mined by the Court in its use of the term "ordinary low-water mark" in its decree; that the term "ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California" is the equivalent of "mean low-water mark on the coast of California" and that the technical meaning of the latter term is the intersection with the coast of the plane of the mean of all the low tides rather than the plane of the mean of the lower low tides (U. S. 151 et seq.). It is of course true that the datum plane of all the low waters and also the datum plane of the lower low waters has been established, and each of these planes is made use of under appropriate circumstances. Mr. Marmer, an outstanding authority, testified that though the expression "ordinary low water" is not a technical term it is understood "to mean average or mean low water," and has the same meaning as "mean low water" (Tr. 58). I think his testimony establishes that to a man skilled in the art the lay expression "ordinary low water" would be taken to mean the same thing as the more exact technical term "mean low water." But nothing has been brought to my attention to indicate that this Court when it used the expression "ordinary low water" in its decree purposely intended to choose the mean of all the low waters as distinguished from the mean of the lower low waters, or that the Court in the principal case judicially resolved the question now in dispute. I have been unable to conclude that that question has already been judicially determined. If, however, I am wrong in that, the correction of my error would lead to the same conclusion that I have recommended on other grounds. There is one further question that has to be determined before the chosen low-water mark can be located by actual survey. That is the question whether the surveyors are to take the low-water mark as it exists today; or whether allowances are to be made for natural or artificial modifications of the shoreline. The parties agree that natural accretions and relictions are to be disregarded. The question is thus narrowed to artificial changes in the shoreline including artificial fills and structures; and artificial structures include outer harborworks as well as inner harborworks. The question as to artificial structures has further been narrowed by the recommendation of counsel for the United States, that with respect to natural accretions added by gradual and imperceptible processes to the shoreline as a result of the presence of artificial structures, this Court should follow the socalled United States rule (See County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 66-69; Cf. Oklahoma v. Texas, 265 U. S. 493, 495) rather than the California rule (Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 787-794; 147 P. 2d 964, 972-975). Under the United States rule such natural accretions to tidelands accruing from artificial structures belong to the riparian owner of the accreted land. Since that is also California's position in the present controversy, the parties are in agreement that such accretions belong to California rather than to the United States. This further narrows the dispute down to the question of the dominion and power over the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the actual artificial structures or within areas between newly constructed outer harborworks and original inner harborworks. And even as to the first part of this narrowed question, the United States has taken the position, as I pointed out in my report of May 22, 1951 (p. 33), that it does not claim title to them: that it has drafted a bill which has been introduced in Congress to make clear that "it does not expect to under any circumstances claim or assert title or take over any improvements which may have been made by the State or by any political subdivision of the State." Counsel for the United States base their contention that the United States retains full dominion and power over the lands, minerals, and other things underlying these artificial projections and harbor areas within the more recently constructed outer harborworks, upon what they regard as the accepted rule of law that artificial changes in the shoreline, either in the nature of reclaiming land or constructing barriers which enclose water areas, do not change the title to the land affected by the improvements (Br. 100-101). They cite a number of cases in the courts of California, New Jersey, New York, and Iowa to this effect. California, on the other hand, contends (Cal. 123–132 and 134 et seq.) that these cases involving title to filled lands are not applicable in connection with the location of the marginal belt. Its position is that the full dominion and power of the United States rests, under the decision in the principal case and the decisions in the Texas and Louisiana cases, upon the national interests, national responsibilities, and national concern in matters of external sovereignty which rest in the United States in connection with the water area of the three-mile marginal belt; not in the area in which these responsibilities might have existed in 1850 or at any other time in the past but upon the responsibilities which now exist ACÍ. U. S. v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 704). In my recommendation I have rejected the position of the United States and accepted the position of California, believing that the California position is the legally sound one. I have been fortified in this conclusion by two ancillary considerations: The