APPENDIX G.-A TREATY PROPOSAL ON GERM WARFARE BY DR. JOSHUA LEDERBERG 1 (As published in the Washington Post, September 24, 1966) On September 19, a distinguished group of my scientific colleagues released the text of a petition to President Johnson concerning U.S. policy on biological and chemical warfare. They point to the encouragement for the wider commitment to these weapons that our own actions in Vietnam might generate. According to news reports, we are making extensive use of defoliating chemicals not only against forest cover but also against crops purportedly available to the Vietcong. At some times, tear gas has also been used in military and occupation missions. The United States has vehemently denied the military use of any biological weapons or of any lethal chemical weapons [and] has continued [to do so] since World War II. The Army has a well-known research facility at Fort Detrick, Md., and a testing station at Dugway, Utah. The aggressiveness with which these activities have been publicized may be laid to intraservice competion [sic] for funds to expand a line of work whose actual military utility is highly controversial. CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare) can easily evoke a highly emotional response, attracting the most vehement emotions on the inhumanity of war. The focus on boycott demonstrations against napalm production shows this; aircraft manufacture or steel production would be far more consequential to the roots of military homicide. The petitioners do not allude to the specific inhumanity of CBR, but it is undoubtedly involved in the stringency of their reactions. Can we be "rational" about the inhumanity of one class of weapons as against another? It is hard to imagine more inhuman methods of homicide than explosion or suffocation in a collapsed building or [of] starvation, the most widely practiced techniques of contemporary warfare. Humanitarian opposition to CBR is altogether irrational, except as it is directed to war itself. It can be argued, however, that man's proclivity to warfare must be contained through his social institutions, and any breakdown of traditional limitations in the way war is practiced is one more step of degradation of the species. The petition suggests that minor uses of CBR will lead to escalation. However, since tear gas is already rationalized for other social purposes, the lumping of chemical, biological, and radiological warfare may be especially confusing, and could exacerbate the chances of escalation. Biological warfare should be carefully set apart, particularly for the initiative in international negotiations, for several reasons: 1 The author is professor of genetics at the Stanford University School of Medicine, and a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1958. Its development is closest to medical research, therefore conveys the most intense perversions of the human aims of science. It is the most dubious of military weapons. Its effects in field use are most unpredictable, with respect to civilian casualties, and even retroactive on the user. The large scale deployment of infectious agents is a potential threat against the whole species: mutant forms of viruses could well develop that would spread over the earth's population for a new black death. Chemical weapons, however potent, at least do not produce equally or more virulent offspring! One approach to the control of biological warfare should be a nonproliferation treaty. Biological warfare development is within the potential resources of the smallest nations, and the weapons liable to the most irresponsible use. On the other hand, no vital interests of one nation are now committed to biological warfare: the powers can afford to limit their sovereignty in this area. A nonproliferation treaty in this area could be a constructive precedent for other areas of arms control; the more narrowly it is defined the greater the likelihood of its adoption. The treaty could dedicate all biological and medical research to human welfare. In this light, no research on living organisms could be classified. M.D.'s and Ph. D.'s in life sciences would be registered and expected to report periodically on their current research activity to an international organization. Ideally, these registrants should have the right of free travel, if necessary, for the purpose of reporting violations of the treaty. Special provisions are needed for proprietary interests, e.g., the drug industry, but with stringent time limits set for confidentiality of its information. A world data center for life sciences would have many human benefits, in addition to centralizing the surveillance of treaty obligations. The future of the species is very much bound up with the control of these weapons. Their use must be regulated by the most thoughtful reconsideration of U.S. and world policy. APPENDIX H.-RELATIVE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS1 [1 B-52 bomber carrying 20-megaton thermonuclear device or "equivalent" in chemical or biological agents] * From "Biological Warfare" by Robin Clarke, in Science Journal, November 1966, p. 76. Biological 34,000 square miles at 25 to 75 percent. A few to 14 days. Note. With respect to Mr. Clarke's estimates on biological effects, the reader is advised that the results of biologic agents are wholly unpredictable; that in contrast to the other weapons, "biologic agents make the human being not only a victim but also a propagator of the disease"; and that biologic agents once introduced produce more agents which may be equally or even more virulent than those introduced. (55) Its development is closest to medical research. the most intense perversions of the human aims o It is the most dubious of military weapons. Its effects in field use are most unpredictable, ilian casualties, and even retroactive on the user The large scale deployment of infectious threat against the whole species: mutant forms of viruses could well deve One approach to the control of biologic nonproliferation treaty. Biological warfare d potential resources of the smallest nations to the most irresponsible use. On the othe of one nation are now committed to biol can afford to limit their sovereignty in thi A nonproliferation treaty in this are precedent for other areas of arms contr defined the greater the likelihood of its The treaty could dedicate all biologi human welfare. In this light, no resear be classified. M.D.'s and Ph. D.'s in lif and expected to report periodically on to an international organization. Ide have the right of free travel, if necess violations of the treaty. Special provi interests, e.g., the drug industry, bu for confidentiality of its informatio sciences would have many human b the surveillance of treaty obligation The future of the species is very of these weapons. Their use must b reconsideration of U.S. and world Ah. res. war 2, and provides a winners with g on President cal warfare is a 1 by the impres e. is reminded of a ago. He was still used for scientific reasons to suppress an scientists, by a rium on the publication because it would Inb. Joliot-Curie alone s a leader of resistance alls of secrecy, produced Vagasaki. On this postwar f nuclear security to biocalled "The Secret War". er be declared. It could go den aggressors knowing what cessive crop failures, human nisms were not "in the books") te (because women were being would reveal the takeover bid. as arguing for full scientific disrwellian double-think of military re used to justify something quite 1 argument runs, "the Enemy is We have to think what he may be o find out what he may be finding urse. And, in the process, we will find ut but that is Top Secret because we re-emptive biological strike. That would e, as the Goodies, would just be acting gainst the Baddy. 10 had been major-general in the Royal was nearly black-balled from the post of World Health Organisation (WHO) because New York, before his appointment, he made d denouncing biological warfare. He gave tulin and how it was proposed to use it during ed defoliants, sterilants and other agents. He king security. tchie Calder in Science Journal, November 1966, p. 3. (57) |