human life,"* and that which must dignify and exalt it, is the more intimate and strict conjunction of contemplation and action. When pursued in all its high relations, it will work to the practical good of mankind. Every discovery of a general principle, is sure to result in some useful application. It is, indeed, a knowledge of general principles that gives us power over the material and intellectual world. By these we invent machines, and by these we make laws. Our highest efforts, then, should be extended in the discovery of these; and this it is, that "grounds us in learning," and that advances knowledge.

Our education on the contrary, has been reduced, in the general, to mere detail; to an almost puerile collection of facts, without any investigation into the principles that bind them together, or without at all training the mind to search. into the causes and effects of things. We see these remarks illustrated in a multitude of instances; in our public and private instruction; in the discourses of our public men; and in the innumerable crowds of trashy effusions ushered forth to the public. There has never been, perhaps, an age in the history of nations, in which so vast a number of publications has been given to the world. One half of mankind seem to have become literary mechanics for the express purpose of manufacturing books. "Scribimus indocti, doctique."

But what is the character of these forced, unnatural creatures of the brain? Do they manifest high and cultivated genius? Are they built on those high and solid foundations-sound thought and systematic arrangement--which are the only means of securing laudable distinction, or of advancing the cause of true knowledge? These are characteristics seldom to be met with in the great mass of the writings of the day, thousands of which are daily issued from the press with no higher aim than to accumulate the "miserable pelf," that gives men a little importance in society. This is so strongly stamped upon their very nature, as to require little scrutiny to be convinced of the truth of the assertion. We find strung together masses of facts, without taste, without logic, without even the common rules of

"Locuples armarium, et gazophylacium ad opificis rerum omnium gloriam, et vitæ humanæ subsidium." De Aug. Lib. I.

+ De Augmentis. See further on the true ends of knowledge, Bacon's Es says, art. Studies; also, Interpretation of Nature.

bold and dignified composition. How is it possible for such works to become models of intellectual excellence, or to produce lasting benefit to society? So far from being beneficial, they are often worse than useless; they are injurious. No mind, how methodical soever, is capable of digesting them, or of appropriating, without useless labor, the information they contain. To search after truth in these, is like seeking diamonds in confused rubbish, where much is to be removed and little to be found; and to attempt to cultivate from them pure style or sentiment, would be in open violation of every principle of refined taste and elevated feeling. While they utterly fail, therefore, to discipline and to instruct the mind, they create a false taste in composition. Hence they only serve to throw barriers before the manly strides. of intellect.

Under these influences, it is impossible for true knowledge to flourish to any considerable extent. And this must always be the case, so long as we continue to estimate knowledge according to its particular, immediate utility; or in other words, according to the amount of money it may yield us. We might as well expect to see the tender plant of knowledge spring up and luxuriate in the despotic soils of Russia or of Turkey, as in the midst of this drivelling spirit. A paltry desire of gain is as fatal to the advancement of profound systematic learning, as the deadly-nightshade to the human constitution. Knowledge must be pursued for the sake of knowledge, before it can develope its grand results. And it must not be circumscribed in the nut-shells of low professional attainments. To reach its high ends, it is necessary to step over the little land-marks of professional distinctions, into the broad fields of knowledge, which contain the first principles of things. To aim short of this, is to debase knowledge, and to cripple its advancement. Convince men, that all information, not capable of being reduced immediately to practice in their particular calling is useless, or, that it will not in any way promote their interest, and all further efforts for improvement will be preposterous. It is irrational to suppose that any thing beyond a standard of low utility will be aimed at. Professional information, and that generally of a limited nature, will supply the place of all the higher and more varied sources of knowledge. It will, likewise, generate in the mind all its concomitant prejudices; all its illiberal feelings; and all its contracted notions. To a mere

theorizer on the subject, these might appear the vague conclusions of idle speculation. But they are too strongly corroborated by every day's experience and observation, to admit of doubt. In almost every profession in the country, this standard of narrow utility has been set up; and what have already been the results of it? Just as they always must be an imperfect disciplining of the mind and a low degree of knowledge. And hence it results, that few among us can be said to have their various propensities and facul ties properly developed, and that fewer still have their minds stored with profound and varied knowledge.

