for two reasons which I have characterized as the horizontal and vertical reasons for opposing it.

I think the horizontal reasons for opposing it was that a number of delegations did not want to deal with the territorial sea and the economic zone unless at the same time we deal with for example, straits and the deep seabed.

I think the vertical opposition came from those who were fearful that to simply adopt a 200-mile economic zone without at the same time knowing what the fine print was going to be without knowing what limitations there would be on coastal state jurisdiction-would have been giving up bargaining strength that would be very difficult to get back.

I think our decision was a conscious decision and was taken on the part of many delegations who, from a political standpoint, would have liked to have a declaration of principles so we could have shown the extent of the general progress, yet in the end this would not have facilitated the negotiation of a treaty.

I think this failure to achieve treaty text last summer was attributable largely to these factors.

I would like to say that it is my conviction and I think the conviction of most of the delegation that a treaty can be achieved by the completion of 1975 in accordance with the present schedule.

To do that, however, governments must be willing to make the hard decisions necessary to resolve a small number of critical issues and they must move right away from the technical drafting and exploratory exchange of views which we completed at Caracas to hard negotiations. These negotiations, because of the very important national interests involved, will have to be conducted at very high levels and must include in many cases, the heads of state themselves.

I think that the delegations must return to Geneva prepared to negotiate on the opening day and between now and then they must carefully consider the different alternatives and push intersessional negotiations as far as they can fruitfully be pushed.

I do think that a multilateral comprehensive convention of unparalled complexity and of unparalled scope in terms of the interests involved is within our reach. I also mean a treaty that would protect U.S. interest, not just any treaty.

However, this international lawmaking process through multilateral negotiation, as any of you who have been with us know, is a tedious, frequently frustrating and always very demanding effort, but there really is no other way of achieving a generally acceptable agreement and avoiding continuing conflict and chaos.

However, I think we are also very conscious, particularly in the light of some of the concerns that I know this committee has, with the necessity for speed and for getting this treaty in a timely fashion. I think that is not only a question of not wasting the Government's money and permitting the members of the delegation to return to their normal activities, but even more important that if we do not get agreement next year, the opportunity to ever do so may very well slip away as countries, because of their serious concerns with developments and in order to protect their own interests, take unilateral action which makes the achievement of an international agreement much less possible as positions within countries become very polarized and frozen.

Madam Chairman, we hope we will have the continued support of this committee in our efforts next year.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. We all have several questions but I would like to make an announcement that we are having a special ceremony on the floor today so we must recess this meeting this morning at 11:45 promptly and that means that we probably will not get to hear from Mr. Moore but he is here and probably could come back at some mutually agreed upon time later.

I have a few questions I would like to start out with, Mr. Ambassador. One is to enlarge upon the last point that you brought out.

I wanted to ask specifically what factors do you base your apparent belief that a great majority of nations generally desire a treaty at an early date?

I think after you read over what you have said you might develop this for us and let us have it for the record.

Would you do that for us?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Certainly. [The committee's reference is invited to paragraphs 4 through 9 of Ambassador Stevenson's written statement for the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. In the event that we should extend our fisheries zone jurisdiction to 200 miles either unilaterally or by international agreement I assume the Coast Guard would have the responsibility for surveillance and enforcement over this extended 200-mile zone.

Has the U.S. delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference given any consideration as to how much more equipment, personnel, and funding would be necessary for the Coast Guard to police adequately this 200-mile zone and could you give us the increased requirements of the equipment, personnel, and money?

Ambassador STEVENSON. We have, of course, given consideration to the problem. Of course, it is an even greater problem from the standpoint of many developing countries than it is from our standpoint. I would like to consult with the Coast Guard and give you specific answers later for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you please, but is it not really a monumental task with respect to the Coast Guard's ability to accomplish such a job? Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, again, obviously enforcement is a problem, and I think it is particularly in the area of pollution, for example, that we have questioned whether some of the proposals for enforcing pollution regulations out to 200 miles were practicable. It is a difficult job.

On the other hand, with respect to some matters such as fishing where a particular species goes out further, it may make enforcement easier to be able to enforce throughout the range of the species.

As to the specific figures, I would like to have that submitted later for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. At this point in the record, also without objection, I have a letter that was submitted by the Coast Guard at the request of Congressman John Murphy, of New York, who is chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard. We will submit this for the record so you can see what has been done to date.

[The letter referred to follows:]

Hon. JOHN M. MURPHY

Chairman, Subcommittee on Goast Guard and Navigation, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of 1 July 1974, in which you request our thoughts and an assessment of resource requirements in the event United States jurisdiction over fisheries is extended to 200 miles. We have been addressing the subject for some months now and have developed what we consider to be a reasonable and effective plan of action.

