willingness on the part of a number of delegations supporting that text to explore changes in the text without commitment.

C. Conditions of exploitation (rules and regulations).-After completing the debate on the exploitation system and three weeks before the end of the session, Committee I arrived at the agenda item of rules and regulations for deep seabed exploitation.

The U.S. Delegation made clear the importance which it attached to a full and comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in the conditions of exploitation. A lengthly, off-the-record statement was delivered that explained in detail the purpose of rules and regulations, why the U.S. considered it important that they be included in the treaty, and our difficulties with moving further in the Committee I work without an agreed commitment that conditions of exploitation were to be included in the treaty.

The Group of 77 decided to prepare their own text of basic conditions of exploitation, and indicated a willingness to create some formal mechanism for discussing and negotiating this issue.

The draft text on basic conditions of exploitation that emerged from the Group of 77 was for the most part an elaboration of their proposal on Article 9, granting almost complete discretion to the Authority in very general terms to make decisions concerning exploitation, so as to protect land-based producers and give the Authority "direct and effective control" over all operators. In certain areas it described in greater detail how the Authority should maintain control and sprinkled throughout were the seeds of ideas that might be converted into treaty articles to protect investment.

In addition to the Group of 77 proposal on basic conditions, draft rules and regulations were submitted to Committee I by the U.S., by Japan, and by eight members of the European Community.

D. Economic implications.—Committee I devoted several days of on-therecord debate to the issue of economic implications. Land-based producers of the metals contained in manganese nodules had in previous sessions of the Seabed Committee succeeded in winning widespread support for price and production controls, but the high profile given this issue during the Caracas session resulted in two new developments:

(a) Detailed presentations and question-and-answer periods with representatives of UNCTAD and the Secretary-General served to highlight the great uncertainty regarding any threat that the ocean mining industry may pose for the economies of developing country producers of the metals contained in nodules. (b) Several developing country representatives made public statements on the need to protect consumers from artificially high prices. This had never occurred in the Seabed Committee.

The U.S. Delegation submitted a Working Paper and made statements that pointed out the interests of all consumers in encouraging seabed output, the unlikelihood that the income of existing producers would decrease, even with seabed production, and the inherent difficulties and adverse effects of schemes to protect land-based producers. Several developing countries expressed a willingness not to require protective measures in the convention itself, and an insistence that a balance between consumer and producer interests be structured into whatever machinery was created for dealing with the potential problem.

E. Evaluation.-The work of Committee I advanced during the Caracas session. The inclusion of conditions of exploitation in the convention is widely accepted. However, the proposals for such conditions are at considerable variance with each other. Further, the Committee's discussion of economic implications led to a greater understanding of the complexity of the issue, coupled with a growing awareness among developing country delegations that the interests of their consumers might be damaged in attempts to protect a small number of developing country land-based producers who account for a minority share of the world's output, although the land-based producers continued to call for developing country solidarity. Most importantly, there was a new, more serious mood in the Committee that indicated an understanding that genuine negotiation is needed if an agreement is to be concluded. This mood, although intangible, can be demonstrated in the following developments:

(1) Most delegations opposed the Chairman's initial plan for two weeks of general debate-they wanted to get to work immediately;

(2) During the third reading of the Regime Articles, certain differences which were previously insurmountable were easily removed e.g.,

(a) The key Article on the common heritage concept was reduced from four to two alternatives-it would have been unanimously agreed but for the refusal

of only a handful of delegations to add language to the principle of the common heritage;

(b) The differences over the Authority's power to regulate scientific research, which had been addressed in several different Articles, were restricted to only two Articles in the Regime;

(3) The Group of 77 was able to agree among themselves on what they believe to be a more flexible approach to Article 9, and agreed to discuss Article 9 along with the conditions of exploitation;

(4) An attempt by several land-based producers and a few others to prohibit reference to the conditions of exploitation in the debate on Article 9 was defeated; (5) The Jamaican proposal for Article 9, although significantly different from that of the Group of 77, was supported by several developing country representatives. This proposal was subsequently made a general footnote to the Articles; (6) Proposals for basic conditions of exploitation were presented and a Working Group for negotiating this issue, together with Article 9, was established;

(7) In various general statements and in all drafts of the basic conditions, the need to ensure an attractive and secure investment climate for deep seabed exploiters was acknowledged;