These evil results have, in a great measure, been produced, we believe, by the doctrines of the utilitarian school; by the advocates of exclusive professional attainments; in a word, by the defamers of general knowledge. And it is sincerely to be regretted, that among those who have favored these ruinous sentiments, there are many, whose fine sense of discernment, and whose comprehensive powers of mind, should have led them to different conclusions. It is always unfortunate, when men of genius and reputation lend their aid to the support of error. Authority is a moral power, which exerts peculiar influence on the minds of men. It of ten leads them to adopt opinions, contrary to their own convictions, and to commit acts, at which their consciences if left to themselves, would strongly revolt. Few individuals have indeed the hardihood to oppose opinions, propagated by men, whom they have been accustomed to regard as their superiors in moral and intellectual excellence. From this frailty of our nature, many errors are disseminated among mankind, and much injury is done to society, by men, too, who, in an honest conviction of their intentions are often led astray into the wildest extravagances. But we trust the time is come, when the errors of great men are no longer to have such absolute sway. We hope the age is arrived, when the mind, delivered from the trammels of authority, will assert its native freedom of thought, and press onward according to its own bent, in the investigation of truth. It is a noble maxim, though in homely Latin, laid down by the father of the English common law: "Nullius hominis authoritas tantum apud nos valere debet, ut meliora non sequeremur si, quis attulerit." Experience has shown that men of genius are liable to error, like other men. It is in truth a part of our nature. It is then a good maxim in

the conduct of the understanding, to adopt no opinions, how imposing soever the names that support them, until one is satisfied of their correctness. Nor is this calculated as some suppose, to unsettle opinions. Judge Story, ascribes the general infidelity in our country, in regard to scientific and religious matters, to a want of proper respect for great authothorities. Admitting this spirit of infidelity to exist to a very dangerous extent, I am led to ascribe it to a cause, the exact reverse of that urged by the lamented Judge. The true reason of this general unbelief and unfixedness of opinion, is the superficialness among us; the want of proper inquiry into the various subjects that interest the public mind. The dogmas of great men are received upon mere faith, upon naked belief, without any search into the reasonableness of them, and consequently without a consciousness of their correctness. And as these dogmas often prove fallacious, the slightly reflecting mind, hastily concludes all notions may be equally so. Many, who are too impatient or too indolent, to investigate, reason no better than this. Some of the opinions of some great men have been proved to be wrong all their opinions, therefore, may be wrong: but if some great men are liable to error, all may be. While, therefore, so much uncertainty exists, it is useless, they reason, to fix belief. Hence a habit of doubt and unbelief is formed, which if not checked in some way, is sure to lead to general infidelity.

To guard against this, we should adopt the opinions of others with proper care and reflection. The mind, that has fully satisfied itself of the truth of a proposition after careful analysis, is not likely to abandon it to suit every breeze of opinion. It appropriates it. It takes it into the memory as a part of its own active knowledge. To be supported by a great authority affords satisfaction, it is true; but without this, the mind is contented and fixed from a consciousness of the truth of its conclusion. Very different is it with the proposition, that has been barely taken into the memory without the conviction of its certainty. The mind scarcely cherishes it as its own. It is unstable. It is subject to all the whims and caprices of the fancy-at one time, producing doubt, at another, creating rash presumption. The mark of uncertainty is stamped on its very nature. It was governed yesterday, upon the authority of Plato; to-day, it is cast upon the dictum of Aristotle. From this sort of proce

dure, there can be no knowledge except by chance. Doubt and uncertainty will always attend our information; and these are the harlot mothers of infidelity.

Before adopting the opinions, then, even of great minds, we should inquire into their reasonableness; nor look upon them as authority, until satisfied of their truth. This reasoning does not conflict with the maxim, "oportet descentem credere;" but shows the importance of joining with it another "oportet edoctum judicare." Nor does it detract from great men, the merit, justly due them. It only points out to the honest inquirer after truth, the proper method to pursue. It only urges upon him to withhold his assent, until his judgment is instructed. To pursue this course is but assuming the proper dignity of our nature. It is but shaking off a servile dependency upon others in matters touching the highest estate of man, and asserting the proud prerogative of individual freedom. The slavery of the mind is the worst form of servility. It divests man of all the nobleness of character, with which he is endued by his Maker. It makes of him a base tool. And in following submissively after the dogmas of others, without exerting to the extent of our ability the noble powers which God has given us, to guide us in our judgments, what are we but the blind followers and slaves of autocrats? True, we should respect great authorities and honor them; but only when we find them to be right. Our first duty is to make this inquiry. And in so doing we detract no reverence from the great teachers of the sciences. We only establish our own proper dignity. "Disciples owe to masters only a temporary belief and suspension of judgment, until they are thoroughly instructed; not absolute resignation and perpetual servitude of mind. Let great authors have their due, but so as not to rob time, which is the author of authors, and the parent of truth."* Now it is easy to see the bad effects

Bacon, &c., Aug. Sci. lib. I. This great philosopher has not always himself, paid a very decent regard, we think, to his canon of judgment In his critique on eminent Philosophers, he breaks forth into the following tirade against the great Stagyrite: "Let Aristotle first appear, whom we charge (1) with abominable sophistry; (2) useless subtlety; (3) a vile sporting with words. Nay, when men by any accident, as by a favorable gale arrived at any truth and there cast anchor, this man had the assurance to fetter the mind with the heaviest irons; and composing a certain act of madness, enslaved mankind with words." This is unworthy of the great Verulam; but it shows that a man may lay down wise rules, and yet not follow them out very clearly in practice.