FEMA insists that there is no difference in responding to a radiological release caused by an operational failure and one caused by a terrorist attack. However, Witt has a distinctly different view. He cites as examples terrorists simultaneously targeting roads and bridges to impede evacuation, attacks on responders and spontaneous and shadow evacuations spurred by public panic. To be clear, the NRC recognizes the possibility of a radiological release with or without terrorism in as little as 1 to 2 hours. Yet, while FEMA claims that it takes fast-breaking scenarios into consideration, it fails to plan or drill for such scenarios. FEMA sidesteps those flaws that Witt identifies as particularly serious: the congested road network and population densities around Indian Point, both of which are fixed givens that cannot be altered. FEMA all but ignores emergency scenarios involving a spent fuel pool disaster. FEMA overlooks Witt's contention that a radioactive plume may travel well beyond the 10-mile EPZ. FEMA fails to comprehend the significance of the fact that many first responders, having little faith in the emergency plan, have admitted that, rather than fulfilling their official duties, they will seek to protect their own families. Probably the most damning statement of all in FEMA's report is the Agency's acknowledgment that studies associated with NUREG 0654 clearly indicate that, for all but a very limited set of conditions, evacuation, even evacuating under a plume, is much more effective than sheltering in place. Clearly, if you can't shelter, if you can't evacuate, you can't protect the people. So what has FEMA's response been to the overwhelming evidence that Indian Point's plan cannot meet our current needs? Finger pointing, bullying and indecision. When counties declare that they could not, in good conscience, certify the plans were up to date, FEMA wrote a letter to the State instructing them to ignore the counties and certify the plans over county objections. When finally realizing it could not provide reasonable assurance that the plan works, FEMA arbitrarily tacked on a 75-day grace period to the 120 days the State is normally given to comply with certification requirements. We worry that all of the buck passing and delays are being used by FEMA to give them time to figure out how to certify a patently unworkable plan. We agree with Mr. Witt that the plan should be improved. Certainly, if you make the improvements that he recommends in his report, that will help to address a minor accident at the plant. But we also agree that plans cannot be fixed to deal with the post-September 11 world. Chairman Shays, in conclusion, I urge you and the rest of the committee to pay close attention to FEMA and the NRC as this process unfolds. If I may, I would like to briefly make several specific recommendations to the committee. Regarding emergency planning, instruct FEMA to start delaying and immediately withdraw its approval of Indian Point's emergency plan in light of overwhelming evidence and unanimous recognition by independent experts, elected officials and the public that the major deficiencies in the plan cannot be repaired. In case the committee is not aware, and I think that FEMA made reference to it earlier, or the NRC, FEMA has been faced with this issue in the past and acted appropriately. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, FEMA not only temporarily withdrew its approval of Turkey Point's emergency plan but ordered the Florida nuclear plant to shut down until reasonable assurances could be made that the plant would actually work. Given the terrorist threats and clear deficiencies with Indian Point's emergency plan, the situation in New York is clearly more serious. Congresswoman Kelly, I would encourage you-recently, a theory was proposed in Congresswoman Lowey and Congressman Engel's hearing last week that it might be the case that FEMA and the local counties, in reorganizing the emergency plan, actually have essentially quarantined Westchester, whereas the evacuation routes used to go north into Putnam and east into Connecticut and so forth, all of the routes go south and away from the plant but are contained within Westchester. Who knows what that means? But it is interesting that, rather than sending people away to less populated areas, they are actually sending you down to more populated areas and, in fact, where the winds are typically blowing. Regarding Indian Point's security, introduce legislation that would require Mr. TURNER. Mr. Matthiessen, if you can conclude. Mr. MATTHIESSEN [continuing]. That Entergy finance hardening of onsite storage and casks for irradiated spent fuel. Introduce legislation that would require Entergy finance federalization of military forces at Indian Point and require that the force-on-force test will be conducted at Indian Point to test the actual ability to repel a sophisticated terrorist attack. And, finally, recognize that perhaps Indian Point is a unique case, and the plant should be shut down. In 1979, in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, Robert Ryan, NRC's director of the Office of State Programs