79 ecutors. (Book IV, 538-39, 610) On April 14, 1973, the President directed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to imply to Magruder, and also to Mitchell who had been implicated by Magruder, the President's assurances of clemency. The President carefully explained how he wanted Haldeman and Ehrlichman to handle these assurances." (WHT 408-514) The President instructed Ehrlichman to tell Mitchell and Magruder that the President did not regard it as in his interests for them to remain silent; that the President held great affection for them and their families. The President set the language for Ehrlichman to use to get the clemency across to Magruder: Lovely wife and all the rest, it just breaks your heart. And say this, this is a very painful message for me to bring-I've been asked to give you, but I must do it and it is that: Put it right out that way. Also, I would first put that in so that he knows I have personal affection. That's the way the so-called clemency's got to be handled. Do you see, John? (WHT 503) Ehrlichman said he understood. Haldeman told Ehrlichman to "[d]o the same thing with Mitchell," although the President also said that Mitchell would put on "the damnest defense" and never go to prison. (WHT 503) The President then asked Ehrlichman how to handle the "problem of clemency" for people like Hunt. Haldeman replied, "Well, you don't handle it at all. That's Colson's, cause that's where it comes from." (WHT 485) Ehrlichman immediately carried out the President's instructions. Ehrlichman met with Mitchell at 1:40 p.m., April 14, 1973. (Book IV, 718) He reported to the President that he had spoken to Mitchell and that Mitchell "appreciated the message of the good feeling between you and him." The President responded, "He got that, huh?” 10 (WHT 524) The President added that there could be clemency at the proper time; but that they all knew that, for the moment, it was ridiculous to talk about it. (WHT 544) As Ehrlichman left the Oval Office for his meeting with Magruder (Book IV,801) the President said: P Be sure to convey my warm sentiments. On the evening of April 14, 1973, the President telephoned Ehrlichman. (Book IV, 854) They discussed how Ehrlichman might divert Dean from implicating Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said he would see Dean the next day. The President told Ehrlichman to remind Dean indirectly that only one man, the President, had the power to pardon him, and keep him from disbarment as a lawyer, if things should go wrong: E I am going to try to get him around a bit. It is going to be delicate. P E Well to get off the passing the buck business. E It is a little touchy and I don't know how far I can go. On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee_subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript. 10 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript. 80 P John, that is not going to help you. Look he has to look down the road to one point that there is only one man who could restore him to the ability to practice law in case things go wrong. He's got to have that in the back of his mind. He's got to know that will happen. You don't tell him, but you know and I know that with him and Mitchell there isn't going to be any damn question, because they got a bad rap." (WHT 663–64) Later in the conversation the President directed Ehrlichman to tell Dean that the President thought Dean has "carried a tremendous load" and that the President's affection and loyalty remained undiminished. (WHT 667) IV APRIL 16, 1973, MEETING On April 16, 1973, after Dean had begun meeting with the prosecutors, the President and Dean discussed potential charges of obstruction of justice against members of the President's White House staff. (Book IV, 1143) The President tried to make the Hunt clemency assurance the responsibility solely of Mitchell. Dean, however, corrected him. DEAN. It's, uh, it's, uh, all the obstruction is technical stuff that mounts up. PRESIDENT. Yeah. Well, you take, for example, the clemency stuff. That's solely Mitchell, apparently, and Colson's talk with, uh, Bittman where he says, "I'll do everything I can because as a, as a friend DEAN. No, that was with Ehrlichman. PRESIDENT. Huh? DEAN. That was Ehrlichman. PRESIDENT. Ehrlichman with who? " DEAN. Ehrlichman and Colson and I sat up there, and Colson presented his story to Ehrlichman PRESIDENT. I know.12 DEAN. regarding it and, and then John gave Chuck very clear instructions on going back and telling him that it, you know, "Give him the inference he's got clemency but don't give him any commitment." PRESIDENT. No commitment? DEAN. Right. PRESIDENT. Now that's all right. But first, if an individual, if it's no commitment-I've got a right to sit here-Take a fellow like Hunt or, uh, or, or