mittee also discuss one other possibility which we do not feel would be helpful to our fisheries interests or to the effort to conclude a Law of the Sea Treaty.

This is an approach that would unilaterally extend the United States fisheries contiguous zone from the present 12 miles to 200 miles without waiting for a treaty.

There are a number of problems that we see in any such approach. First, we feel that the precedent of the United States which is looked to very strongly for leadership in oceans policy, going unilateral at this time would be extremely harmful to overall U.S. oceans interests. If the United States is to take unilateral action for the purpose of protecting our fisheries stocks this does not control what other nations will do when they respond with unilateral action designed to protect the particular interest that they may be most concerned about at that time.

We are very concerned in the soundings that we have taken from our embassies on this issue and the discussions we have had with key leaders at the Law of the Sea Conference that in fact unilateral action by the United States such as extension to 200 miles would have a grave implication for triggering unilateral claims by other nations. Many of these claims would damage very severely other issues and other interests that this committee has before it; for example, the protection of our merchant marine interests, the general navigational interest of the country, our interest in freedom of marine scientific research and a variety of other oceans interests that we feel can only be effectively protected by a comprehensive oceans treaty. On the other hand, a pattern of unilateral claims seems destined through time to lead to 200-mile territorial seas which would very severely threaten free navigation as well as a variety of other important oceans interests.

A second concern which we have with going to 200 miles unilaterally is that we feel that such a move would be seriously damaging to the foreign relations of the United States and could pose a risk of serious confrontation with foreign nations off our coasts such as the Soveit Union, Japan, or a number of other fishing nations.

Lest we dismiss this one completely as an imaginary horrible thing, we should reflect on the events which followed the unilateral extension by Iceland to 50 miles. In the wake of the Icelandic action there were armed confrontations between Icelandic vessels and vessels of the United Kingdom.

In addition, I think we should keep in mind that the Soviet Union, like the United States, is engaged in what is considered one of the most important multilateral negotations in which it has ever been engaged and it would be extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to accept a unilateral claim directly counter to its interests during the course of those negotiations.

Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, we feel that such an approach would be damaging to U.S. fisheries interests.

It would pose a threat to our distant water coastal fishermen such as our fishermen for shrimp that are fishing off a number of Latin American coasts within 200 miles of the coast, and despite the fact that our legislation has the full utilization principle written into it, we feel that if we went unilateral it is unlikely that other states would be willing to include in any unilateral action they may take appropriate.

provisions for our distant water fishing interests and the full utilization principle.

Similarly, we feel that with respect to highly migratory species, the tuna stocks, in which many of our fishermen fish within 200 miles of the coasts of other states, that we would be seriously endangering the ability of those fishermen to continue. Again it would be very difficult to expect that unilateral actions in those cases would have carefully built-in provisions protecting highly migratory species and seeking a more rational management regime throughout the range of those stocks.

With respect to our coastal and our salmon fishing interests we are also very concerned that a pattern of unilateral action at this time. could, in fact, lead other nations to drag their heels in the negotiations we are now conducting to further protect the stocks off our coasts or in some cases possibly to abrogate existing agreements which we have made with those governments.

If that were to happen, of course, we could lose some of the protection which has already been achieved with respect to our coastal and our salmon stocks.

We also feel with respect to our fisheries interests that unilateral action by the United States to 200 miles could threaten our ability to achieve an important environmental obligation that would apply to all coastal states; that is, that there would not be a management regime which would permit utilization exceeding maximum sustainable yield.

That kind of provision is one that is being considered in the Law of the Sea negotiations but if coastal states see that they can merely extend their jurisdiction and get the kind of control they would like by unilateral claims without the necessity of agreement, then this may well undercut our ability to obtain good environmental controls protecting fish stocks worldwide and insuring full utilization of those stocks.

Fourth, Mr. Chairman, we are concerned that a unilateral extension by the United States from the present 12-mile fishery contiguous zone to 200 miles would not be consistent with international law.

