Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the VirtuesOpen Court, 1999 - 172 pages In Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre compares humans to other intelligent animals, ultimately drawing remarkable conclusions about human social life and our treatment of those whom he argues we should no longer call "disabled." MacIntyre argues that human beings are independent, practical reasoners, but they are also dependent animals who must learn from each other in order to remain largely independent. To flourish, humans must acknowledge the importance of dependence and independence, both of which are developed in and through social relationships. This requires the development of a local community in which individuals discover their own "goods" through the discovery of a common Good. |
Contents
Vulnerability dependence animality | 1 |
Humans as contrasted with humans as included | 11 |
The intelligence of dolphins | 21 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues Alasdair C. MacIntyre Limited preview - 1999 |
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues Alasdair MacIntyre Limited preview - 1999 |
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues Alasdair MacIntyre No preview available - 2009 |
Common terms and phrases
ability able achieve acknowledged dependence activity adequate adults affliction ALASDAIR MACINTYRE Aquinas Aquinas's argument Aristotelian Aristotle Aristotle's ascribe ascription attitudes become behavior beliefs bottlenose dolphins capacities characteristically characterized child chimpanzees commitments conception contexts course culture D. W. Winnicott desires disabled distinctions dolphins enquiry environment evaluate example exercise expression extent failure generosity giving and receiving gorillas Heidegger Heidegger's human flourishing important independent practical reasoner individual insofar judgments justice kind Lakota language ment misericordia nation-state nature networks of giving Nicomachean Ethics nonhuman animals norms one's ourselves parents particular Paul Carus perceptions philosophical phronesis political possess possible prelinguistic presuppose question range rational rational animals reasons for acting reasons for action recognition recognize relationships of giving relevant responses rules self-knowledge sentences shared social relationships someone sometimes speak speech acts Summa Theologiae tion types understand virtues of acknowledged vulnerability