The range of possibilities we face in fisheries enforcement has led us to develop as our primary planning tool an approach designed to be (1) usable with any foreseeable extension of fisheries jurisdiction, (2) reasonably compatible with any enforcement and surveillance methods that may become available and any regulations that are actually imposed on foreign fishing vessels, and (3) realistic. This approach is useful now in planning our current effort to enforce our jurisdictional limits, monitor compliance with international agreements, and keep informed on fishing off our coasts. Using this planned approach, we will be able to cope with enforcement under most degrees of cooperation by other nations whose vessels will seek to fish off our coasts.

The main thrust of our planned approach would provide various levels of coverage of known active fishing areas in direct proportion to the experienced intensity of foreign fishing activitie, i.e. our enforcement efforts would concentrate on those areas where and when the fishing will most likely be done. A mix of long and medium range aircraft would patrol the areas to monitor foreign fishing activity and provide fishing vessel locations to cutters on fisheries patrols. A mix of high and medium endurance cutters with helicopters embarked whenever possible would be used to monitor foreign fishing activity through examination from the helicopter and the cutter itself as well as through any boarding of the foreign vessels that may be permitted. The cutters would also make any seizures. that may be permitted.

This part of our approach is very similar to our current effort under such provisions as:

1. 16 U.S.C. 986. National and international measures of control in connection with the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Enclosure (1) shows the area involved which covers the primary fishing areas off the East Coast and extends well beyond 200 miles.

2. 16 U.S.C. 1083. Enforcement of the prohibition on foreign taking of Continental Shelf fishery resources. Enclosure (2) shows the area within the 200 meter isobath. The area of enforcement of this provision actually extends beyond that isobath as far as the depth of the superjacent waters admits exploitation of the resources and the seabed and subsoil are adjacent to the United States. This area covers primary fishing areas off all coasts.

3. 16 U.S.C. 1027. National and international measures of control in connection with the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. This Convention applies to North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea areas that are in some cases more than 200 miles from the U.S, coast.

We have prepared composite plots of foreign fishing vessel sightings over a two-year period. See enclosure (3). The patterns change from time to time and new fisheries are developed, but there is no reason to believe that the active fishing areas will expand dramatically following an extension of jurisdiction. This belief is bolstered by available information on where fish are found. See enclosure (4). Enclosure (5) presents the experienced variations in foreign fishing activity over the last few years.

In addition to the coverage of known active fishing areas, some coverage to the full range of 200-mile jurisdiction will be provided to determine if changes. in patterns of fishing activity are occurring, to make our presence known throughout the area, and to facilitate apprehension. This latter coverage is basically the difference between our five-year plan assuming no extension of fisheries jurisdiction and our five-year plan with an extension of jurisdiction to 200 miles.

If this approach were to be fully implemented, we will need to increase our operating facilities by six high endurance cutters, six long range search aircraft, four medium range search aircraft, and ten shipboard helicopters. To operate these facilities will require an increase in our annual operating funds of $47.2 million. The start up, acquisition and reactivation costs are estimated at $63.2 million. Both costs are estimated in 1975 fiscal dollars. I would like to caution that these cost estimates are determined by both the latest economic trends and acceptance of our coverage concept. For this reason, the estimates must be used

with care. If either the concept or the economic trends change, the estimate will have to be adjusted accordingly. Details on these and other cost figures are set out in enclosure (6).

Assumptions have been made with regard to the availability for fisheries patrols of cutters and aircraft that must also serve other Coast Guard missions. The cost factors included are those related to operating, activating, and procuring cutters and aircraft. Operating and procurement costs are based on cutters and aircraft now in our inventory or at such an advanced stage of planning that costs may be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty. Operating costs are those associated with a 12-month period when all the cutters and aircraft required for the enforcement approach are available and operating. This will not be the case immediately upon implementation of any new legislation due to the delays in activating and procuring additional cutters and aircraft required to fully implement the approach adopted.

The period immediately following an extension of jurisdiction presents particular difficulties in planning. Added to the unknowns such as the regulatory scheme and the probability of violation, there will be such other unknowns as the positions of various nations with regard to existing international agreements and the U.S. position with regard to any interim period and escalating enforcement measures. The time of year will also be important as demonstrated by enclosure (5). We expect some cutter shortages until the ships we now hold in reserve are reactivated. We also expect significant flight hour shortages until additional aircraft can be procured. Until this occurs, interim provisions will have to be arranged to ensure adequate aerial surveillance. Although those provisions are uncertain, we have included in the five-year plan cost figures based on experience with aircraft currently in our inventory.

