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ple is rather improved. In his chapter on Norway, he is forced to confess that the laboring classes are in a very excellent state in that barren, cold country. But he attributes this to the unusual vigour of the prudential check, caused by the low state of agriculture, and the difficulty of subsistence! To such monstrous absurdities, does his principle lead him! To suppose that bad tillage and sterile soils, improve the condition of the laborer!

Mr. Malthus, has almost entirely forgotten the inventive genius of man, and his powers of discovery and improvement. The whole question is changed by introducing these elements. He looks only to the narrow limits of the British Isles, and he hopes for little improvement there. He fears that "increased woe will befal them," should their supply of food be increased by the prosperity of the cotton trade. (p. 184, in note.) Does he forget that tea, coffee, and sugar, are food? And how are these purchased but by the manufactures of England? Has not their supply diminished the pressure of the demand for food or corn? Should the increased speed of travel, or the inventions of chemistry in the preservation of food, place the tropical fruits, the bananas, and oranges of the West Indies, within the reach of the English people, will not these cheaply produced articles, be substitutes for much food of other kinds? Will not the existing supply of corn go farther? And would they not be purchased with manufactures? Mr. Malthus himself, would, we presume, consider this as much a benefit to England, as the use of tea and sugar. Yet this is, in substance, the same case with buying American or Baltic corn, with English cottons and iron.

Mr. Malthus has looked at every question of Political Economy, from this point of view. It has perverted all his reasonings, and materially lessens the value of his labors. With this caution, his views of the market or temporary variations of rents, wages, and profits, may be recommended as very useful. It would lead us beyond our limits to consider in detail, his chapters on these subjects, but they are worthy of a careful study. As he justly remarks, these variations are not only frequent, but may last considerable periods of time, and are, therefore, more important, than theoretical Economists, are wont to allow.

Mr. Ricardo's theories are so nearly like those we have

already examined, that it will be useless to devote a separate study to them.

In conclusion, we will remark, that there are some persons who attempt to escape the conclusions of Political Economy, by resorting to vague generalities. They will neither deny, nor admit its theories, but imagine they are following the safe middle way, by saying that these doctrines are partly true, and partly false. Thus in speaking of price, they say that it is only within certain limits that its laws can be known, and that nothing definite in relation to it can be ascertained. What these limits are, they cannot be forced to say, for such critics know that their only safety is in that want of precision, and uncertainty, which are the sworn enemies of science. We challenge them to produce, or imagine any variation of price, which is not caused by a change in the ratio between the demand for, and the supply of the commodity in question. And this once admitted, as it must be, when no answer is made to our challenge, we appeal to every strict reasoner to say, whether the changes in this ratio are not such as we have attempted to prove them to be.

We propose, at some future opportunity to examine the influence of positive laws, and social institutions, on the natural laws of price, and the distribution of wealth, as exhibited in this article.

M. R. H. G.

ART II-THE WILL.

1. Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will. By JONATHAN EDWARDS. Leeds: 1806.

2. Essays on Liberty and Necessity, in which the true na ture of Liberty is stated and defended; and the princi pal arguments used by Mr. Edwards and others for Necessity, are considered. By SAMUEL WEST, D. D. New Bedford: 1795.

WRITERS on Liberty and Necessity do not agree in their definitions of the Will, each fixing its meaning for himself, and putting all others in the wrong. The ablest on the side of Necessity, and one of the most accomplished logic

ians of any age, is Jonathan Edwards, and yet his definition is altogether vague and often at variance with itself. He says it is,

"That by which the mind chooses any thing.-The faculty of the will is that power or principle of the mind, by which it is capable of choosing. An act of the will is the same as an act of choosing, or choice. The very act of volition itself, is doubtless a determination, i. e.: it is the mind drawing a conclusion, on coming to a choice between two or more things proposed.-God has endued the soul with two faculties; one is, that by which it is capable of perception and speculation; or by which it discerns, and views and judges of things, which is called the understanding. The other faculty is that, by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things but is in some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either is inclined to them, or is disinclined or averse from them. This faculty is called by various names; it is sometimes called inclination, and as it has respect to the actions that are determined or governed by it, is called the Will."

