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In the past, Ambassador McKernan, as your Special Assistant, has had direct access to you and your office and he has been aided in his dealings with foreign nations by his ambassadorial rank. Under the proposed reorganization plan, we are fearful that Ambassador McKernan's successor will not only have to go through two or more layers of rank before reaching you, but will also be hampered in his international dealings by the lack of ambassadorial status.

Representatives of national fisheries organizations are also deeply concerned in this regard, and we are enclosing a sampling of their letters to us for your information.

As you are well aware, the United States is turning more and more to the sea for its protein and other resources. Foreign nations are having to do likewise to an even greater extent. Negotiations in fisheries matters have been on the increase in recent years and this trend is expected to continue in the future. For example, the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has finally materialized and fisheries jurisdiction is high on its agenda of urgent matters. Your Special Assistant for Fish and Wildlife has played a vital role in developing the United States' position on this item and he has done an outstanding job of representing our interest at the various international meetings and negotiations. This is equally true in the area of international wildlife protection.

If we expect to give the fisheries and wildlife resources of the United States the protection to which they are entitled, we think it is imperative that the person charged with these responsibilities have direct access to you and retain ambassadorial rank. Failure to provide this office with the rank and authority necessary to the effective performance of its duties, will be most detrimental to the areas concerned and an already beleaguered group-the U.S. fishing industry-in particular, will suffer immeasurable harm.

We would greatly appreciate your taking our views into consideration in the course of finalizing your reorganization plans and would appreciate being advised of your decision in this regard.

Sincerely,

Enclosures.

LEONOR K. (MRS. JOHN B.) SULLIVAN.

Chairman.

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Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., September 5, 1974.

DEAR SENATOR MAGNUSON: In response to your recent inquiry concerning enforcement procedures in connection with continental shelf fishery resources,

am pleased to advise you that foreign governments whose vessels fish above the continental shelf of the United States are being notified of the following new guidelines for the enforcement of our rights to continental shelf fishery resources. "1. The taking of continental shelf fishery resources from the United States continental shelf will result in the arrest and seizure of any vessel taking such resources, except as provided by the United States in bilateral agreements. For the purpose of determining whether such a taking has occurred, vessels may be boarded when engaging in either of the following acts:

(a) Fishing above the continental shelf of the United States with gear which is designed specifically to catch continental shelf fishery resources; or

(b) Fishing above the continental shelf of the United States with bottom gear which can be expected to result in the catch of continental shelf fishery resources except where the procedures used are designed to reduce and control such incidental catch pursuant to an agreement with the United States.

"2. In those instances where the taking of continental shelf fishery resources does not result in a substantial catch and such taking does not appear to be deliberate or repeated, a warning will normally be given. In any event, fisherman are expected to return to the sea immediately any continental shelf fishery resources which may be taken incidentally in the course of directed fisheries for other species. Fishermen who encounter concentrations of continental shelf fishery resources in the course of their fishing operations should take immediate steps to avoid such concentrations in future tows.

3. To facilitate the transition in fishing procedures required by these procedures, U.S. enforcement officers will act with discretion during a short period to allow fishermen operating in the region to become familiar with these procedures.

"4. The boarding and where appropriate the arrest of any vessel pursuant to these procedures shall be in strict conformity with paragraph 1 above.

"5. The effective date of these new procedures will be December 5, 1974." These guidelines should substantially enhance our protection efforts and help conserve our valuable resources. The practical effect of the change in procedure contemplated by paragraph 1(b) is to require the negotiation of bilateral agreements with all nations fishing over our continental shelf with bottom gear which can be expected to result in the catch of continental shelf fishery resources. These agreements would set forth appropriate procedures to ensure the fullest protection of our resources.

I hope that you will conclude, as I have, that this effort will materially assist in providing added protection to our continental shelf fishery resources.

Sincerely,

JOHN NORTON MOORE,

Chairman, National Security Council,
Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, and

Deputy Special Representative of the
President for the Law of the Sea Conference.

The CHAIRMAN. For the moment that is all the questions that I have. Mr. de la Garza?

Mr. DE LA GARZA. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mosher?

Mr. MOSHER. Madam Chairman, I am sorry to say that I have just arrived and have not been in on this conversation, but I have been told by staff that Tom Clingan will be Acting Assistant Secretary. Ambassador BROWN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MOSHER. I think that is great news.
That is all, Madam Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ginn?
Mr. GINN. I have no questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grover?
Mr. GROVER. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Studds?
Mr. STUDDS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask if anyone has any questions so I do not

have to go down the roll?

Apparently there are no further questions. However, we would appreciate it if you would wait around as there might be questions as the other members arrive.