(8) Efforts by a few delegations to rally support for a vote on Article 9 did not succeed;

(9) Attempts by several land-based producers to prevent informal economic seminars on economic implications were unsuccessful;

(10) Efforts by a few delegations to obstruct progress in the Negotiating Group did not succeed;

(11) The principle of compulsory settlement of disputes and the establishment of a dispute settlement organ in the Seabed Authority was widely endorsed. 3. Committee II

The following are excerpts from the final summing-up of the Chairman of Committee I on August 28 (DOC.A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.86):

In 13 informal Working Papers the officers of the Committee summarized the main trends with respect to the various subjects and issues, as they had been manifested in proposals submitted to the United Nations Seabed Committee or at the Conference itself. . . . In view of the nature and purpose of those papers, each of them had been submitted to the Committee in formal working meetings. Thus all the members of the Committee have had the opportunity to make observations on these papers in their original versions and in their first revised versions. After considering those observations in detail, the officers prepared a first and, in almost all cases, a second revision of the papers which, by agreement of the Committee, is the final version.

Thus what we have is the collective work of the Committee which, with the limitations and reservations to be indicated in the general introduction and, in some cases, in the explanatory notes accompanying certain of the papers, is a faithful reflection of the main positions on questions of substance that have taken the form of draft Articles of a convention.

Assembling these papers in a single text, with consecutive numbering makes it possible to present in an orderly fashion the variants which at this state of the work of the Conference are offered for consideration by states with respect to the subjects and issues falling within the Committee's competence.

This document, in my opinion, should serve not only as a reference text relating to the most important work done by the Committee at this session but also as a basis and point of departure for the future work of this organ of the Conference. It would be senseless to begin all over again the long and laborious process which has led us to the point where we now stand.

No decision on substantive issues has been taken at this session, nor has a single Article of the future Convention been adopted, but the states presented here know perfectly well which are at this time the positions that enjoy support and which are the ones that have not managed to make any headway.

The paper that sums up the main trends does not pronounce on the degree of support which each of them had enlisted at the preparatory meetings and the Conference itself, but it is now easy for anyone who has followed our work closely to discern the outline of the future Convention.

So far each state has put forward in general terms the positions which would ideally satisfy its own range of interests in the seas and oceans. Once these positions are established, we have before us the opportunity of negotiation based on an objective and realistic evaluation of the relative strength of the different opinions.

It is not my intention in this statement to present a complete picture of the situation as I see it personally, but I can offer some general evaluations and comments.

The idea of a territorial sea of 12 miles and an exclusive economic zone beyond the territorial sea up to a total maximum distance of 200 miles is, at least at this time, the keystone of the compromise solution favored by the majority of the states participating in the Conference, as is apparent from the general debate in the Plenary meetings, and the discussion held in our Committee.

Acceptance of this idea, is, or course, dependent on the satisfactory solution of other issues, especially the issue of passage through straits used for international navigation, the outermost limit of the continental shelf and the actual retention' of this concept and, last but not least, the aspiration of the land-locked countries and of other countries, which, for one reason or another, consider themselves geographically disadvantaged.

There are, in addition, other problems to be studied and solved in connection with this idea, for example, those relating to archipelagos and the regime of islands in general.

It is also necessary to go further into the matter of the nature and characteristics of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, a subject on which important differences of opinion still persist.

On all these subjects substantial progress has been made which lays the foundations for negotiation during the intersessional period and at the next session of the Conference. (End of quotation)

A. Territorial sea.-Agreement of a 12-mile territorial sea is so widespread that there were virtually no references to any other limit in the public debate. Major conditions for acceptance of 12 miles as a maximum limit were agreement on unimpeded transit of straits and acceptance of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. A variety of articles have been introduced on the territorial sea regime which, for the most part, parallel the provisions of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.

B. Contiguous zone. The contiguous zone is an area where the coastal state may take measures to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws in its territory or territorial sea. Its maximum limit is 12 miles under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. Some states seem to feel that with the establishment of a 12-mile territorial sea, the contiguous zone has become superfluous. Others would like it extended to an area beyond 12 miles. C. Straits. The introduction of the U.K. Articles was the major event of the session, as the U.K.-as both a maritime power and a state bordering the most heavily used strait in the world-necessarily sought an accommodation of the interests involved. These articles were well received. The U.S.S. R. and Oman introduced articles on straits as well. In general, there was a trend in the direction of unimpeded passage. While there was little public movement toward conciliation on the part of the straits states, debate was less heated. The U.S. made a statement reiterating the fundamental importance of unimpeded passage on, over, and under straits used for international navigation, and addressed means of accommodating the concerns of straits states with respect to security, safety, and pollution. The U.S. also made it clear that distinctions regarding the right of passage could not be made between commercial vessels and warships.