In common speech, it is the understanding that perceives, views and considers things; but we are startled when told that the soul possesses another faculty, the will, by which it views, considers things and forms its conclusions.

When a traveller deliberates whether he shall go by land or water, by which of these faculties, the understanding or the will, does he view and consider the subject? He must, before he can draw up a conclusion, consider the dangers of the sea, contrary winds, detention and sickness on one side, and on the other, safety on land, beauty of the country, town and city, field and forest. According to the definition, the process must be wrought out by the will alone, otherwise, the soul could feel no inclination or aversion, that is, make a choice between the two modes of travelling.

When a basket of fruit is presented to President Edwards for choice, he perceives by the sight, touch and smell, their respective qualities, and by the understanding, compares and judges of the best. But the judgm 'nt of the understanding creates no inclination or aversion, the objects must be viewed and considered by the will before a choice can be made the soul must, therefore, repeat by the will, the same operation it had just undergone by the understanding, and since it proceeds upon the same evidence, the second examination must be a repetition of the first, unless it view the same things differently by its faculty, the will, from what it does by its faculty the understanding: this is impossible,

since it is the same soul considering the same facts, wherefore its perceptions must be the same, as the truth of a problem is always identical, however often the demonstration be repeated. Yet that author, in another page of the same work, affirms that the will obeys the judgments of the understanding. "That which appears most inviting, and has what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest motive, and in this sense, I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest motive."

If such be his meaning, the power of perceiving, viewing and considering things by the will is a mere nullity, since it obeys perceptions not his own; the mind is a blemish upon nature, in all else so beautiful, so great; it is at war with itself; the conflict is perpetually renewed, always to terminate in the submission of the power that chooses, to the power that does not choose, so that the actions of men are never the effect of choice, unless the determinations of both faculties happen to be the same.

Dissatisfied with his own analysis of the mind, President Edwards proceeds to identify the will with the affections. He says "The affections are not essentially different from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclinations of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of the exercise. I humbly conceive the affections of the soul, are not properly distinguishable from the will, as though they were two faculties."

The passions, always fatal to reason, are here unaccountably identified with the will, which according to the definition, perceives, views, considers things, and draws up its own conclusions.

It is plain, this writer had no just conception of the faculty he attempts to define. Two reasoning powers can never harmonize in the same mind, and hence the struggle that is kept up throughout his entire work. He adopted the notion of their twofold existence according to the philosophy of the day, while he shows them to be identically the same. He saw that man was a necessary agent; that his actions were as his perceptions of the greatest apparent good, but was afraid to avow his conviction, lest it should effect accountability for crime. His fears were without foundation, as I trust will be shown in its proper place.

Bielfeld, a writer of some reputation, affirms "that the understanding examines and presents all objects to the will, and according as that presents them, this accepts or rejects; for the will has not absolutely any power of examining and judging; its sole quality is that of determining. It is the judgment that errs, and the will that embraces the error; for if the will could freely determine either for good or bad, it must have the faculty of reasoning, comprehending and examining, which is the business of the judgment-the will at all times will follow the judgment as its guide."

The will is here interposed between cause and effect, as a useless wheel, in a machine that must detract from its power and retard its movement. If it were an active principle, it might add to the force of the judgment, but being passive, it is an obstruction with which nature, according to this author, chooses to encumber her own operations.

Malebranche, on the contrary, insists that it is the province of the will alone to reason, and of the understanding to perceive, but has not informed us how the will can reason without perceiving, or how the understanding can perceive without reasoning, since to reason is but to perceive the relations of our ideas, nothing more.

Locke defines the will to be, "a power in the mind, to direct the operative faculties of a man, to motion or rest." This power he repeatedly identifies with thought. "We find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind.-A power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind.-The power of the mind to determine its thoughts to the producing, continuing or stopping any action as far as it depends on us. We must remember that volition or willing, is an act of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power."

If thought and will be the same, then a man acts simply as he thinks, and there is an end to the controversy. If they be different, then the will is not that power in the mind that directs its operative faculties, for this is exclusively ascribed to thought. And yet that philosopher says, "That the only object of the will, is some action of ours, and nothing more; for we, producing nothing by our wil

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