physical. Happiness, that light and glory of the world, is the end and aim of his being. His perception of the greatest apparent good is a law unto him, as gravitation is to matter, that never relaxes its hold; it binds him in fetters he cannot break if he would, and he would not if he could: and however varied or incongruous his actions may be; although he should contradict himself an hundred times a day, yet is his purpose ever the same, as the meanderings of a river lead but to the sea.

Our first notions of this imaginary will, are derived from the philosophy of the Greeks, and we still drink from the muddy stream, though the pure fountains of knowledge are within ourselves-vw deaurov, ecælo descendit. Read the book that is within: truth is not to be found in the writings of philosophers who take upon trust what others have said. "I study hard," said Descartes, but without books; and Hobbes said, "I should have been as ignorant as other men had I read as much as they."

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

It is no derogation from the freedom or impartiality of the press, that it discusses, with fairness, decency and independence, both sides of a vexed question. On the contrary, a duty, it is believed, devolves on the conductors of the press, to present, as far as possible, the truth in respect to any important matter in controversy, and this is best done when the advocates of differing opinions are afforded an equal opportunity to be heard. Entertaining these views, we do not consider ourselves at liberty to reject a well written article, because we may happen to differ from the writer in opinion. He may be right in his conclusions, and we may be wrong. If we are convinced that he is wrong, and that we are right, we are at liberty to express our dissent, and should express it, leaving the public, which is the final tribunal, to arbitrate between us, and settle the question, if it can be settled, as it thinks proper. Thus, we differ materially from the ingenious author of this article in his views of the constitution of the human mind, and shall state, in this place, the reasons we have for maintaining a theory almost totally opposite to the one he inculcates with singular

acuteness and ability. In doing this, we shall omit all smaller matters of criticism, and confine ourselves to the main points, involved in the argument. We advise our readers to peruse, first, the article throughout, and then recur to this note, which partakes of the character of a brief review of the writers's opinions.

And 1st, It is asserted and maintained, that man has no such faculty as the will. This is certainly, a rather startling declaration, and did it not proceed from a respectable source, and were it not gravely uttered by one who regards it, not only as new, but important, we should have been inclined to consider it a mere jeu d'esprit of the author. We are bound to believe, however, that it was uttered with all due seriousness, and that the writer meant that it should be seriously considered. Out of respect to him, therefore, we shall inquire, in what manner he sustains so very singular a speculation, and whether there is any foundation for it in fact.

The writer insists, that metaphysicians do not agree in their definitions of the will. He quotes the various definitions of this faculty, which have been given by Edwards, Locke, Bielfield, Malebranch, Herner, Reid, Clarke, Gall, Spurzheim, Cousin, Hobbes, Tappan, and other metaphysical writers. He insists, that these writers contradict themselves, and contradict each other, in their definitions, and he accordingly, pursues them with mingled wit, sarcasm and ridicule. We cannot say that he appears to us always to treat them with perfect fairness, or that the language they employ, wiil uniformly justify the inferences he deduces from it. He has, however, demonstrated, beyond all question, that they differ widely from each other, and do not appear to have as clear and distinct views of the human will as are desirable. Some, nay most of them insist, on the distinct and independent existence of the will, but some assign to the will, what are ordinarily regarded as the functions of the understanding, while others assign to the understanding, what are commonly looked upon as exclusively the functions of the will. He thus finds in the obscurity of our most distinguished metaphysical writers, some authority for compounding the will and understanding together. He consequently asserts, that the two faculties are identical, or, rather, that man has no will at all, that judgment alone wills, chooses, and determines, as well as perceives, compares things and draws

conclusions, and that it is quite sufficient, by its own unaided energy, to accomplish all the acts which a man performs. We say that he asserts this, and he has made many ingenious remarks on the subject, and has amused us with many specimens of his witty and satirical humor, but we cannot see that, beyond the assertion of the non-existence of the will, which is made with a very commendable degree of courage, he has advanced a single step in proof of an hypothesis, which is to overthrow all our previously received systems of moral and intellectual philosophy.

