but the act was done freely, and he is consequently amenable to the laws for a murder. And so in the case of every opinion that is formed, or of every act that is done, the opinion or the act is the necessary result of the exertions which a man, without necessity, 1. e., voluntarily, has put forth for the production of that result. In either case, he is responsible for his opinions and actions, and acquits or condemns himself, and is acquitted or condemned by others, according to their character. The necessity of the result no more affects his responsibility, than his freedom. He is free to think, to will, to speak, and to act, when nothing interferes to prevent him, but his thought, determination, speech and act are not free, but necessary, the necessary results of the free exercise of the powers with which he is endowed. If he acts and judges wrong, when he has the means of acting and judging right, he is responsible for his wrong acts and his wrong judgments, but when he has not the means of so acting and so judging, he is not responsible. For those opinions which he receives and embraces under the force of threats, dictation or a false education, he is not responsible, for if he has acted at all in such cases, he has acted under compulsion. We are only responsible for the things we do ourselves, and not for those which others do for us without our authority or permission. The victim of false instruction must lay the sin of a perverted mind at the door of those who have tyrannized over him. But, once convinced of his error, a solemn duty devolves on him, as a rational being, to assert his liberty against all gainsayers, to exert his faculties, and take all the steps that are necessary and proper, to obtain better information.

But, we are asked, can a man act contrary to the determinations of his mind, believe contrary to the conclusions of his judgment, see, hear, touch, taste, smell, contrary to the intimations of his senses? If he cannot do these things, is he free? We reply that a man can do none of these things contrary to the laws of action which govern all actions, and yet, that he is is free in doing whatever he does. Our determination may, on reflection, give place to another, but the determination which leads to any particular act is absolutely necessary to the production of that act, and yet a man is perfectly free in coming to that determination. No child can resist the conclusion to which his mind has come, that two and three are five, but he must add two and three

together, before he finds out the mystery, and this he does of his own free will. If a man tastes sugar, he can neither think nor say, if he says truth, that it has a sour or a bitter taste. But he can either taste sugar or let it alone, as he thinks proper. The man, in tasting, does a voluntary act, but the effect of the action,-the taste or sensation of sweetness is involuntary, as all effects and all sensations are. A man is not omnipotent, because he is free. He holds his freedom, i. e., his power of action under certain limitations. He cannot, at will, change the qualities of things, and make them different from what they really are. With all his power, which is derived power, he must still respect the laws of his being, and can only do possible things. He can neither reach the moon with his arm, make a circle without a centre, nor create a world. When the facts presented to a jury are as nine on one side to ten on the other, the jury must recognize or believe the facts as they are, not as they are not. They have no volition in the matter. If one of the jury says, they are as nine on one side to three on the other, it is because, from some defect of vision, he does not see all the facts. No man is at liberty to say that that is false, which he perceives to be true. But he is at liberty to pursue the truth, to discover it if he can, and to acknowledge it when discovered. The man who once demonstrated? that a steamer could not cross the Atlantic, and who yet subsequently passed the Atlantic in a steamer, cannot return to his former opinion, because his former opinion was false, and he knows it to be so. He cannot perceive a proposition in every respect, to be true, and, in every respect, to be false at one and the same time. He was free in the steps he took in coming to his former conclusion, that no steamer could cross the Atlantic, which conclusion entered his mind necessarily, with all the force of a supposed demonstration, and he was free in coming to his latter conclusion, that a steamer could cross the Atlantic, a conclusion which entered his mind as necessarily as the other, without any demonstration at all, except his simply doing that which he formerly deemed impossible to be done. To ask, whether he can now return to his former opinion, is tantamount to asking, whether a man, in his senses, is free to become an idiot. So a man, who hears a tune that is familiar to him, cannot judge that the tune is different from what it is. He has no election in the matter. But he may go, if he chooses to a concert, a