stated, I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in Westchester County. Mr. TURNER. Mr. Matthiessen, your time has expired. Mr. MATTHIESSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the committee. [The prepared statement of Mr. Matthiessen follows:] RIVERKEEPER TESTIMONY OF ALEX MATTHIESSEN Executive Director, Riverkeeper, Inc. U.S. Congressional Subcommittee Hearing on Emerging Threats: Assessing Public Safety and Security Measures at Nuclear Power Facilities Rep. Christopher Shays, Connecticut Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the Government Reform Committee Scheduled for Monday, March 10th at 2:00 p.m. Room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on this crucial public health and safety issue affecting millions of people living and working in the populated region surrounding the Indian Point nuclear power plant. I am Alex Matthiessen, executive director for Riverkeeper, Inc, a non-profit public interest organization with 5,000 members. Riverkeeper's mission is to protect the environmental, recreational, and commercial integrity of the Hudson River, and to safeguard New York City's and Westchester County's drinking water supply. Riverkeeper and its predecessor, the Hudson River Fishermen's Association, Inc., has over 35 years of experience with Hudson River issues, and is a leader in the pursuit of economically viable and ecologically sound power plants. Riverkeeper is not and has never been an anti-nuclear organization. Our focus is solely on the Indian Point nuclear power plant and the federal policies that affect Indian Point and the communities surrounding the facility. Therefore, our testimony here today will be geared strictly to Indian Point security and emergency planning preparedness and those federal policies that apply to this nuclear power plant. INTRODUCTION The Indian Point nuclear power plant, located in Buchanan, NY, on the Hudson River, 35 miles north of Times Square in New York City, is situated in the midst of the densest population surrounding any U.S. commercial reactor site. Approximately, twenty million people live within a 50-mile radius of Indian Point. Due to its proximity to the nation's major population nucleus, financial center and transportation hub, Indian Point is a unique case that deserves special attention. In 1979, in the wake of the Three Mile Island meltdown, NRC's Director of the Office of State Programs, Robert Ryan stated that: "I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in If the location of Indian Point was called into question two decades ago, then post September 11th we really need to question Indian Point's proximity to such a densely populated area. Clearly, today, we would not site Indian Point this close to the New York City metropolitan area. The bottom line for this public health and safety issue is that the risks associated with Indian Point far outweigh the benefits. There is no question that the risks are significant and the consequences catastrophic. Since the attacks of September 11th, legitimate concerns have been raised by the public and elected officials regarding security lapses and poor security defenses at Indian Point. Valid concerns have also been raised about the inability of the emergency preparedness plan to protect the public in the event of a radioactive release from Indian Point. Concerns about Indian Point being a potential terrorist target and deficiencies within the plant's emergency plan have garnered further legitimacy especially with the recent release of the draft report by James Lee Witt Associates on emergency planning for Indian Point and the paper issued by the National Research Council which devotes a chapter to nuclear plant security. Back in July of 2002, the National Research Council released a report' stating "nuclear power plants may present a tempting high-visibility target for terrorist attack and the potential for a September 11-type surprise attack in the near term using U.S. assets such as airplanes appears to be high." The report explains that "such attacks could potentially have severe consequences if the attack were large enough.” And now, the findings of the Governor Pataki commissioned Witt Report have reignited concerns about the inability of Indian Point's emergency plan to protect the public from a radioactive release. The long-awaited Witt Report's conclusions are decisive, irrefutable and inescapable. With regard to the "problems" associated with the emergency plan, Witt Associates states that, "...it is our conclusion that the current radiological response system and The report criticized virtually every aspect of the regional evacuation plans, including the planning process, monitoring equipment, the plans' underlying premises, the ability to handle modern terrorist scenarios, communications between local agencies, and the size of the area that would be affected by a successful terrorist attack. The National Research Council's July 2002 report is titled "Making The Nation Safer: The Role Of Science And Technology In Countering Terrorism" and it can be viewed at the following website: http://books.nap.edu/html/stct/index.html |