We could respond to any extension of fisheries jurisdiction immediately by using our active inventory of cutters and aircraft to best advantage by limiting safe speeds only as necessary to maintain the desired range of operation without regard to fuel cost. We could also overload our cutter crews for a period of time. If the extension comes within the next two years, we will have in reserve six old high endurance cutters and a number of helicopters. The cutters could be reactivated in six to eleven months. The first helicopter could be operational in about six months Costs of these actions are in enclosure (6).

Two approaches to continuing coverage of a 200-mile zone have been developed which are possible responses to your questions regarding the worst possible foreign reaction to a unilateral non-cooperative extension to a 200-mile fisheries zone. Neither approach looks to actual armed conflict with any of the nations whose vessels seek to fish off our coasts. We developed the approaches last year simply to demonstrate the costs involved. The costs in enclosure (6) have been updated, but they are not as comprehensive as the costs for the planned approach, e.g. many support costs included in planned approach figures are not included in the cost figures for these other two approaches. We do not feel that the very large expenditures they require would be in the public interest. The first approach uses a mix of high and medium endurance cutters on stations 60 miles apart along the 200-mile perimeter. A mix of long and medium range aircraft would patrol the zone twice a week. Operating costs would be about $750 million annually; acquisition and reactivation costs would be about $6 billion. The second approach uses cutters every 400 miles along the 200-mile perimeter on the theory that most violators sighted by twice-weekly overflights could be boarded within 24 hours. Operating costs would be about $200 million annually; acquisition and reactivation costs would be about $1.4 billion.

The fisheries enforcement and surveillance effort is a joint one with the National Marine Fisheries Service. The division of effort is along the lines of an interagency agreement, enclosure (7). We do not have their plans for increased effort in case of an extension of jurisdiction. The subject of Department of Defense actions and assistance has been addressed and resulted in a Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and DOT, enclosure (8). This memorandum speaks maily to policies re Command and Control and the deployment of DOD facilities in support of enforcement operations. In addition, the Coast Guard utilizes the outputs from DOD's comprehensive information gathering systems which provide important data on fishing fleet movements and concentrations. You raised a related issue in the following words:

"Under the unilateral, non-cooperative assumption, request the Coast Guard's position in detail with reference to turning certain cutter or aircraft patrols from the 'white fleet' into 'gray fleet' operations, i.e., heavier, more modern armed vessels for special patrols, such as off Cuba, where confrontation may be more likely."

We think that our unique position apart from the Department of Defense in peacetime has been of great value to the United States in the areas of fisheries enforcement and surveillance.

The fact that we mix humanitarian functions and enforcement functions has undoubtedly played a part in the seizure, without the use of deadly force, of 41 foreign fishing vessels flying nine different flags for violating our fisheries jurisdiction.

The design of every Coast Guard cutter involves careful evaluation of size and armament as they relate to multi-mission operation. Cutters developed in that way served effectively with the Navy off Vietnam. While the size and armament of future cutters could well be affected by the development of a continuing confrontation with one or more of the nations whose vessels seek to fish off our coasts, the primary U.S. response at sea would probably involve Coast Guard enforcement measures similar to those presently employed, The Department of Defense would properly serve as neutralization potential in the event that a situation developed involving significant escalation of a military nature.

We feel that, at least for the present, our approach will allow us to proceed with no Congressional action beyond that of providing the additional resources required. However, considering the negotiations being conducted at the Law of the Sea conference, the situation probably will change. Should you or your staff desire further information on any of the issues involved, we are prepared to respond at your convenience.

These are difficult and complex issues which are complicated by rapidly increasing prices. For this reason, we request the opportunity to revise the cost estimates contained in enclosure (6) in light of the latest information available should you find need to use these data in the future.

Sincerely,

O. W. SILER,

Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant. [Committee note.-The enclosures were placed in the files of the Committee.]

The CHAIRMAN. As you know the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee has jurisdiction over the Panama Canal.

Would the various considerations of the Law of the Sea Conference have any negative effect over the U.S. sovereignty over the canal and the Canal Zone and would the Law of the Sea affect the operation of the canal?

Specifically, if it were agreed to have a 200-mile economic zone would this not affect the traffic in and out of the Panama Canal?

Also, would there be provision made internationally for the right of innocent passage of straits in the event of a 200-mile economic zone. What effect would this right of innocent passage in straits, if agreed to, have on the operation of the canal?

There are a lot of questions for you at this time but they are all tied together.

Have you discussed in the conference the Panama Canal?

Ambassador STEVENSON. The Panama Canal has not been discussed at all in the conference and hopefully will not be.

I think there has been understanding that this is a special regime. There have been some general statements not dealing with the specific technical issues that you have raised.

I did say there were some polemic statements in general debate. One or two of those related to the whole question of continuing U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone but there has been no discussion from the technical standpoint.

The assumption has been that like the Suez Canal and Straits of the Dardenelles, the Panama Canal will be governed by a special regime and will not be affected by the more general provisions.

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