rehearsal, or an oratorio, and hears music. There he has an election. The geologist, who draws his conclusions of the antiquity of the world from the accumulation of shells, and the stratification of rocks; the traveller, who puts on his cloak, or the mariner, who trims his sails, when the storm arises; the physician, who judges from the symptoms of the case, that his patient has the pleurisy; the court, which decides that the evidence is in the plaintiff; the man, who listens to the debates in the senate, and is convinced by the arguments he hears; the individual, who has become deist, christian, baptist, and catholic by turn, in consequence of reading the works of Hume, Paley, Hall and Bossuet, have arrived at conclusions which enter their minds necessarily, in consequence of the books they have sought out and read without compulsion, and the studies and investigations of various kinds which they have freely prosecuted, until they have arrived, step by step, at those necessary conclusions. It is certain, that a man has much to do, and does much, on all these occasions, and that whatever he does, he does freely, while the effect of his action is inevitable as the law of gravitation. The man who wishes to become a christian, goes to the New Testament and studies and investigates its contents; the New Testament does not go to him, and study and investigate its own contents. The jury makes up its verdict; the verdict does not make itself up. There is no compulsion in the case of the jury. A juror may stay at home and pay his fine, or he may go to court, and perform his duty in obedience to laws he has himself enacted. The jurors, regardless of their oaths, may voluntarily stop their ears with their fingers, and refuse to listen to the testimony, and the Judge'may voluntarily cause them to be imprisoned for contempt of court. They may bring in a verdict contrary to law and evidence, because, instead of weighing the force and bearing of both, as they should have done, they have employed their time in speculating about the dress and countenances of the spectators, who have come to witness the trial. On the other hand, they may perform their duty like upright men, listen to the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of the counsel, the charge of the Judge, and taking all the circumstances of the case fully into consideration, make up their minds on whatever side the truth appears to them to be. Their verdict is the record of the conclusion which flows, necessarily, from

the light in which they view the case, and, if they do not act on the testimony, they certainly think, judge, determine and act according to it, and in all instances, act voluntarily.

We have thus adverted to the main points in our correspondent's argument, and have expressed our dissent from some of his opinions, and our reasons for that dissent. We could not, with a due regard to what we conceived to be truth, have published those opinions without note or comment, and thereby given them the sanction of our approval.

There are some propositions which, in conclusion, we are prepared to lay down in respect to this doctrine of human. freedom:

1. Men are free, not actions or opinions. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as voluntary actions or voluntary opinions. Men think, speak, will and act voluntarily, but thought, speech, volition, action are the necessary results of the voluntary exercise of a man's power.

2. Liberty is synonymous with power. A man is free to do only what he has power to do. A man increases his power of action by action, and he who neglects to exert his powers, soon loses the power to exert them, and, so far abridges his liberty of action.

3. An act is something done, not something merely willed, thought of, or meditated about. Willing to do a thing, is not doing it. There is no such thing as an act of the will. There is no such thing as an act of the understanding. Man alone thinks, determines and acts. The faculties must not be confounded with the agent who exerts them.

4. Liberty, is the power of thinking, speaking, willing and acting according to reason. This is a power peculiar to man, and distinguishes him from brute animals, who possess only insight and affection. A man who does not act from a motive, and a reasonable one, is either insane or an idiot. There is a necessary connection between an action and the motive that prompts to it-but the necessity of this connection does not render the action necessary, since a man may omit to do that particular action, and do some other.

5. Men are influenced in their actions more or less by a regard to their own happiness and well being. They expect some advantage or other to result from their action. They expect to derive or communicate pleasure or satisfaction of some kind by their action. The desire of happiness is a reasonable motive to conduct. That men are created to be

All the prompt

happy is a dictate of enlightened reason. ings of their nature therefore, lead them to pursue their own happiness, although they often mistake the means which should be employed to secure it. What promotes their highest happiness they pronounce good, right, proper and fit to be done, and what does not promote it, but is calculated to diminish and ultimately destroy it, they pronounce evil, wrong, improper and unfit to be done.

6. Men governed by reason and religion, usually act from a regard to their highest happiness, but the mass of mankind are actuated by inferior motives. What is agreeable, what pleases the senses, what gratifies the appetites and propensities, what promotes present pleasure at the expense of future and higher good, are the predominant motives which govern most men in their conduct in this life. Self interest is more regarded than the well being of others--the happiness of the individual, than the welfare of the man.

7. What promotes a man's happiness, he loves to think about, he loves to do, and consequently wills or determines to do, and actually does because he is free to do it, i. e., has the power to do it, when nothing within, and nothing from without, interferes to prevent him from doing it. His will and thought therefore, are usually as his affection is, and consequently his actions, his life, his liberty, his power are as his affection is; but, being endowed with reason, he is capable of elevating his thoughts above his affections,-of restraining a misdirected affection, and of substituting in its place a better and a reasonable one. Hence he is capable of reformation and improvement. Without this faculty, he would be no better than the brutes.

S. Motives are so called, because they move or may move the mind to act. They are mere inducements or incitements to action. They are not the cause or author of action. The cause or author of action is the actor, i. e., the man who does the act. There is no compulsion in motives. Motives or inducements to action may exist without any action following. Many motives or considerations exist, why a man should lead a virtuous and religious life, and yet these motives may not exert the slightest influence on his conduct. The necessary connection that exists between a motive and an act, is a subsequent and not an antecedent necessity. If a man has acted, he must have acted from some motive or other. If he has not acted from that motive, it is because