a look at it from the standpoint of the guidance that we currently have in place and how we conduct our exercise. I don't believe it gives undue weight. No, I don't.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Conklin.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, may I try

Mr. SHAYS. No, not yet. Not yet. You got it to the end and the question is you do not believe what?

Mr. CONKLIN. I do not believe it gives undue weight. I believe it's an issue that needs to be looked at and needs to be looked at seriously, and I believe with the new formation of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA's incorporation into the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, positions us well to take advantage of a lot of activities across the government that can help us look at this issue in a much broader, more detailed view. Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, context is everything here. And that comment that we made was made recognizing that, as Mr. Witt himself or the Witt group acknowledged, it wasn't within their charter to look at security in detail. They didn't have the time to look at security in detail. The report recognized that. The Commission issued that letter to make clear that many steps were taken, that the Witt report and the Witt committee the Witt study was not able to examine. So it was in that context we said we thought it appeared as if undue weight may have been given, that not enough was recognized regarding the kinds of steps that I had talked about earlier.

So it was not in any way downplaying terrorism and the potential impacts that it could have. And as far as differences are concerned, certainly a scenario involving terrorism would be different than, you know, sequences that might involve a pump or a power supply and the like. But what we have always required is that the emergency plan be able to deal with a whole spectrum of things, things we can't even think about today. And it's in that respect, it's in the result, it's in the outcome, that we have talked about how the current emergency plans, we feel, address and encompass the kinds of things that can occur as a result of a terrorist attack. We're talking about the potential for releases from the plant. We have always required that large, fast developing releases be addressed through emergency planning.

Mr. SHAYS. I feel like you're giving me old theology, and I feel that it is not pertinent to what we are dealing with now, and so we're going to have just a difference of opinion. You obviously are telling me what you believe, and it scares the heck out of me that you believe that. It gives me no confidence. And I didn't intend to come to the hearing and I thought this panel would be quick in and quick out, and I thought we'd spend a lot more time on the third panel. So it's just probably been one of the most unsatisfying panels in my 4 years that I've ever listened to, because I feel like we aren't being honest with the American people. That's the way I feel.

Mr. MILLER. Well, we continue to look at vulnerabilities. I've said that. We have not stopped looking at the potential vulnerabilities associated with terrorism, and hopefully you don't take away from this that we have stopped, and all the actions that we think, you

know, will ever need to be taken have been taken. We're continuing to examine that. So in that sense we've not closed out our consideration of what the potential effects of terrorism would be.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm just going to read this paragraph-I got it from the chairman and then we're going to go to the next panel: "while we appreciate and recognize the effort that went into the draft report, we believe the draft report appears to give undue weight to the impact of potential acts of terrorism on emergency planning and preparedness." And continuing, and in context with the rest of what's said, "Emergency preparedness programs are designed to cope with a spectrum of accidents including those involving rapid large release of radioactivity. Emergency preparedness exercises invariably included large releases of radioactivity that occurs" slightly-"shortly after the initiation of events. Necessary protective actions and offsite response are not predicated on the cause of events. Whether releases from the plant occur as a result of terrorist acts or equipment malfunctions, emergency plans guide decisionmakers and responders in the same way. Preliminary results from our vulnerability studies do not indicate an increased source term or quicker release from terrorist-initiated events than is already addressed by the emergency planning basis required by the NRČ regulations and in place at Indian Point."

I believe that's old theology. That's what I believe. It is my practice to allow the last word on the part of the panelists, so you have the last word, and then we'll get to the next panel.

Mr. Conklin is there anything you wanted us to ask that you were prepared to say that you need to put on the record?

Mr. CONKLIN. I would just like to say that the REP program is committed to supporting the efforts of State and local governments to improve the planning and exercise process, and thank you for the opportunity to be here before you today. And what we will do is continue to work with the folks on Indian Point and all the other nuclear sites to improve their programs and plans.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, NRC has taken strong steps to assure that security is appropriate for this post-September 11 environment, and we continue to examine the threat environment, working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other appropriate Federal agencies. And we will also continue to work with stakeholders at all plants and, in particular, the Indian Point plant, as the State, FEMA, and others work to address the issues that have come up in that case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, gentlemrn.

Our second panel is the honorable Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, State of Connecticut; Mr. John Wiltse, director, Office of Emergency Management, State of Connecticut; and the honorable Richard Bond, first selectman, Town of New Canaan, which is also in the State of Connecticut.

A little bias toward Connecticut on this panel here.

Gentlemen, if you could just remain standing, I will swear you in before you sit down. Thank you.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Please be seated.

Just change those names around; we have you in reverse here, but we'll just switch those around. Would you change the names? That goes over one.

Gentlemen, sorry to keep you waiting. Your testimony will be part of the record. You can read from your testimony. You can summarize it and make comments to comments you've already heard. You have the time and it's yours.