first of these is that the United States has full control of the erection of any such artificial accretions, because of its control of navigable waters. I think it may be assumed that in the past the question of the ownership of the lands, minerals, and other things underlying these artificial accretions has not been taken into consideration by the United States in passing judgment upon whether the accretions will be permitted; but it seems clear that in the future that aspect of the matter can be, and probably will be, taken into account. I do not share the view of counsel for the United States (U. S. 102) that this would be an undesirable situation. On the contrary, I think it would give opportunity for appropriate negotiations and agreement between the State and the United States at the time the artificial change is approved. Harbors The second of these ancillary considerations, applicable particularly to the question of outer harborworks, is that the position of the United States leads to an anomalous and I think unsound conclusion. Counsel for the United States admit (U. S. 101) that at The Hague Conference of 1930 the United States proposed and the Second Sub-Committee recommended that the baseline of the mar ginal belt should at harbors be the "outermost permanent harborworks," and they say that "*** it is probably still the position of the United States that the completion of permanent harborworks carves the particular area out of the high seas and vests complete control in the nation owning the mainland, and in that respect makes the area inland water." They contend, however, that this does not mean that in the internal relation between the states and the federal government title would pass. They say that, on the contrary, under the rule of title to real estate above referred to, title would not pass and would remain in the United States rather than pass to California. They do not suggest that there is any authority or precedent in domestic or international law for thus attributing a double status to these water areas. In my opinion, the contention that the boundaries of the marginal belt are at one place as between the United States and an individual State and at another, different place as between the United States and a foreign nation, is unsound on the general principle underlying the judgments in the principal case and the Teras and Louisiana cases, Finally, there is, in my opinion, another fallacy in the position taken by the United States with respect to the extent of inland waters at harbors. The concept of a port or harbor necessarily includes anchorage area for vessels that load and unload without docking or vessels that are waiting for dock space; just as the concept of a railroad terminal includes switching yards and waiting rooms. Counsel for the United States (U. S. 101, 107) take the position that the baseline of the marginal belt should be so drawn as to include only anchorages which are protected by the natural configuration of the coast; that it should exclude anchorages which are sheltered by, or in which a deficient natural sheltering is supplemented by, the artificial construction of a breakwater. No authority or precedent is cited for this conclusion, and it does not seem to me a reasonable one. It would be a particularly hard rule on a coast like that of California on which nature has afforded relatively little shelter. I think it is in conflict with the generalized consensus of the Second Sub-Committee at The Hague Conference that the outermost harborworks should be excluded from the marginal strip of open sea. It can safely be assumed that wherever an artificial breakwater is erected (always with the consent of and usually by the Corps of Engineers) the breakwater is planned to include a reasonable, adequate anchorage for the port in question. It is for these reasons that I have recommended that in front of harbors the outer limit of inland waters should embrace an anchorage reasonably related to the physical surroundings and the service requirements of the port, and, absent contrary evidence, may be assumed to be the line of the outermost harborworks. Respectfully submitted. New York, New York, October 14, 1952. WILLIAM H. DAVIS. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10426, SETTING ASIDE SUBMERGED LANDS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AS A NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows: SECTION 1. (a) Subject to valid existing rights, if any, and to the provisions of this order, the lands of the continental shelf of the United States and Alaska lying seaward of the line of mean low tide and outside the inland waters and extending to the furthermost limits of the paramount rights, full dominion, and power of the United States over lands of the continental shelf are hereby set aside as a naval petroleum reserve and shall be administered by the Secretary of the Navy. (b) The reservation established by this section shall be for oil and gas only, and shall not interfere with the use of the lands or waters within the reserved area for any lawful purpose not inconsistent with the reservation. SEC. 2. The provisions of this order shall not affect the operating stipulation which was entered into on July 26, 1947, by the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorney General of California in the case of United States of America v. State of California (in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1947, No. 12, Original), as thereafter extended