He does not actually deny the existence of wit, memory, imagination, conscience, or any of the other powers or passions, except the will, (for which he cherishes no sort of respect,) but, if they exist at all, they are made to perform a very subordinate part in the mental economy, and are regarded as mere off-shoots from the great parent faculty, the judgment,-as flowers and leaves are offshoots from the parent stalk on which they grow. Judgment perceives and acts, thinks and acts, judges and acts, wills and acts, and as judgment does every thing, that is done, in the drama of life, it is difficult to see what the other faculties have to do, or are fit for. They do any thing, or are fit for any thing. They seem rather to be like Bieldfield's will, on which the writer expends his satire,-useless wheels in that machine which is called the mind. The writer's one motive might also, be dispensed with on the same ground of utter inutility, for the judgment, like the eye, sees objects by barely looking at them, without any motive for the seeing, which is quite unavoidable and cannot be helped. The judgment is the shortest road to an action. It is plain, even and smooth as a turnpike, and why men should take a circuitous route to an end, when they have a direct path to it, is what the writer cannot comprehend. Every difficulty in the case is solved by a simple idea, a thought,-which is no sooner conceived, than an act flies from it, like a bullet from a pistol, when the trigger is drawn. The writer might simplify his theory still further, and improve it by the proviso. He might distinctly announce to the world the fact, that things are, and therefore they are, and we should be saved all the trouble of settling the vexed question as to who or what is their author.

There are many cases, doubtless, in which the intellectual, are more entirely called into exercise, than the moral, powers. This is true in all mental calculations. The pursuit

of the abstract sciences makes larger and more constant demands upon the intellect than upon the will. But that is a cold kind of philosphy, which attributes all the acts, of whatever kind, which a man performs, to the operation of pure intellect. Nor is it true. A Judge upon the bench, whose special office it is, to utter judgments and decrees, may perceive, if he chooses, that however important a sound understanding, may be to the skillful exercise of his peculiar functions, yet that a firm will or purpose, and fixed determination. to do what is right, are not less important to his reputation as a Judge, or to his mental tranquillity as a man. In matters of less moment, also, he will find that he cannot get along well, or at all, without the intervention of a will. Thus, if he puts on his robes of office, goes to Court, hears the arguments of counsel, delivers a decision, pronounces a sentence, he must, in each of these cases, will to do what he thus does. If he writes out a decree, he cannot put pen to paper, without an exercise of his will. The vast majority of those who constitute the population of this working-day world, would achieve little for themselves or their families, without the intervention of a will,-a stern will to labor. If a man builds a house, he must first will to build it. He must then employ his understanding in devising the means for building it, and lastly, he must put his hands to the work. Willing to do, thinking how to do, and doing, are the three stages in the proceeding, each of which is equally important to the accomplishment of the work, and, unless the first step is taken, in the shape of a determination to build, it is very obvious, that neither the convenience which a house affords, which is the end in building, nor the most ingenious and magnificent plan which imagination can conceive or judgment frame, would ever suffice to build the house. We have examined the writer's article, and although we are not satisfied with the arguments he urges, and in most respects, reject his theory, yet we have published it because he thinks it valuable, because we may have erred in our estimate of its importance, and because the Press is free, and open to the speculations of all persons of intelligence and learning, who desire to enlighten and benefit the world by their writings. But, if we had not willed to publish it, it certainly never would have appeared in the pages of this Review. We are now criticising it, because we do not agree with the writer, and think his views erroneous, but if we had not willed

to criticise it, we should not have said a word about it. There is much in the human will. It is a fundamental part of the mental constitution. Judgment is an essential attribute, but the will is equally important to human happiness and human fame. No hero ever existed, who did not owe much of his success to the determinations of a strong and unconquerable will. Cæsar, Hannibal, Alexander, Napoleon, and Washington, were as much distinguished for great firmness of purpose, as for commanding talents. The age is remarkable for its improvements. Rail-roads have been constructed, canals cut, rivers opened, towns and cities built, but none of these herculean labors would have been accomplished, had men only judged that they were expedient, and never willed to do them, nor co-operated together for the purpose. The will, in a word, may be said to enter into ev ery plan that is formed, and into every act that is done. We cannot consent to give up so important and controlling a faculty, and thereby reduce ourselves to the condition of mere drones, living, as we do, in a world where so much is done, and so much is still to be accomplished.

Metaphysicians, again, have erred in supposing, that any one faculty of the mind can act by itself. The mental faculties, however much we may divide or subdivide them, are dependent on each other for the integrity of their action, and, to borrow a scripture illustration,-the eye might as well say to the hand, "I have no need of thee," or the head to the foot, "I have no need of thee," as memory, attention, reflection, or those two great fundamental powers of the mind, which include all the rest,-the will and understand. ing, say to each other, "I have no need of thee." The will and understanding never act singly, but co-operate in every act that is done. If they do not co-operate, nothing is accomplished. The thought, judgment or understanding of what is to be done, must always precede the will to do it. Thought thus gives form to an act, which first exists in the mind only as an object of contemplation, and the will then co-operates with the thought in bringing the act into being. Thinking without willing, or willing without thinking, can never produce any act. This law of action applies to the nicest mental operations, which are recognized by the mind alone, as well as to those external acts which appear outwardly, and are visible to the senses. If a man possessed judgment alone, without will, he would be only half of a