Contents Provisions of the U.S. Constitution Regarding the Matter of Debate on the Question: "Shall the Executive Be Removable on Impeachments?" (From the Journal of James Madison, Records of the Federal Convention, Friday, July 20, 1787)-- Debate in the First Congress, 1789, on the Establishment of Executive Departments and the Power of Removal From Procedure of the Congress in Matters Relating to Impeachment (From Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice and Rules of the House of Representatives). Impeachable Offenses: Extracts from Hinds' and Cannon's (b) Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the Trial of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President Report of the Committee Appointed December 29, 1826, on a letter of John C. Calhoun, Vice President of the United States asking an investigation of his conduct while Secre- Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, 42d Congress, 1873, on inquiry as to Impeachment in Credit Mobilier Testimony Page (V) VI "Impeachment for 'High Crimes and Misdemeanors' ", Raoul "The Scope of the Impeachment Power", Paul S. Fenton- "Power of Impeachment", Congressional Quarterly Guide to Pago 617 663 689 705 Provisions of the United States Constitution Regarding the Matter of Impeachment The following provisions of the United States Constitution apply specifically to impeachment: "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be in Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." Article II; Section 2, clause 1 "The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment." Article II; Section 4 "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." (1) (1137) Debate on the Question: "Shall the Executive Be "to be removable on impeachment and convic- See Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out this part of the Resolution. Mr. P. observed. he (ought not to) be impeachable whilst in office Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He considered this as an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.1 Mr. Wilson concurred in the necessity of making the Executive impeachable whilst in office. Mr. Govr. Morris. He can do no criminal act without Coadjutors who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his functions. If it is not the mischief will go on. If it is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will render the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach. Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most extensive injustice? When great crimes were committed he was for punishing the principal as well as the Coadjutors. There had been much debate & difficulty as to the mode of chusing the Executive. He approved of that which had been adopted at first, namely of referring the appointment to the Natl. Legislature. One objection agst. Electors was the danger of their being corrupted by the Candidates: & this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments whilst in office. Shall the man who has practised corruption & by that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt? Docr. Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable to the executive. History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice. Every body cried out agst this as unconstitutional. What was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse From the records of the Federal Convention, Friday, July 20, 1787; reprinted with permission of Yale University Press, Vol. 2, Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. 1 Crossed out: "To punish him when". (3) |