and modified. SEC. 3. (a) The functions of the Secretary of the Interior under Parts II and III of the notice issued by the Secretary of the Interior on December 11, 1950, and entitled "Oil and Gas Operations in the Submerged Coastal Lands of the Gulf of Mexico" (15 F. R. 8835), as supplemented and amended, are transferred to the Secretary of the Navy; and the term "Secretary of the Navy" shall be substituted for the term "Secretary of the Interior" wherever the latter term occurs in the said Parts II and III. (b) Paragraph (c) of Part III of the aforesaid notice dated December 11, 1950, as amended, is amended to read as follows: "(c) The remittance shall be deposited in a suspense account within the Treas ury of the United States, subject to the control of the Secretary of the Navy, the proceeds to be expended in such manner as may hereafter be directed by an act of Congress or, in the absence of such direction, refunded (which may include a refund of the money for reasons other than those hereinafter set forth) or deposited into the general fund of the Treasury, as the Secretary of the Navy may deem to be proper." (c) The provisions of Parts II and III of the aforesaid notice dated December 11, 1950, as supplemented and amended, including the amendments made by this order, shall continue in effect until changed by the Secretary of the Navy. SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 9633 of September 28, 1945, entitled "Reserving and Placing Certain Resources of the Continental Shelf Under the Control and Jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior” (10 F. R. 12305), is hereby revoked. HARRY S. TRUMAN. THE WHITE HOUSE, January 16, 1953. (F. R. Doc. 53-734; Filed, Jan. 16, 1953; 4: 56 p. m.) JANUARY 16, 1953. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT REGARDING EXECUTIVE ORDER 10426, SETTING ASIDE SUBMERGED LANDS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AS A NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE I have today issued an Executive order setting aside the submerged lands of the Continental Shelf as a naval petroleum reserve, to be administered by the Secretary of the Navy. The great oil and gas deposits in these lands will be conserved and utilized in order to promote the security of the Nation. This is an important step in the interest of the national defense. The tremendous importance of oil to the Government of the United States in these times is difficult to overestimate. The latest statistics indicate that, during the year 1952, the domestic consumption of petroleum products in the United States averaged about 7.3 million barrels per day. A large part of that daily consumption of petroleum products was attributable to agencies of the Federal Government, particularly the three military departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The domestic production of petroleum during the year 1952, according to the latest statistics, averaged about 6.8 million barrels per day. It will be seen, therefore, that the production of petroleum in the United States during 1952 fell far short of meeting the consumption of petroleum products. This deficit is expected to grow larger year by year. In view of the great demand for oil by the Government for defense purposes, it is of the utmost importance that the vast oil deposits in the Continental Shelf, which are assets of all the people of the United States, be conserved and utilized for the national security. At the present time, there are a total of 22 known oilfields in the Continental Shelf adjacent to the coasts of California, Louisiana, and Texas. These known fields contain estimated proven reserves aggregating approximately 492 million barrels of oil. Moreover, it has been estimated, on the basis of available scientific data, that the Continental Shelf adjacent to the coasts of these three States actually contains a grant total of about 15 billion barrels of oil. In order that these great reservoirs of oil, which belong to all the people of the United States and are of such crucial importance from the standpoint of the national security, may be preserved for the Nation, I have set them aside as a naval petroleum reserve. The Executive order does not require the shutdown of any existing production of oil from submerged lands of the Continental Shelf. Special provisions have been inserted in the order to permit the continuation of this existing production. It has been, and still is, my firm conviction that it would be the height of folly for the United States to give away the vast quantities of oil contained in the Continental Shelf, and then buy back this same oil at stiff prices for use by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in the defense of the Nation. MEMORANDUM FEBRUARY 14, 1953. To: Senator Guy Cordon. From: Stewart French, staff counsel, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subject: Chronology of Major Background Events in Submerged Lands Contro versy. 