D. High seas.-Discussion centered on issue of whether or not the high seas regime, as modified with respect to fishing, etc., would apply in 200-mile zone beyond the 12-mile territorial sea. The U.S. sponsored draft articles on this issue, on fishing beyond the economic zone, and also co-sponsored articles providing for hot pursuit from the economic zone and continental shelf.

E. Access to the sea.-There was little visible progress on the issue of landlocked state access to the sea, although there appears to be growing recognition among coastal states that the question needs to be dealt with fairly. Negotiation of the issue is probably tied to some extent to the question of access to and benefits from the resources of the economic zone.

F. Archipelagos.-The Bahamas, Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, and the Philippines strongly advocated adoption of the archipelago concept. The issue has been complicated by the addition of arguments for archipelagic treatment of island groups belonging to continental states, with substantial differences of view indicated in conference statements on this issue. It is widely recognized that the key issues of definition and transit of archipelagic waters must be resolved for a satisfactory accommodation on the issue.

G. Economic zone and continental shelf.—(I) General: Over 100 countries spoke in support of an economic zone extending to a maximum limit of 200

nautical miles. With respect to the content of the zone; there is widespread support for the following:

(a) Coastal state sovereign or exclusive rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources;

(b) Coastal state rights and duties with respect to pollution and scientific research to be specified, presumably in the Chapters of the Convention being prepared in Committee III.

(c) Exclusive coastal state rights over artificial islands and most installations; (d) Exclusive coastal state rights over drilling for all purposes;

There is also general agreement that there would be freedom of navigation and overflight in the economic zone, as well as other third state rights such as laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines. Provisions for the accommodation of uses in the zone would be included.

It is also widely recognized that a variety of detailed provisions regarding coastal state and third state rights in the economic zone will determine whether this overall framework can be translated into a generally acceptable treaty. Virtually all these details, in alternative form, are now present in the informal Working Paper (No. 4 on the Economic Zone) thus laying a clear foundation for negotiation and decision of these issues. With a few exceptions, economic zone proposals have now been proffered from all conference groups, including the U.S. These proposals have been incorporated into the alternative texts on main trends.

The major problems encountered in the economic zone negotiation center on the following points:

(1) What are the rights of the coastal state with respect to scientific research and vessel-source pollution? The issues are being dealt with in Committee III and are discussed in Section 4 of this Report.

(2) Do the rights of coastal states over the seabed and subsoil resources of the continental shelf extend beyond 200 miles where the continental margin extends beyond that limit? While a trend toward agreement on such jurisdiction is discernible, with some states declaring that such jurisdiction is a condition of agreement for them, there has been resistance from landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, and from some African coastal states. The U.S. proposal of an accommodation that includes coastal state jurisdiction over the margin coupled with revenue-sharing as a solution to the problem is picking up additional support, but is still strongly opposed by some coastal states with large margins. The idea proposed by some landlocked states that they have rights of access to mineral resources of adjacent coastal states has met strong and widespread opposition.

(3) What are the duties of the coastal states with respect to conservation and full utilization of fish stocks? What are the rights of access of landlocked states to fisheries? What is the role of regional and international organizations in fisheries management? What special provisions should be included for highly migratory species and for anadromous species? Section (II) below addresses the fisheries question.

(4) What principles apply to the delimitation of the economic zone or continental shelf between adjacent and opposite states? Any precise formula will tend to divide the Conference, since for each coastal state that supports a particular rule-e.g., equidistance-another naturally reacts in fear that it will lose some area. This problem has in turn given rise to arguments over the weight to be given to islands in such delimitation and, even further, to arguments that small or uninhabited islands are not entitled to an economic zone at all. The realization is growing that the Conference could become hopelessly bogged down if it tries to deal definitively with essentially bilateral delimitation problems.

