man, and, if it were possible to suppose any such man to exist, it would still be impossible to conceive how he could act. If food were presented to him he could never raise a morsel to his lips, and would die of starvation. Our corres pondent states à case where tea, coffee, bread, butter, and various condiments are offered to a person, and which he accepts only through what appears to him the tedious process of "motive, last determination and volition;" but, if he possessed judgment alone without will, he could never determine to accept them at all, and consequently would never do so. He could only judge of their qualities,-that they were tea, coffee, &c. If men possessed judgment alone without will, the consequence would be, that we should think, reason, imagine, remember, love, hate, fear and be angry only according to the dictates of judgment. We should all become thinkers, logicians, metaphysicians, philosophers, sages and judges of a high order, but whether, while we did nothing but form judgments, propound theories, and lay down axioms in science and philosophy, we should ever find time, or have ability, to act according to the dictates of judgment, would still be a question and a difficult one to decide in the affirmative.

Enough, however, of this new theory of a single faculty, and a single motive, which is certainly quite an original speculation, but, as it seems to us, much more amusing than defensible, by any sound arguments. It is not probable that any determined man who has a will of his own, and who is accustomed to make use of it in the management of the affairs of life, would be disposed to surrender it, even though he were to be made Judge in earnest, with as large a salary as is enjoyed by their honors, the Judges of the liberal State of Louisiana. Those modest and quiet persons, who allow others to think, will and determine for them, and to do for them all those things which they ought to do for themselves, may be quite content with a theory, that relieves them of a great deal of duty and as much responsibility.

2dly, It is asserted by our correspondent, that man is a necessary, and not a free agent. We think it is time that this notion should be abandoned as obsolete and worthless. We are the advocates of moral as well as civil liberty, and the age, including all the metaphysicians, should come up to the defence of this great doctrine, and maintain it as a sensible creed, and an essential element in any sound sys

tem of metaphysics, as well as of morals and religion. The idea of acting under compulsion, except when a man goes to prison, or is compelled by threats to act, is absolute nonsense. It is not a fact, and never was one. Man is a free

agent, by which we mean, 1st, That he is the author or originator of his own actions; and 2dly., That in the ordinary course of events, when he is not forcibly prevented from acting, he can act of his own accord, or refuse to act, or, having commenced acting, can let it alone. Of all those things which it is possible for him to do at all, he can determine for himself what he shall do, and what he shall omit doing. As a moral agent, he has a choice, not only in respect to some particular action, whether he shall do it or not, but in respect to the whole course of his conduct in life, whether it shall be good or evil. These things depend on himself, not on his will alone, but on his will and understanding taken together, and acting together as one man. But the metaphysicians tell us, that men are compelled to act from the force of the strongest motive. Is this true? No! If Lam compelled to act, the act I do, is not mine. I become a mere passive instrument in the hands of another. Who or what is that other? The stronger motive. The motive is stronger than the man. The motive, then, and not the man is the cause or author of the action, and, when it acts wrong, should be called to account for its behaviour, and churches should excommmunicate, and courts fine and confine motives, while men, who are neither principals nor accessories in the crime or heresy, should be suffered to go at large at their pleasure, and without rebuke. Newspapers, instead of detailing the crimes of culprits in all their enormity, should announce that, on a certain day, a very pugnacious motive knocked a man down; on a certain other day, a very thievish motive stole a man's pocket-book, and that, last Wednesday, a very wanton and malicious motive way-laid a man, as he was going into the country, assailed him with a formidable bowie-knife and killed him outright with a thrust in the side, and that these several motives, having been arrested by still stronger motives than themselves, and tried by a jury of motives, were found guilty of a flagrant violation of the laws, and were duly incarcerated for a term of years, whipped in the market-place, or hung on the gallows. This would be justice, if metaphysics were morals or even common sense. Equally false, is

the idea, that because actions are foreknown, they must, therefore, certainly take place. Is it not obvious to the slightest reflection, that actions do not take place, because they are foreknown, but that they are foreknown simply because they will take place? That they take place, because men, having the power to do them, do them?— And no more depend, for their happening, on prior knowledge that they will be done, than on subsequent knowledge that they have been done? Such, at least, is our opinion. Nor does the notion of divine decrees, of which some speculative writers speak, render this doctrine of necessity a whit more respectable. All things, we are told, are decreed, and a man's actions among them. This, we are constrained to say, is a fundamental error. Actions are not decreed, but only rules of action. Rules of action are decrees. They are laws or ordinances, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. The very existence of such decrees proves, not that man is a necessary, but a free agent, capable of obeying or disobeying those decrees. All just governments throughout the world, in their enactments, proceed upon the same principle, making those amenable to the laws and liable to punishment, who, regardless of their duty, rob, slander or commit murder. The consciousness, indeed, of every man that he is free to act, is stronger than any argument that can be brought against his freedom. This consciousness has all the force of an overwhelming demonstration, before which, in any court of conscience, law or honor, the fiction of necessity is driven like chaff before the storm. If a man commits a crime, he cannot say, "I could not help myself. I am a necessary agent. I am compelled to act by the strongest motive." The answer is, "You are justly punished. You are not not a necessary agent. You act voluntarily, or you do not act at all. This may not be metaphysical sense, but it is common sense, the best sense in the world, and the basis of all sound philosophy. If this doctrine, so essential to the well being of society, be abandoned for a mere speculative theory, all responsibility for human actions ceases, and law, morality, religion, common sense, common justice and common honesty, are left without the slightest foundation on which