The United States has consistently protested claims of an extension of the fisheries contiguous zone beyond 12 miles and to make a shift during the course of the Law of the Sea negotiations would be extremely difficult from the standpoint of international law.

In addition, the International Court of Justice has recently held in two cases arising from the cod war that the unilateral extension by Iceland to 50 miles in that case violated the legal rights of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the United Kingdom. So you see we have a very recent precedent which would be extremely difficult to overcome from the standpoint of international law.

Fifth, Mr. Chairman, we feel that this approach would have the potential to very seriously undercut the Law of the Sea Conference. If there are to be a series of unilateral claims made so that when we go to the Geneva session and come to the point of concluding the final agreement we discover that in the interim many other nations of the world have gone unilateral with claims they seek to protect, once that occurs it is extremely difficult to walk the cat back.

In addition, we are concerned that unilateral action in the fisheries area which is a very important part of the overall package treaty now

being negotiated could undermine the overall package agreement and thereby seriously injure the totality of interests that we have at stake in the negotiation.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it would seem to us that any benefits from such an extension must be measured against the enforcement costs which would result from trying to enforce a claim to this 200 mile area against nations which do not accept that claim. I think that is the critical point that we need to focus on in terms of enforcement cost.

The real point is the difference between an arrangement in which there is basically self-policing, that is, that the other participants agree with the authority of the law and accept the claim as opposed to the situation which would be the case with unilateral extension, of the other participants not accepting the particular claim and thereby requiring a higher enforcement cost for equal effectiveness.

The difference, to use a domestic analogy, is that if the population accepts that the Government has authority to enact laws saying a person should stop at red traffic lights, it is not necessary to station a policeman at every traffic light to have a workable system. On the other hand, if the basic pattern is one of nonacceptance of the claim, it will be necessary to incur an additional cost of a larger enforcement effort to achieve the same degree of enforcement.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we have recognized that there is a serious global fisheries problem and there is a serious problem that the United States has both with respect to our coastal stocks and with respect to protection of our interests in distant water fishing off other countries. We believe that we do have a good solution to those problems. In fact, we think it is the only effective solution to these problems, that is, a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty.

At the same time we are concerned about the interim difficulties and have sought to meet those

I do not pretend to indicate that we can solve all of our interim fisheries problems. We cannot, but we do feel we can make substantial progress toward protection of those stocks in the interim period.

I have also not sought to discuss the specifics of an approach rooted in the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. Such an approach such as that contained in H.R. 15619 introduced by Congresswoman Sullivan and other members of this committee is potentially not as objectionable as legislation rooted in a unilateral extension to 200 miles.

The principal problem with H.R. 15619, an approach based on article VII, of course, is that the most important nations fishing for our coastal and anadromous stocks including the Soviet Union and Japan are not parties to the 1958 convention but with appropriate changes it is possible that H.R. 15619 or a similar measure rooted in existing international law could be a useful alternative to an approach based on the 200-mile extension.

Accordingly, before commenting further on the approach of H.R. 15619 the executive branch would welcome an opportunity for further study with this committee and the Congress with a view to examining the possibility of changes which might make that legislation acceptable.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I am sorry to have taken as much time as I have in going through these materials in great detail but it is my feeling that this committee and the Congress is

faced with the most fundamental choice that we have ever made for the future of U.S. oceans policy.

Again, thank you.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.

Mr. Downing?

Mr. DOWNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moore, that case involving the Icelandic unilateral extension of its fishing zone can be argued both ways, can it not?

Let me elaborate on that a little, if you will. The Court found, or I think they indicated, that it was in violation only because it did not take into consideration the rights of foreign nations already fishing in the area nor, I believe the fishing interests of others.

As long as these two factors are present and proper negotiations. are undertaken I believe the Court indicated it would be within international law for the coastal state to assert preferential fishing rights in zones off its coast. Is that not correct?