a Cuban whose wife is sick and something-that's what clemency's about. DEAN. That's right. PRESIDENT. Correct? DEAN. That's right. PRESIDENT. But, uh, but John specifically said, “No commitment,” did he? He— DEAN. Yeah. PRESIDENT. No commitment. Then, then Colson then went on to, apparently— DEAN. I don't know how Colson delivered it, ub— PRESIDENT. Apparently to Bittman DEAN. for PRESIDENT. Bittman. Is that your understanding? DEAN. Yes, but I don't know what his, you know, specific PRESIDENT. Where did this business of the Christmas thing get out, John? What the hell was that? DEAN. Well, that's, a, that's a PRESIDENT. That must have been Mitchell, huh? DEAN. No, that was Chuck, again. I think that, uh— PRESIDENT. That they all, that they'd all be out by Christmas? 11 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript. 12 The President's "I know" does not appear in the edited White House transcript. (WHT 81 DEAN. No, I think he said something to the effect that Christmas is the time that clemency generally occurs. PRESIDENT. Oh, yeah. DEAN. Uh PRESIDENT. Well, that doesn't—I, I, I don't think that is going to hurt him. DEAN. NO. PRESIDENT. Do you? DEAN. NO. PRESIDENT. "Clemency," he says-One [unintelligible] he's a friend of Hunt's. I'm just trying to put the best face on it. If it's the wrong--if it is—I've got to know. DEAN. Well, one, one of the things I think you have to be very careful, and this is why Petersen will be very good, is, if you take a set of facts and let the prosecutors who have no-they'll be making, making no PR judgments. PRESIDENT. Yeah. DEAN. But they'll give you the raw facts as they relate to the law, uh, and it's later you've got to decide, you know, what public face will be put on it. In other words, they'll-If their Dean suggested that Petersen might be able to advise whether the attempt to silence Hunt by offering clemency was lawful. (HJCT 204-06) In a meeting with Petersen, just three hours after this meeting with Dean, (Book IV, 1230) the President asked whether the prosecutors had anything on Colson. Petersen said that there were allegations, but nothing specific.15 (WHT 872-75) The President neither posed a hypothetical question to determine the legality of Colson's conduct, as Dean had suggested, nor informed Petersen of Colson's conversation with Bittman. Thereafter, the President made repeated statements on the clemency issue to the public. On May 22, 1973, the President said: At no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer. ("Presidential Statements," 5/22/73, 21) On August 15, 1973, the President said: .. under no circumstances could executive clemency be considered for those who participated in the Watergate break-in. I maintained that position throughout. ("Presidential Statements," 8/15/73, 42) And on November 17, 1973, the President said: Two, that I never authorized the offer of clemency to anybody and; as a matter of fact, turned it down whenever it was suggested. It was not recommended by any member of my staff but it was, on occasion, suggested as a result of news reports that clemency might become a factor. ("Presidential Statements," 11/17/73, 64) These statements are contradicted by the transcripts of the President's own words. This evidence establishes that the President personally and through his subordinates and agents endeavored to cause prospective defendants and those duly tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in return for their silence or false testimony. 15 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript. DECEPTION AND CONCEALMENT I FALSE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS In his public statements, as part of the continuing cover-up the President repeatedly said that he had ordered, and even personally undertaken, thorough investigations of the Watergate matter, and that those investigations determined that no one from the White House was involved. The President said he had ordered three investigations by his immediate staff: two in August, 1972, and March, 1973, by Dean; and one in April, 1973, by Ehrlichman. He said his intention was to get to the bottom of the matter, and get the truth out. However, clear and convincing evidence indicates that this was not the case. A. THE AUGUST 1972 DEAN INVESTIGATION On August 29, 1972, at a news conference, President Nixon said that in addition to investigations into Watergate by the Department of Justice, the FBI, the GAO and the Banking and Currency Committee, John Dean had conducted an investigation under the direction of the President: In addition to that, within our own staff, under my direction, Counsel to the President, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of all leads which might involve any present members of the White House Staff or anybody