EMERGING THREATS: ASSESSING PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY MEASURES AT NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES MONDAY, MARCH 10, 2003 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Janklow, Kucinich and Tierney. Also present: Representative Kelly. Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Mackenzie Eaglen, fellow; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. SHAYS. This hearing entitled, "Assessing Public Safety and Security Measures at Nuclear Facilities," is called to order. The attacks of September 11, 2001 should have seared this hard truth into our national consciousness: Security is not a state of rest. It is not a static measure. Sanctuary from the terrorists of the 21st century demands a new level of vigilance to protect the public from known and emerging threats. Heightened awareness of new threats and proactive countermeasures are particularly imperative to protect critical infrastructure facilities, fixed assets of enormous importance to national economic and social well-being. Of those, civilian nuclear power plants stand as highly attractive targets of terrorism. Today, we ask if Federal regulators are demanding the physical security and preparedness enhancements needed to protect public health and safety from nuclear terrorism. Recent reports suggest the answer may be no. Although specific to the Indian Point reactor complex in Buchanan, NY, observations by the General Accounting Office [GAO], and to a private security firm point to systemic weaknesses in nuclear incident response planning that have implications for every community within 50 miles of any of the Nation's 64 active reactor sites. A release of radiation caused by terrorists is a unique event, one that requires acknowledgment of the distinct factors and fears that will define the public response to such an incident. Yet the chair (1) man of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], recently wrote, "Necessary protective actions and response are not predicated on the cause of events." I disagree. That view overstates the reach of an all-hazards approach to first responder capabilities and ignores the obvious need to accommodate unique causal elements in any effective response scenario. Just as flooded roads will alter an evacuation strategy, transportation routes flooded by the spontaneous evacuation of frightened families will impede response to an attack on a nuclear plant. One dangerous element not predicated on the cause of an incident, but certainly capable of compounding the negative effects, is poor communication between Federal, State and local officials. County, city and town leaders wait at the far end of a dysfunctional daisy chain of confusing directives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], the NRC and plant operators. In the event of a terrorist attack on a reactor, timely information will be local officials' most potent weapon against the panic and overreach that terrorists hope will drive property damage and loss of life. Emergency response plans and exercises have to include more accurate, more direct communications to local officials and the public. It is telling, no nuclear plant license has ever been suspended or revoked due solely to weaknesses in emergency response and evacuation planning. Deficiencies can linger for years. Compliance with critical incident response and evacuation planning has been allowed to become a static bureaucratic exercise. That has to change. If the planning requirement is to be real, not just cosmetic, reasonable assurance a plan protects public health and safety cannot be achieved through paperwork alone. It must be gained through robust exercises and measurable outcomes for which operators are held closely accountable. We appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses today, appreciate that they came to Washington to testify before this committee as we continue our examination of terrorism and the protection of critical infrastructure from new threats. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:] The attacks of September 11, 2001 should have seared this hard truth into our national consciousness: Security is not a state of rest. It is not a static measure. Sanctuary from the terrors of the 21" century demands a new level of vigilance to protect the public from known and emerging threats. Heightened awareness of new threats, and proactive countermeasures, are particularly imperative to protect critical infrastructurc facilities, fixed assets of enormous importance to national economic and social well-being. Of those, civilian nuclear power plants stand as highly attractive targets of terrorism. Today we ask if federal regulators are demanding the physical security and preparedness enhancements needed to protect public health and safety from nuclear terrorism. Recent reports suggest the answer may be no. Although specific to the Indian Point reactor complex in Buchanan, New York, observations by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and a private security firm point to systemic weaknesses in nuclear incident response planning that have implications for every community within fifty miles of any of the nation's 64 active reactor sites. Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays A release of radiation caused by terrorists is a unique event, one that requires acknowledgement of the distinct factors and fears that will define the public response to such an incident. Yet the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently wrote, "Necessary protective actions and offsite response are not predicated on the cause of events." I disagree. That view overstates the reach of an "all hazards" approach to first responder capabilities, and ignores the obvious need to accommodate unique causal elements in any effective response scenario. Just as flooded roads will alter an evacuation strategy, transportation routes flooded by the spontaneous evacuation of frightened families will impede response to an attack on a nuclear plant. One dangerous element not predicated on the cause of an incident, but certainly capable of compounding the negative effects, is poor communication between federal, state and local officials. County, city and town leaders wait at the far end of a dysfunctional daisy chain of confusing directives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the NRC, and plant operators. In the event of a terrorist attack on a reactor, accurate, timely information will be local officials' most potent weapon against the panic and over reaction that terrorists hope will drive property damage and loss of life. Emergency response plans and exercises have to include more accurate, more direct communication to local officials and the public. It is telling no nuclear plant license has ever been suspended or revoked due solely to weaknesses in emergency response and evacuation planning. Deficiencies can linger for years. Compliance with critical incident response and evacuation planning has been allowed to become a static, bureaucratic exercise. That has to change. If the planning requirement is to be real, not just cosmetic, reasonable assurance a plan protects public health and safety cannot be achieved through paperwork alone. It must be gained through robust exercises and measurable outcomes for which operators are held closely accountable. We appreciate the testimony of all our witnesses today as we continue our examination of terrorism and the protection of critical infrastructure from new threats. Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would invite Mr. Kucinich, the ranking member of this committee, to make a comment. Mr. KUCINICH. Good afternoon. Welcome to our distinguished witnesses. Glad you could be with the committee today. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your ongoing interest in the security of this country's nuclear power plants. It is certainly one of America's most critical homeland security priorities. The administration knows this. Indeed, in the 2002 State of the Union Address, the President warned that nuclear facilities could be attacked and with dire consequences. The President asserted that U.S. forces found diagrams of American nuclear power plants, in the caves of Afghanistan. On December 12th of last year, the administration was supposed to submit to Congress a report on the best way to efficiently and safely provide potassium iodide to communities surrounding nuclear power plants in the event of an attack. Potassium iodide is a very cheap, widely available tablet that can prevent fatal thyroid illness caused by radiation exposure. We have seen no sign of the report. We required the report, because prior to September 11, there was no comprehensive plan to buy potassium iodide and distribute it to local communities. Before September 11, the nuclear utility industry lobbied against such measures because they feared people would become alarmed about the dangers of nuclear power. After September 11, however, it became clear that nuclear power facilities are indeed likely targets. After September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommended that States consider including potassium iodide in their emergency evacuation plans. The NRC offered to buy potassium iodide so States could cover a 10-mile radius surrounding nuclear power plants. Anyone with a knowledge of past incidents, such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, would acknowledge that 10 miles is a very modest step. Many of us in Congress believe the NRC did not go far enough. For this reason, Congress expanded this to a 20-mile radius as part of the bill we passed last June. We also gave local government greater flexibility to obtain potassium iodide when State governments failed to do so. To ensure that the administration would purchase the potassium iodide, distribute it and administer it in the most effective manner possible, we also mandated the report I described, which was to be conducted in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences that was due in December. Here we are 3 months later and still no report. Apparently no one in the administration even allocated funding for this report until after it was due. It appears the administration hasn't even contacted the National Academy of Sciences to contract for the study. Eight months of inaction. Last week we were told that someone in the administration finally wrote a memo to the National Academy asking them to begin work, but they are just now appointing the panelists who will begin to study this issue. How could the administration so completely ignore a directive of Congress? More importantly, how could they ignore this critical issue and the families living in neighborhoods where the nuclear power plants are located? Perhaps it is because the homeland secu |