appropriation," of any commodity, (p. 439.) Substitute this in his proposition, and it reads, "That the quantity of labor required for the production or appropriation of a commodity is measured by, and is wholly dependent on, the quantity of labor required for its production!!"

It is obvious that he has abandoned his own definition of cost, and the 4th proposition shows that he now uses it with the meaning we have assigned to the term natural price, for that proposition is entirely true, if we use cost in this sense, and value, as equivalent to market price. Otherwise to say that the value, and cost, or quantity of labor required in the production, of a commodity, are identical, would be a direct contradiction to his assertion, that an article "will never exchange for exactly the same quantity of labor that produced it," but always for more. (p. 442.)

This double meaning assigned to cost, has occasioned him much confusion. By using the first meaning, the 4th proposition will prove that the natural wages of labor, to which its market wages or value will, on an average, conform, are the whole that it produces. But as this was too plainly false to be maintained, Mr. McCulloch, fell into the same fallacies, in relation to wages, which we noticed in Dr. Smith, and carries them to a much more serious extent. He assumes, that the "natural or necessary wages" of laborers, is "the sum which the habits of society render necessary, to enable them to subsist and continue their race." (p. 471.) Yet a little farther on, (pp. 471, 472,) he tells us that these habits and standard of subsistence may be elevated or degraded by the market wages actually received; in other words, market wages depend on natural wages, and natural wages depend on market wages! What do we gain by such a step in the deduction?

Mr. McCulloch, hence concludes, that a rise or fall in the natural price of food raises or depresses wages, and that nothing can be worse for the laborer than cheap food; consequently, the use of the potato has been a serious injury to Ireland. Those, who have no such theory to mislead them, would suppose that the low wages, and standard of subsistence, of the Irish peasant, are the effects of unequal laws and bad government, which the introduction of the potato alleviated, instead of enhancing. According to this theory, if food could be produced without labor at all, the greater part

of society would sink to the most abject state of want, and brutality!

This fallacy has thrown much difficulty in the way of those who advocated a repeal of the Corn laws, which, it was promised, would cheapen food. But, as this must also reduce wages, the protectionists, had a powerful argument with the masses, ready furnished by their antagonists. Their papers and speeches continually ring with the cry of cheap corn, and low wages, high wages and dear corn. The extreme difficulty of meeting this argument, has produced some symptoms of change of doctrine, in the McCulloch and Ricardo school. Such indications may be discerned in some articles that have appeared in recent numbers of the Edinburgh Review, and Sir Robert Peel, in one of his great speeches of the late session, remarks that experience seems to prove, that the reduction in the prices of bread, and other necessaries of life, does not reduce wages, or even money wages.

In the life of Adam Smith, just published, Lord Brougham, adverts to this difficulty, and, after attempting to diminish it by arguments, which are at variance with the theory, says that he "must, however admit that the interest of the working classes in this question, (i. e., the repeal of the Corn laws,) is not so manifest, though we should not wholly neglect it, as that of the capitalist," because there is a tendency in the laborer "to cause a glut of his only merchandize, his labor, in the market." It is a rather strange notion, it must be confessed, that the poor are less interested in cheap bread, than the rich, but it is only a consequence of the theory, and it forces its advocates into the assertion that there is more apt to be a glut of labor in market, than of any other commodity. This, which is untrue of countries, where the laws do not interfere with the natural course of production and distribution, is the foundation of all that is erroneous and extravagant in the Malthusian theory of population. Accordingly, McCulloch, (as well as Malthus,) thinks that a reduction in the price of corn, would increase the means of subsistence, lower natural and market wages, and stimulate population to grow still faster than its subsistence, (p. 473.) But an author of such power of thought, cannot be consistent in error, and he soon says that "a fall in the cost of producing any article consumed by the laborer, or suitable for his consumption, must in so far improve

his condition. The demand for labor is in most cases immediately increased, and it is never generally or permanently reduced by a reduction in the cost of production.

It is no doubt, true, that were population to increase, as it is sometimes alleged it would, proportionally to the increased demand for labor, or to the fall in the price of produce, the improvement in the condition of the laborer, would only be temporary. But it is not improbable merely, but next to impossible, that population should increase in the same proportion." (p. 473.) All this is as true, as it is inconsistent with his former conclusions, to which he apparently returns on the next page, when he says,—

"It has been already seen that the cost of raw produce has a natural tendency to rise in the progress of society; and as the greater part of the wages of labor is laid out on its purchase, it is plain that the rate of wages, though occasionally reduced by improvements in agriculture, manufactures, &c., must also have a natural tendency to rise, as society advances, and population becomes denser."(p. 474.)