in the Government. I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one in the White House Staff, no one in this Administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident. I think under these circumstances we are doing everything we can to take this incident and to investigate it and not to cover it up. (“Presidential Statements," 8/29/72, 3) At the time President Nixon made those statements he knew that Dean had not made or reported any such investigation. According to White House records, the President had not met or spoken with Dean since before the break-in. Dean testified that he first heard of his "complete" investigation in the President's announcement. (Dean testimony, 2 HJC 252; Book II, 590-92) No independent evidence exists that such an investigation was ever completed or undertaken. On September 15, 1972, more than two weeks after the August 29, 1972 press conference, the President and Dean first discussed Watergate. (Book II, 598; Dean testimony, 2 HJC 228) Before Dean entered the room, Haldeman told the President it had been "a good bringing Dean in;" that Dean, while "he'll never again gain any ground for us . . . enables other people to gain ground while he's making sure that you don't fall through the holes." (HJCT 1) When Dean joined the meeting, the President referred to the Watergate matter can of worms," and congratulated Dean for "putting your fingers in the dikes every time that leaks have sprung there." (82) 83 (HJCT 7) The President also said, "So you just try to button it up as well as you can and hope for the best." (HJCT 13-14) In his March 21, 1973, morning meeting with Dean the President confirmed that, in the summer of 1972, Dean was directed to help with the cover-up, not to conduct a "complete investigation." DEAN.... Now, [sighs], what, what has happened post-June 17? Well, it was, I was under pretty clear instructions [laughs] not to really to investigate this, that this was something that just could have been disastrous on the election if it had-all hell had broken loose, and I worked on a theory of containment PRESIDENT. Sure. DEAN. to try to hold it right where it was. Later in the conversation, the President said "you had the right plan let me say, I have no doubts about the right plan before the election. And you handled it just right. You contained it." (HJCT 129) B. TIIE MARCII 1973 DEAN REPORT In a public statement on August 15, 1973, President Nixon said: "On March 23, [1973], I sent Mr. Dean to Camp David, where he was instructed to write a complete report on all he knew of the entire Watergate matter." ("Presidential Statements, 8/15/73, 41-42) The "report" that President Nixon had, in fact, requested Dean to make in March, 1973, was one intended to mislead official investigators and to conceal the President's complicity in the cover-up. In a March 20, 1973, telephone conversation, the President told Dean to "make it very incomplete." 1 P But you could say, "I have this and this is that." Fine. See what I am getting at is that, if apart from a statement to the Committee or anything else, if you could just make a statement to me that we can use. You know, for internal purposes and to answer questions, etc. D As we did when you, back in August, made the statement that— P You've got to have something where it doesn't appear that I am doing this in, you know, just in a-saying to hell with the Congress and to hell with the people, we are not going to tell you anything because of Executive Privilege. That, they don't understand. But if you say, "No, we are willing to cooperate," and you've made a complete statement, but make it very incomplete. See, that is what I mean. I don't want a, too much in chapter and verse as you did in your letter, I just want just a general D An all around statement. P That's right. Try just something general. Like "I have checked into this matter; I can categorically, based on my investigation, the following: Haldeman is not involved in this, that and the other thing. Mr. Colson did not do this; Mr. so and so did not do this. Mr. Blank did not do this." Right down the line, taking the most glaring things. If there are any further questions, please let me know. See? D Uh, huh. I think we can do that. (WHT 167-68) On the afternoon of March 21, 1973, after Dean had discussed with the President the involvement of White House staff in perjury (HJCT 1 On April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the tape recording and other materials related to this conversation. The President refused to produce this recording. The President submitted an edited transcript. 2 Dean had drafted a letter to Senattor Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in connection with hearings on the nomination of L. Patrick Gray to be Director of the FBI. |