say that he should know that before he goes, and be prepared.

E Friday-I will call him in the morning.

P Let me put it this way: I do think we owe it to Chuck to at leastE Sure

P So that he doesn't, I mean, go in there and well frankly on a perjury гар

E I understand. I don't think he is in any danger on that but

P Why wouldn't he be in any danger, because he's got his story and knows pretty well what he is going to say?

E

Yeah, I think he is pretty pat, but I will talk to him in the morning and give him a cautionary note anyway. (WHT 650-51)

27

III

APRIL 30, 1973 STATEMENT

On April 30, 1973, the President addressed the nation about the Watergate investigation.

Last June 17, while I was in Florida trying to get a few days rest after my visit to Moscow, I first learned from news reports of the Watergate break-in. I was appalled at this senseless, illegal action, and I was shocked to learn that

29 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript.

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employees of the Re-election Committee were apparently among those guilty. I immediately ordered an investigation by appropriate Government authorities. On September 15, as you will recall, indictments were brought against seven defendants in the case.

As the investigations went forward, I repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my Adminstration were in any way involved. I received repeated assurances that there were not. Because of these continuing reassurances, because I believed the reports I was getting, because I had faith in the persons from whom I was getting them, I discounted the stories in the press that appeared to implicate members of my Administration or other officials of the campaign committee.

Until March of this year, I remained convinced that the denials were true and that the charges of involvement by members of the White House staff were false. The comments I made during this period, and the comments made by my Press Secretary in my behalf, were based on the information provided to us at the time we made those comments. However, new information then came to me which persuaded me that there was a real possibility that some of these charges were true, and suggesting further that there had been an effort to conceal the facts both from the public, from you, and from me.

As a result, on March 21, I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter, and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me, right here in this office.

I again ordered that all persons in the Government or at the Re-election Committee should cooperate fully with the FBI, the prosecutors, and the grand jury. I also ordered that anyone who refused to cooperate in telling the truth would be asked to resign from government service. And, with ground rules adopted that would preserve the basic constitutional separation of powers between the Congress and the Presidency, I directed that members of the White House Staff should appear and testify voluntarily under oath before the Senate committee which was investigating Watergate.

I was determined that we should get to the bottom of the matter, and that the truth should be fully brought out-no matter who was involved. (“Presidential Statements," 4/30/73, 14-15)

This statement, like the President's statement on August 29, 1972, that "we are doing everything we can to investigate this incident and not cover up." was false. The evidence set forth in this section compelled the Committee to conclude that both before and after March 21, 1973, the cover-up was sustained by false public statements by the President assuring that the White House or CRP were not involved, as well as, by false statements and testimony by the President's close subordinates, which the President condoned and encouraged and in some instances directed, coached and personally helped to fabricate.

THE PRESIDENT'S INTERFERENCE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INVESTIGATION IN MARCH AND APRIL 1973

I

THE NEW PLAN AFTER MARCH 21, 1973

On the morning of March 21, 1973, Counsel to the President John Dean told the President that there was a "cancer" close to the Presidency, which, Dean said, was growing daily. Dean warned that the White House was being blackmailed; and that even people who had not yet committed perjury would soon have to perjure themselves to protect other people. Dean said there was no assurance that the problems could be contained. (HJCT 81) He spoke of the adoption of the Liddy Plan. He said that in February, 1972. Liddy and Hunt had gone to Colson; that Colson had called Magruder and told him either to "fish or cut bait"; that Colson had "had a damn good idea" what Liddy and Hunt were talking about. Dean said Colson would deny it and probably get away with it unless Hunt talked. The President acknowledged the problem of criminal liability in the White House. Dean said that when the Liddy Plan had gotten under way Strachan had started pushing Magruder for information. Magruder had taken that as a signal, and had told Mitchell that the White House was anxiously pushing the plan. Dean said that Haldeman had once instructed Liddy to change his "capability" from Muskie to McGovern. (HJCT 84-85)

Dean said that in June, 1972, when he had called Liddy to find out what happened, Liddy had told him that no one in the White House was involved. Liddy said he had been pushed without mercy by Magruder to get more information. Dean said that Magruder had said, "The White House is not happy with what we're getting.” (HJCT 86)

Dean then spoke of the cover-up. Dean said that Magruder and Porter had prepared with him a false story about the purpose of the money spent on the Liddy Plan, and then perjured themselves before the Grand Jury. (HJCT 87) Dean said he had worked on a theory of "containment" and the President responded, "Sure." (HJCT 88) Dean said that Colson had told the FBI he had no knowledge concerning the break-in; and that Strachan had been coached before his FBI interview. Dean said Liddy had gone to Attorney General Kleindienst and asked him "to get my men out of jail," but that "this has never come up." (HJCT 89)

Dean spoke about payments to the defendants, who had made demands. He said that arrangements had been made through Mitchell to take care of the demands; that Kalmbach had been used and had raised some cash. The President interrupted by asking if that had been put under the cover of a Cuban Committee. He instructed Dean

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