What, then becomes of the Malthusian theory, that as society advances, and population grows denser, the condition of the working classes grows worse? In order to reconcile both theories, a distinction has to be drawn between "absolute wages, or wages measured by the quantity of commodities they will exchange for, or buy, and proportional wages, or wages measured by the share of the produce of his labor." But as we have shown, labor receives, not a part of the produce of its present exertions, but the whole of the produce of its past exertions. Proportional wages therefore, are measured only by the proportion between the wages of last year, and the wages of this, or the ratio between the capital, expended in production, and that produced. This is properly a question of profits, not of wages, and when we cease to speak of absolute wages, we confuse, and in truth abandon, the whole question.

It follows, of course, that Mr. McCulloch, in his Note on Profits, represents that wages and profits vary inversely, which, as we have shown, can be true only of temporary market rates, not of the natural rates, which determine the average market rates.

The Note on Rent is a clear, able exposition of the theo ry we have attempted to sustain. Many of the objections to this theory are founded on the rather illogical distinction,

drawn by Mr. Ricardo, and others, between fertility, as a source of rent, and (to use McCulloch's words,) "those peculiarities of soil or situation which afford a rent on the principle of monopoly." (p. 447.) "Tokay, fine hock, chambertin, constantia, or any peculiar kind of produce, obtainable only from particular soils, and in limited quantities," are given examples. The difference is one of degree, not of kind. The monopoly of Tokay, &c., is absolute, while that of cheaply produced corn is limited by the cost at which less fertile soils will produce it.

Another motive for the opposition this theory has encountered, is, that its advocates usually insist that as inferior soils must be occupied in the progress of society, corn must grow dearer. But these soils, though iuferior to others in use, may be actually superior to the best formerly used. To use a form of illustration, which Mr. McCulloch resorts to for other purposes, let us suppose that

A. B. C. are qualities of land, and that

100, 90, 80, are the quantities of produce obtained with equal capitals, and

20 10, 0, are the Rents.

It is obvious that C. cannot be cultivated, until the market price has so risen above the natural price of the produce of A, that 70 bushels sell for as much as 100 formerly did. Now let us suppose, that by some improved processes of agriculture, the same capitals will produce

That is 50 per cent more. equal ratio. Yet the 120 bushels can only sell for what the So did, before the improvement, or what the 100 did, before C. was cultivated. Thus the price of the produce will be reduced one third, compared with its rate, before the improvement, and one sixth, compared with what it was at first. This case proves that the mere fact of cultivation of classes of soils of unequal fertility, does not prove that the price of grain is higher, than it was at an earlier period.

Rents of course are raised in an

The same errors, which detract from the value of Mr. McCulloch's writings, infect the Treatise on Political Economy, by M. JEAN BAPTISTE SAY. Indeed all that portion, which treats of price and distribution, is very inferior to either the Wealth of Nations, or McCulloch's Notes.

There is no other scientific writer of Mr. Say's eminent talents, who has permitted himself such vagueness of phraseology. His definitions are rarely exact, and he uses terms as often in any other sense, as that in which he has defined them. This occasions such ambiguities, that very close attention, and a collation of various passages, are at times necessary, before his true meaning can be detected.

As an illustration of this we may notice the various ways in which he uses the word value. He first says that wealth consists only of things which have "inherent value," or "real and intrinsic value." (p. 1.) He adds, that this value is, not the estimation of the owner of an article, but the estimation fixed by other persons, and measured by what they are willing to give in exchange for it. Here then, he must mean by value, exchangeable value. Yet, on the next page, he says that "the utility of things, or their inherent fitness or capability to satisfy the various wants of mankind, is the ground-work of their value," and that we may be certain he does not mean merely that utility is a condition, without which value could not exist, he says that "value is the measure of the utility" of things, as price is the measure of value. He has therefore changed his meaning already, and confounds exchangeable value, with value in use. To escape the necessary consequence that air and water are articles of high exchangeable value, he says, that they are destitute of such value, because "the want of them is never felt." But surely, this does not impair their utility, and how can it impair their value, since "value is the measure of their utility?" To reconcile these contradictory statements with each other, and with truth, he says, very truly, that, "in this science, relative value is the only guide," and that "objects are items of wealth," not "in respect of their actual utility," but "of their admitted or recognized utility." (p. 236, note.) But is it not a complete perversion of language, to say that air and water are not objects of "admitted and recognized utility?" Take his own definition of utility, and can he pretend that air and water are not objects of admitted and recognized "inherent fitness or capability to satisfy certain wants of mankind?"

Such is a specimen of his mode of using language, and to this very ambiguity in the use of the word value, many of his most important errors may be traced. In such a writer, detached passages may be found, which appear to