Our next witness will be Ambassador John R. Stevenson, Special Representative of the President at the Law of the Sea Conference. STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN R. STEVENSON, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador STEVENSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been very anxious to hear what you have to tell us.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I have a formal written statement which I would like to submit for the record, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be put into the record at this point.

[The full statement of Ambassador Stevenson follows:]

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHN R. STEVENSON, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND CHAIRMAN OF U.S. DELEGATION TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

Madam Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to appear before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee to report on the progress made at the first substantive session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Caracas, Venezuela, from June 20 to August 29, 1974.

Before proceeding with this report, I would like to say how much we appreciated the attendance at the Conference of Representative de la Garza of this Committee and Mr. Ernest J. Corrado, Mr. Ned P. Everett, and Mr. Francis D. Heyward of the Committee Staff. We are deeply grateful for their willingness to attend the Conference and for the advice and assistance that they and other members of the Committee have given to our efforts to achieve an agreed constitution and supporting legal regime for two-thirds of this planet. It has been and will remain a fundamental part of our policy to work closely with the Congress and this Committee to achieve a Law of the Sea Treaty that fully protect the basic interests of the United States.

I want to emphasize at the outset that, while the results of the Caracas session were not all we hoped for, the session was not a failure.

A most significant result was the apparent agreement of most nations represented there that the interests of all will be best served by an acceptable and timely treaty.

To that end, the Conference has scheduled not only the next session in the spring in Geneva, but a return to Caracas for the signing of this agreement in the expectation that this will take place in accordance with the United Nations timetable. That timetable provides for conclusion of the treaty in 1975.

Further evidence of this desire to achieve promptly a widely-acceptable treaty was reflected in the adoption by consensus of the rules of procedure early in the session. These rules make several changes in normal procedures that are designed to promote widespread agreement.

The tone of the general debate and the informal meetings was moderate and serious and reflected wide agreement on the board outlines of a comprehensive general agreement.

Finally, I am sure the members of the House who were with us will agree that the Delegates from all regions worked hard. Three or four simultaneous meetings were common and there were some night sessions. The number of papers worked on was enormous, but this time the object—largely achieved—was organizing and reducing the alternatives, not proliferating them.

Other accomplishments of the session were considerable. Among the most important are the following:

(a) The vast array of critical law of the sea issues and proposals within the mandate of Committee II-including among others the territorial sea, economi

zone, straits, fisheries and the continental margin-was organized by the Committee into a comprehensive set of working papers containing precise treaty texts reflecting main trends on each precise issue. All states can now focus on each issue, and the alternative solutions, with relative ease.

A similar development occurred with respect to marine scientific research in Committee III. Committee I, dealing with the novel subject of a legal regime for exploiting the deep seabed, had previously agreed to alternative treaty texts in the preparatory Committee and further refined these texts at the Caracas session.

(b) The transition from a preparatory Committee of about 90 to a Conference of almost 150, including many newly independent states, was achieved without major new stumbling blocks and a minimum of delay.

(c) The inclusion in the treaty of a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile economic zone was all but formally agreed, subject of course to acceptable resolution of other issues, including unimpeded transit of straits. Accordingly, expanded coastal state jurisdiction over living and non-living resources appears assured as part of the comprehensive treaty.

(d) With respect to the deep seabeds, the first steps have been taken into real negotiation of the basic questions of the system of exploitation and the conditions of exploitation.

(e) Traditional regional and political alignments of states are being replaced to a certain degree by informal groups whose membership is based on similarities of interest on a particular issue. This has greatly facilitated clarification of issues and is necessary for finding effective accommodations.

(f) The number and tempo of private meetings has increased considerably and moved beyond formal positions. This is essential to a successful negotiation. Of course, by their very nature, the results of such meetings cannot be discussed publicly.

With few exceptions, the Conference papers now make it clear what the structure and general content of the Treaty will be. The alternatives to choose from, and the blanks to be filled in, and even the relative importance attached to different issues, are well known.

What was missing in Caracas was sufficient political will to make hard negotiating choices. A principal reason for this was the conviction that this would not be the last session. The absence prior to the completion of this session of organized alternate treaty texts on many issues also inhibited such decision making.

The next step is for Governments to make the political decisions necessary to resolve a small number of critical issues. In short, we must now move from the technical drafting and preliminary exploratory exchanges of views at this just completed session, which has laid bare both the outlines of agreement and the details of disagreement, to the highest political levels, involving heads of states themselves, to make accommodation on these critical issues possible.