And I think we are going to start out with you, Mr. Blumenthal. Is that correct? And then we will go to Mr. Wiltse and then we will end up with the first selectman of New Canaan.

STATEMENTS OF RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF CONNECTICUT; JOHN T. WILTSE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF CONNECTICUT; AND RICHARD BOND, FIRST SELECTMAN, TOWN OF NEW CANAAN

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And may I thank you and Congressman Kucinich for your leadership in having this hearing. And to Congresswoman Kelly for her leadership as well; you and other Congressmen in the New York area, such as Congresswoman Lowey and Congressman Engel, all have been involved. And this issue really has been one that has united Connecticut and New York in a common cause simply to protect our citizens.

And I want to particularly thank you for having this hearing because one of the illuminating aspects of what we just heard is that these agencies do not plan to have any formal public comment. And so really, you in Congress are filling that vacuum and it is a vital task that you are performing by giving citizens and their representatives an opportunity to comment and trying to make this process more transparent, enable people to be more informed so that the level of fear can be diminished somewhat and it is in many respects that fear that we have to fear more than anything else. And so I really want to thank you genuinely for the enormous educational function that you are performing.

Mr. SHAYS. Would the gentleman just suspend a second? I want to point out that Mr. Tierney has really been very-leading a very strong effort in this area and has kind of taken over for Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. TIERNEY. He's just afraid I'll ruin Kucinich's reputation, so he wants to make it clear.

Mr. BLUMENTHAL. I express my thanks to Congressman Tierney, as well, first, may I say that I submit my testimony for the record and I will just very briefly restate it, but also react to some of what we have heard so far.

When you commented, Mr. Chairman, that we were hearing the old theology, I would go even further back. I think we are in the Stone Age of planning for security against terrorist attack on our nuclear facilities; and in a sense, Indian Point is just a poster child for the lack of planning and safeguarding of these facilities across the country.

These facilities really are dirty bombs waiting to be detonated. They are vulnerable to attack and they are improperly and inadequately safeguarded from that kind of attack, which we cannot an

ticipate in detail. But we do know, Mr. Chairman, as you stated so well, that the terrorists know more than the people, and part of what we need to do is make this system more transparent.

The Witt report says, and we all know, that the current planning is inadequate in part because largely because it fails to address the possibility of nuclear-the terrorist attack on these nuclear facilities. And, in fact, it says, and I am quoting, the plans do not consider the possible additional ramifications of a terrorist-caused release.

FEMA has accepted the fact that the current plans inadequate, but it has ducked its responsibility by kicking back the issue to of ficials in New York. In my view, the plant should be shut down until we have adequate planning, including safeguarding against

terrorist attack.

And it's more than my opinion that counts. I believe that is also the law. The law indeed requires that there be an adequate plan. Connecticut has petitioned FEMA. We will side with environmental groups that have petitioned the NRC. We will go to court if necessary. But I believe that this Congress has a unique obligation, as well as an opportunity, to send a profoundly important message to the industry and the Federal regulators that it will not tolerate this kind of buck-passing.

Congressman Janklow asked the question, who is at fault, whose fault is it that we have inadequate planning? And the simple answer is, we don't know. No one can say, given the current state of the law and given the current buck-passing that has happened and is ongoing.

There are obviously needs for legal accountability and, more important, public policy accountability here that is simply not happening. And in my view, the regulatory agencies have dismissed and disregarded the very real threat of terrorist attack in the public pronouncements that you have cited, Mr. Chairman, and that people simply will not accept.

What we need to do is, on Indian Point, shut it down until there is adequate planning. There may be objections that the power has to be made available from other sources. There are other sources, they are affordable, and they are achievable and must be achieved, because the safety and security of citizens who live in that area are at stake.

Let me just close very briefly by saying that the Witt report finds that this plan is inadequate not only because it fails to guard against or plan for terrorist attack, but any sort of release would trigger an emergency that there simply have not been plans for.

In terms of evacuation, Connecticut's roads would be involved. One-third of our population, including many of our major cities like Bridgeport and Norwalk, Stamford, Waterbury, Danbury, all would be at risk within the 50-mile area. Our food and water supplies would be jeopardized. And the plan really is inadequate because it fails to consider common sense, as well as science that parents, for example, will not evacuate separately from their children. You don't need to do another study to know the answer to that question.

And so I think that I just want to thank this committee for its contribution, thank the members of this panel who have helped to

lead it and say that as State officials, we need Federal help. We need their resources. We need the science that Federal officials can make available to us. We need it now. And we also need, again, accountability.

This committee has asked the right question. Who's fault is it? And someone has to answer, it's mine, it's ours; and right now, that isn't happening. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Blumenthal.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blumenthal follows:]