to rest.

3dly, it is asserted, that faith or belief is involuntary. We do not dissent from this proposition. Some writers, we are aware, have maintained the contrary, such as Wardlaw,

Hazlitt, and many others. Faith consists of ideas, divided from testimony, as contra distinguished from those which are obtained from observation and experience, which constitute knowledge. We entertain no doubt, that faith or belief, so defined, is wholly involuntary. But we object to the conclusion that is usually drawn from the postulate, that faith is involuntary, viz: that men have therefore, nothing to do in the formation of their opinions, and are, consequently, wholly irresponsible for them. This conclusion is of very mischievous tendency,-at least we so regard it. If it were a just conclusion from the premises, no sort of obligation would rest on men to inform their minds by the acquisition of sound knowledge or the formation of correct opinions. Our correspondent, after stating some of the peculiarities of different sects of christians, asks the question, "Can either of these sects change sides and pass at will," (i. e. by a single determination) "over to the creed of the other?" He is endeavoring to enforce his position, that faith is involuntary. We reply No! No more than a man, by merely willing to travel fifty miles, can reach his journey's end without moving a step. A man, who changes his creed, if he is an honest man, not only thinks, but does, much, before the change is effected. A creed is like a habit, which, when once formed, is not easily abandoned. It cannot be laid aside, resumed or changed at will, as a man takes off or puts on his coat, or changes one coat for another. No! A man, who perceives that he has embraced an erroneous creed, cannot thus revolutionize all his fixed opinions and confirmed habits of thinking, by a mere sudden determination of the will. The determination is something, nay it is much, for no change can be effected without it, but the man has still a great deal to do. He must exercise his faculties, read his Bible, meditate on its contents, study the best commentators, weigh the force of testimony, consider the arguments for and against different opinions, and look steadfastly at their moral bearings. He is thus prepared to make up his mind, like a rational being, as he is, endowed with liberty. In all that he does in this process of investigation, he acts voluntarily and without compulsion, and the change that takes place in his opinions is the necessary result of what he thus voluntarily does. We say necessary result, and let no one be startled by the declaration, as if we intended thereby, to throw a mantle of apology

That men, con

over shallow doctrines and wilful errors. stitutionally endowed with liberty by their Creator, living in a free country, and an enlightened age and with christianity in their hands, are bound to embrace nonsensical creeds and cannot help themselves, because the opinions they form, enter their minds necessarily, i. e. in accordance with the inevitable laws of their being, is monstrous doctrine, worthy only of the dark ages. The erroneous opinions men entertain, in consequence of previous inquiries voluntarily prosecuted, but not prosecuted with sufficient industry and fidelity, enter their minds necessarily, or they do not enter them at all. They should form other and better opinions, which will then make a part of their creed, just as necessarily as their former opinions have done; and they should be grateful for the necessity by which so beneficial a change is effected. No advocates of the doctrine of liberty, which is itself as much an inevitable law of action as anything else, do or should object to any such kind of necessity as this. On the contrary, they demand, and human nature universally demands, as much certainty in all things as can possible be attained. Men never would act at all, unless they were satisfied in advance, that they should accomplish something certain by their action. They would never employ their faculties, and devote their time to the investigation of the different systems of belief of which the world is full, unless they expected, by such endeavours, to attain to opinions that are certain, or which they believed to be so. If we are correct in this train of reasoning, it is obvious, that men are, in all respects, as responsible for their opinions or creeds, as they are for their actions or conduct. Their characters are the necessary result of the actions which they voluntarily do, and they are responsible for that necessary result, because they freely do those things which produce it. In like manner, their creeds are the necessary result of actions voluntarily done, and they are equally responsible for that necessary result, because they do, of their own accord, those things which produce it. Where is the difference, in respect to responsibility, between the two cases? There is none. It thus appears, that the freedom of the mind, in bringing about a necessary result, is not affected in the slightest degree, by the necessity of the result itself. If a man deliberately shoots another down with a rifle and kills him, the killing is the necessary result of the act done,