The fundamental problem is that most states believe the major decisions must be put together in a single package. Every state has different priorities, and agreement on one issue is frequently conditioned on agreement on another. Thus, it might have been possible-and might have been helpful to the Executive Branch in its efforts here today-to adopt a general declaration of principles in Caracas endorsing, among other things, a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile economic zone. Our Delegation opposed such an idea, because it would have diverted us from negotiating the key details of an economic zone that can spell the difference between true agreement and the mere appearance of agreement, and because our willingness to support such concepts is also conditioned on satisfactory resolution of other issues, including unimpeded passage of straits. In choosing to concentrate on precise texts and alternatives, our Delegation believed we were in fact best promoting widespread agreement on schedule. However, we recognized that the absence of tangible symbols of agreement would place us in a politically difficult situation between sessions.

In his closing statement before the Caracas session, the President of the Conference, recognizing the problem, stated, "we should restrain ourselves in the face of the temptation to take unilateral action", and then urged states to prepare to reach agreement "without delay" since governments cannot be expected to exercise 'infinite patience."

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We regret that for a variety of reasons the Conference was unable to capitalize upon the initial, prevailing good will to produce a final treaty at the Caracas session. Nevertheless, the political parameters of an overall agreement were made much clearer at Caracas and we are at the stage where differences in approaches are embodied in specific treaty articles expressed as alternative formulations on almost all the major issues.

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On July 11 at a Plenary session, we noted there was a growing consensus on the limits of national jurisdiction, which we expressed in the following terms: "A maximum outer limit of 12 miles for the territorial sea and of 200 miles for the economic zone *** conditioned on a satisfactory overall treaty package and, more specifically, on provisions for unimpeded transit of international straits and a balance between coastal state rights and duties within the economic zone." To promote negotiations on the essential balance of coastal state rights and duties the United States submitted draft articles proposing the establishment of a 200mile economic zone in the treaty. The U.S. draft articles consist of three sectionsthe economic zone, fishing, and the continental shelf.

The economic zone section provides for a 200-mile outer limit with coastal state sovereign and exclusive rights over resources, exclusive rights over drilling and economic installations, and other rights and duties regarding scientific research and pollution to be specified. There would be coastal state environmental duties with respect to installations and seabed activities. All states would enjoy freedom of navigation and other rights recognized by international law within the economic

zone.

The fishing section gives the coastal state exclusive rights for the purpose of regulating fishing in the 200-mile economic zone, subject to a duty to conserve and to ensure full utilization of fishery stocks taking into account environmental and economic factors. Fishing for anadromous species such as salmon beyond the 12mile territorial sea would be prohibited except as authorized by the host state. Highly migratory species such as tuna would be regulated by the coastal state in the zone and by the flag state outside the zone, in both cases in accordance with regulations established by appropriate international or regional organizations. Membership in the organization would be mandatory and the coastal state would receive reasonable fees for the highly migratory fish caught in its zone by foreign vessels. The international organization in establishing equitable allocation regulations, would be obligated to ensure full utilization of the resource and to take into account the special interests of the coastal states within whose economic zones highly migratory fish are caught.

The continental shelf section provides for coastal state sovereign rights over exploration and exploitation of continental shelf resources. The continentai shelf is defined as extending to the limit of the economic zone or beyond to a precisely defined outer limit of the continental margin. The coastal state would have a duty to respect the integrity of foreign investment on the shelf and to make payments from mineral resource exploitation for international community purposes, particularly for the economic benefit of developing countrise. In our plenary statement we suggested that these payments should be at a modest and uniform rate. The revenue sharing area would begin seaward of 12 miles or 200 meters water depth, whichever is further seaward.

The draft articles on the economic zone place the United States in the mainstream of the predominant trends in the Conference, and we were pleased with the favorable reaction to our proposal. We were disappointed, however, at the support, particularly among a number of African countries, for an economic zone in which there would be plenary, coastal state jurisdiction, not only over resources, but over scientific research and vessel-source pollution as well and in all of these areas there would be no international standards except provisions for freedom of navigation and overflight and the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines. Many of the same countries are saying that if a pattern of unilateral action by individual countries emerges before a treaty is agreed, they would go further and opt for a full 200-mile territorial sea.

We believe that specifying the rights and duties of both coastal states and other states in the economic zone is the approach best designed to avoid the sterile debate over abstract concepts.

At the final meeting of the Second Committee on August 28, the Chairman, Ambassador Andres Aguilar of Venezuela, made a constructive and challenging statement summing up its work. On its own initiative, the Committee decided to have the statement circulated as an official Committee document. This occurred after initial opposition by the 200-mile territorial sea supporters, which was withdrawn in the face of other Delegations' willingness to proceed to a vote if necessary. Because of its great importance and the universal respect and admiration earned by Chairman Aguilar for his strong and effective leadership, I would like to quote briefly from that statement.

"No decision on substantive issues has been taken at this session, nor has a single Article of the future Convention been adopted, but the States represented here know perfectly well which are at this time the positions that enjoy support and which are the ones that have not managed to make any headway.

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