(5) Collateral political and other issues. Numerous proposals have now been introduced regarding islands or areas under foreign domination or control. While most are now designed to ensure benefits for the local inhabitants, some go farther and address questions of administration or total denial of rights. Similarly, other questions have been raised that are more appropriately considered in other forums. (6) The Legal Status of the Economic Zone. It is clear to all that the economic zone is not a territorial sea. It is equally clear that some classic high seas freedoms will be eliminated (e.g., fishing) or modified, while others, subject to the provisions on pollution), will be retained (e.g., navigation and overflight). It appears that the provisions of the Convention regarding coastal state rights will need further elaboration before some states feel secure enough to grapple with the issue in precise terms.

In an effort to mollify such concerns, the U.S.-after consultation with a number of coastally-oriented states-introduced the following text:

The regime of the high seas, as codified in 1958 United Nations Convention on the High Seas, shall apply as modified by the provisions of this Chapter and the other provisions of this Convention, including, inter alia, those with respect to the Economic Zone, The Continental Shelf, the Protection of the Marine Environment, Scientific Research and the International Sea-Bed area.

(7) Dispute Settlement. Since the heart of the economic zone negotiation turns on a balance of rights and duties, the question of dispute settlement becomes a critical element. On the one hand, guarantees are sought against unreasonable interpretations, particularly as they affect navigation and overflight. On the other hand, a measure of coastal state resource management discretion is clearly inherent in the exercise of resource jurisdiction. The dispute settlement question is also examined in Section 5 of this Report.

There appears to be a genuine desire to negotiate on these questions, and they are likely to dominate regional and international consultations before the next session.

(II) Fisheries: The maritime nations, in particular the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R., made significant moves toward increased coastal states rights. In early August the U.S. tabled draft Articles setting forth in detail a 200-mile economic zone system, which implemented its earlier expression of a willingness to accept a 200mile economic zone as part of satisfactory overall settlement of conference issues including unimpeded transit of straits, and dependent on a concurrent negotiation and acceptance of correlative coastal state duties. These duties would include a duty to conserve fisheries and a duty to permit foreign fishing under coastal state regulation where a fishery resource is not fully utilized, and international and regional cooperation in establishing equitable conservation and allocation regulations for highly migratory species such as tuna, that includes fees and special allocations for the coastal state in the economic zone. Additionally, we reiterated our position on special treatment for anadromous species such as salmon. Three main approaches seem to have emerged with respect to fisheries in the economic zone. One is complete exclusively, with no coastal state duties. Another is the U.S. type approach, which couples exclusive coastal state regulation with conservation and full utilization duties. A third, exemplified by the Articles presented by 8 EEC states, emphasizes the role of regional organizations.

While advocates of the first approach dwelt largely on conceptual arguments in the public meetings, private discussions tend to reveal more flexibility.

It is widely recognized that there should be special provision regarding landlocked state access to fisheries. In the U.S. Articles, this is presented in conjunction with the full utilization concept, but a coastal state is free to give special priority to neighboring landlocked and dependent coastal states.

The provisions on highly migratory species in the U.S. Articles represent a large conceptual and substantive shift in the hope of finding reasonable accommodation. A large number of developing country delegates have commented favorably on the U.S. move.

In response to conceptual problems with jurisdiction following salmon beyond the economic zone, the U.S. has now proposed a ban on fishing for salmon beyond the territorial sea, except as authorized by the state of origin for purposes of ensuring full utilization.

Despite these positive signs, the failure to come to grips with the question of access and full utilization still plagues the negotiation, and is of central importance to the ultimate ability of the Conference to accommodate widely disparate interests on the subject.

(HI) Continenta! shelf: Draft articles on the continental shelf were contained in L. 4 (Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway) and in L. 47 (U.S.). Coastal state jurisdiction beyond 200 miles, reflected in both submissions, was the major theme of debate. Other issues such as limits between states remain divisive.

Formal debate presented an opportunity for states favoring extention of coastal state jurisdiction beyond 200 miles and for those favoring a limit of 200 miles to present their positions. African states speaking, with exception of Mauritius, generally advocated the position in the OAU Declaration against coastal state jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. Other opposition came principally from land-locked and other geographically disadvantaged states plus Japan. States in favor of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental margin beyond 200 miles included numerous Latin Americans and Asians, Western Europeans, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Mauritius. The Soviet Union supports jurisdiction