Entergy Nuclear management have asked security personnel to alter incident reports so that an incident becomes a less serious offense and non-reportable Company officials sugarcoat and cover up real problems regarding the missing handgun incident, forging documents, giving guards a third chance to pass requalifying tests, watering down mock attack drills Numerous recommendations made by guards to improve security have not been implemented resulting in the same problems resurfacing time and again. Many demoralizing incidents involving sexism, racism, homophobia and anti- Fortifying the Storage of Irradiated “Spent” Fuel Riverkeeper recognizes the vulnerability of Indian Point's current method of storing irradiated ("spent" or "used") fuel" to terrorist attack. Therefore, Riverkeeper calls for the “hardening" of the wet and dry storage for all of Indian Point's irradiated fuel and other radioactive waste at Indian Point to the maximum extent possible. These structures must immediately be hardened to repel entry or penetration into building via air or ground attack. All irradiated fuel older than five years must be moved out of the wet storage (e.g. cooling pools) and into hardened dry cask storage. Stored in hardened on-site storage, the irradiated spent fuel is less vulnerable to a spent fuel fire triggered by accident, sabotage or terrorist attack. As recommended by industry experts, the remaining spent fuel assemblies in the pool must be reconfigured so that there is more space in between each assembly. The current spacing between fuel assemblies is dangerously close which increases the likelihood of a spent fuel pool fire consuming more fuel and releasing greater amounts of radioactivity. The dry cask storage system must involve the spacing of casks at an adequate distance from one another and the concealing of these casks through the use of berms and other protective measures. Riverkeeper advocates that the irradiated fuel be stored safely on site until an environmentally sound method is developed and suitable storage site determined. The proposed Yucca Mountain storage site is years away from opening and faces numerous legal challenges and scientific hurdles. Currently, the total estimated 1500 tons of irradiated fuel is kept in cooling pools in three separate nonreinforced storage buildings (IP-3's pool holds approx. 600 tons; IP-2's pool holds approx. 800 tons; and IP-1's pool holds less than 100 tons). III. PUBLIC BEARS LIABILITY AND BURDEN OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION Entergy would not be held fully responsible in the event of an accident or terroristtriggered radioactive release from Indian Point. Currently, Entergy's liability is limited by the Price-Anderson Act. Under Price-Anderson, commercial nuclear operators are required to carry only $200 million in primary insurance. A second level of retrospective premiums in the event of an accident is capped at approximately $88 million per reactor, for an industry-wide total of approximately $9.4 billion. Yet according to a 1982 study, a worst case scenario accident at a U.S. nuclear reactor would result in $24.8 billion - $590.4 billion in damages in today's dollars. A 1997 Brookhaven National Lab Report ("A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants") claims that a disaster from a spent fuel pool could cause up to $566 billion in damage. In addition, the CRAC2 Report reveals that in the event of a worst case scenario, a meltdown at the Indian Point Unit 2 or 3 reactors could cause $274 billion (1982 dollars) in property damage, and $314 billion (1982 dollars) in property damage, respectively. In terms of 2000 dollars, property damage from a Unit 2 meltdown would be estimated conservatively at $500.5 billion, and property damage from a Unit 3 meltdown would be estimated conservatively at $573.5 billion -- figures based solely on inflation without factoring the substantial rise in metropolitan area real estate values. The sizable discrepancy between the coverage available under Price-Anderson and the calculated consequences of severe nuclear incidents leaves the public unprotected and the industry unaccountable in the event of a serious accident. Furthermore, by artificially limiting the liability of nuclear operators, the Price-Anderson Act serves as a subsidy to the nuclear industry in terms of foregone insurance premiums. In addition, all homeowner insurance policies exclude nuclear accidents from coverage, leaving homeowners to bear the risk of Indian Point's operations. In other words, no homeowners policy will cover the loss from contamination which results from a radioactive release from Indian Point triggered by an accident or terrorist attack. Outrageously, residents would still have to pay their mortgages even if their homes are contaminated. No other energy source benefits from this level of subsidy. Clearly, the Price Anderson Act is central to the survival of the commercial nuclear power industry and is a major subsidy to nuclear plant operators. If the nuclear industry was truly confident in its safety and security, then it would forego the Price Anderson Act. But, that seems unlikely. According to a October 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission report - The Price-Anderson Act - Crossing the Bridge to the Next Century: A Report to Congress - "Many nuclear suppliers express the view that without PriceAnderson coverage, they would not participate in the nuclear industry." Even with the limited liability, commercial nuclear power corporations - like Entergy, Exelon and Dominion - may not have the fiscal fortitude to withstand a catastrophic accident at one of their plants. In the case of catastrophic nuclear accident, anywhere in the United States, Entergy, by virtue of assuming ownership of several reactors, would be required to put up over $1 billion as part of a national self-insurance program under the Price-Anderson Act. A significant accident occurring at one of Entergy's 10 reactors could jeopardize the safe operation of Indian Point. In a recent prospectus from the Exelon Corporation the following statement can be found: "We may incur substantial cost and liabilities due to our ownership and operation of nuclear facilities...The consequences of an accident can be severe and include loss of life and property damage. Any resulting liability from a nuclear accident could exceed our resources, including insurance coverages.” IV. CONCLUSION In conclusion, I would like to offer the following recommendations: Regarding Radiological Emergency Planning: · Demand that FEMA stop delaying and immediately withdraw certification for the Indian Point emergency plans in light of the overwhelming evidence that the major deficiencies in the plans cannot be repaired. Demand that the NRC recognize that Indian Point is a unique case - given its proximity to a dense population and to New York City, which remains a terrorist target - and order the immediate closure of Indian Point and its safe and orderly decommissioning. Regarding nuclear plant security: Introduce legislation that would require the "hardening" of on-site storage facilities and casks for irradiated "spent" fuel. Cost of fortifying the storage of irradiated fuel must be born by nuclear plant operators and not by the public. Introduce legislation that would require the federalization of military forces at Indian Point, and perhaps the nation's other nuclear facilities. The cost of this security upgrade needs to be borne solely by the nuclear plant companies, not by the public. • Demanding that the force-on-force (OSRE) drill that will be conducted at Indian Point later this year test the ability of Indian Point's security force to repel a 9/11 type of terrorist attack – i.e., 20 suicidal terrorists launching a coordinated assault on the plant from multiple directions armed with an array of weapons, working in conjunction with an “active” insider; moreover, Entergy should not be given any more than 72 hours notice that the mock assault is coming. Regarding Financial Fitness of Commercial Nuclear Power Corporations like Entergy: Parent corporations should be required to guarantee that plant-owning subsidiaries and affiliates will be provided whatever funds are needed to safely operate and decommission their nuclear power plants. Parent corporations should be held fully responsible for the unmet liabilities incurred by both direct and indirect nuclear power plant owning subsidiaries. Congress should adopt legislation to assure that costs related to (1) safety and security (2) decommissioning assets and (3) Price-Anderson nuclear accident responsibilities receive priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Reactor owners should be required to guarantee payment of their nuclear accident insurance responsibilities under the Price-Anderson Act through surety bonds, letters of credit, sinking funds, or other comparable financial instruments that will be bankruptcy remote. This will assure that public liability claims will be paid up to the limits of the Price-Anderson Act without concern about the financial condition of the industry and without requiring a taxpayer bailout. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should not eliminate the current legal requirement that non-utility corporations must disclose their financial qualifications when applying to re-license nuclear power plants, as the agency has proposed in a recent rulemaking. Instead, the NRC should bolster its disclosure requirements concerning the character of the legal relationships between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries in the event of a bankruptcy, business failure or accident. |