Mr. MOORE. Congressman Downey, I have learned to be ex-tremely cautious to international law questions posed by persons. such as you trained under Judge Hardy Dillard of the International Court of Justice.

I think there are points that emerge on both sides of those two cases to certain protective actions which might be taken.

The Court is moving to some extent in the direction of recognizing certain preferential rights for coastal states which are dependent on or heavily dependent on fishing off their coast as well as the duty to conserve endangered stocks.

I think your point is accurate.

Mr. DOWNING. Thank you. I knew that both sides of the question were using this case as precedent.

Let us get to the deep-sea mining for a moment. As you know there are factors here which require quick action. One, we need manganese. We need to become self-sufficient in manganese and not have to depend on 98 percent of our manganese being imported from other

countries.

In 1980 I am told we will be importing 100 percent of our manganese. Already countries producing manganese and other minerals found in manganese nodules have made attempts similar to OPEC, to set price floors on those minerals. If successful, they could put an embargo on minerals just as the Arab nations put an embargo on oil.

Secondly, and almost as important is the fact that the three, four, or five companies in this country that have had the initiative to go forward so that we will be in a position to mine minerals of the sea in the next few years cannot afford to wait any longer and some of those companies have combined with foreign nations in order to get the necessary capital.

A example of this is Deep Sea Ventures which is located in my area. They could not wait any longer, so they formed a consortium with Japan and now that is no longer solely an American venture.

We would like to take action now so that these companies can go forward, and can be in position 2 or 3 years to recover and process deep seabed minerals in commercial quantities. For that reason, I hope we can move now on our domestic legislation.

Now tell me, what are your views about that?

Mr. MOORE. If I could for a moment just qualify my answer to the preceding question by adding that the Court also indicated that the essence of the decision was that there was no agreement entered into with those fishing off the coast of Iceland and that the particular unilateral action taken was in the absence of agreement in violation of their legal rights.

Mr. DOWNING. But had those factors been taken into consideration it would not have been a violation.

Mr. MOORE. Had they taken action by agreement with the countries fishing off their coast, not by unilateral action, that certainly would have been consistent with international law.

With respect to our very great interest in deep seabed mining and access to the mineral resources of the deep seabed we certainly agree that this is an important part of the overall U.S. interest in the

oceans.

We also agree that our companies at the present time are at a point of decision and are having difficulties in raising the kind of capital that is necessary to get on with the job of mining the deep seabed.

Again, the problem is one that we do not have a sufficiently stable legal regime to permit the raising of that capital.

We have felt that the best solution to this problem was a comprehensive oceans law treaty which would also provide a good regime and machinery that would permit secure access by U.S. firms to these mineral resources.

We are working as strongly as we can in the international negotiation to insure that this interest will be protected.

Mr. DOWNING. Another thing comes to mind. If we passed a law which would permit U.S. companies to mine the deep sea, and we licensed them to mine certain tracts, and they proceeded to mine those tracts, then along comes the International Law of the Sea Conference and they agree on some other system for deep-sea mining, the companies that were already in place, that is U.S. companies, might lose their prior rights, might they not?

Mr. MOORE. I think again this is a reason that we need an agreed regime for the mining of the deep seabed and a regime which can be agreed in a timely fashion on the General Assembly schedule and if we are able to obtain that agreement on schedule we would hope that this problem would not arise.

Mr. DOWNING. Has the administration in any way reviewed its decision on deep-sea mining legislation since Caracas?

Mr. MOORE. We are continuing to review our position on the deepseabed mining legislation.

Mr. DOWNING. Is any work being done on administrative legislation as witnesses previously have said would be done?

Mr. MOORE. We have indicated recently in testimony before the Senate Interior Committee that we would be shortly submitting to the Congress, this is something we will want to be consulting with this committee on in the next few weeks, legislation which would authorize provisional application of the deep-seabed mining as well as the fishery portions of the new Law of the Sea Treaty and we will be submitting such legislation shortly to the Congress after consultations with this committee.