1921: General leasing statute enacted by California, and under it the State Issued leases on lands over oil deposits extending out into the marginal sea. This statute was repealed in part in 1929, and from then until 1938 there was no general leasing by the State of under-ocean lands in California. In 1933 an act was passed permitting the leasing of certain lands necessary to protect the State against drainage. During this period, certain applications were made under the Federal Mineral Leasing Act. December 1933: Secretary of Interior Ickes rejected application filed under the Mineral Leasing Act by Dr. Olin S. Proctor of California for a lease on submerged lands on ground settled law is that "title to the shore and lands under water *** inures to the State within which they are situated" (answer of California, pt. II, p. 462, in United States v. California, 1945). Aug. 19, 1937: Senator Nye's Senate Joint Resolution 208, declaring lands below low water were the property of the United States and directing the Attorney General to take action to establish possession passes Senate. February 1938: First of the 14 hearings on submerged lands control held by House Judiciary Committee on above measure (see list of 14 hearings). 1938: Louisiana extends State boundaries 24 marine miles seaward from a belt 3 miles from her shores (West's Louisiana Revised Statutes, 49:). Texas extended her State boundaries similarly in 1941. September 28, 1945: President Truman issues Proclamation No. 2668 asserti that mineral resources of Continental Shelf “appertain to" the United S The same day, Executive Order No. 9633 placed such deposits under the ad: trative custody of the Secretary of the Interior (10 F. R. 12305). October 1945: Attorney General Clark files suit in Supreme Court a California (No. 12, Original). August 1946: Motion to override veto of House Joint Resolution Congress, a bill to assert title in the States, fails to obtain necessi majority in House. 1947: Texas extends her seaward boundaries to the outer nental Shelf (Acts of 50th Legislature (1947) ch. 253, p. 451). June 1947: Supreme Court rules that States do not own areas seaward of mean low water, but that Federal Government has "paramount rights" in them by virtue of sovereignty in external affairs of Nation (United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19). August 1947: Department of Interior and Justice issue formal administrative ruling that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, is not applicable to the submerged lands. January 30, 1948: Mayhew case filed by former Senator Burton K. Wheeler in United States District Court, District of Columbia, on behalf of applicant under Mineral Leasing Act for mandamus to Secretary of the Interior directing him to grant application on leases. December 1948: Actions against Louisiana and Texas initiated in Supreme Court by Attorney General. 1949: California Legislature enacts statute asserting State boundary runs 3 miles seaward from outer islands, rocks, and reefs off her shores (1949 Cal. Stats,, ch. 65; Cal. 56). June 1950: Supreme Court decisions in Louisiana and Texas cases affirmed California decision (339 U. S. 699; 339 U. S. 707). May 29, 1952: Senator Holland's substitute form of Senate Joint Resolution 20 vetoed by President and returned to Senate. November 1952: Final report of special master in California case filed, recommending location of inland water boundary along seven segments of California coast. 1953: Nine of the ten applicants' suits in United States Court for District of Columbia were "off calendar" until Supreme Court should determine demarkation of inland waters boundary. The remaining one, the Justheim case, had been taken under advisement by Judge McLaughlin. January 16, 1953: President Truman issued Executive Order No. 10426 purporting to set aside Continental Shelf as a naval petroleum reserve. STEWART FRENCH. MEMORANDUM To: Senator Guy Cordon, chairman, submerged lands legislation. There has been considerable discussion in the submerged lands hearings as to historic State seaward boundaries. For convenient reference, I submit the following table of provisions with respect to sea boundaries in the enabling acts under which the coastal States, other than the original 13, entered the Union, or in pertinent State constitutions which were approved by Congress. Washington.-The 50th Congress, in the act of February 22, 1899 (found in 25 Stat. 676), made no reference to sea boundaries, merely providing: "The inhabitants of all that part of the area of the United States now constituting the Territories of Dakota, Montana, Washington, as at present described may become the States * The Washington Territorial Organic Act [act of March 2, 1853], also is silent as to seaward boundaries. The first Washington State Constitution, adopted October 1, 1889, provided in section XXIV for a boundary "beginning at a point in the Pacific ocean one Marine league due West of and opposite the middle of the mouth of the north ship channel of the Columbia River ***" Subsequent to its adoption, Washington was admitted as a State by the proclamation of President Benjamin Harrison of November 11, 1899. Oregon. By the act of February 14, 1859 (11 Stat. 383) of the 33d Congress, Oregon was "*** received into the Union on a free and equal footing with other States in all respects whatever, with the following boundaries: * *. Beginning one marine league at sea due West from the point where the forty-second parallel of north latitude intersects the same; thence northerly, at the same distance along the line of the coast, lying West and opposite the State, including all islands within the jurisdiction of the United States California.—The 31st Congress in the act of September 9, 1850 (9 Stat. 452), provided: "*** The State of California (having submitted a constitution which 'is found to be republican in its form of government') *** is hereby admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever The California Constitution of 1849 had been trans |