such voyage or period, or if failure to do so is occasioned 1 Draw, 2 Sumner, 157, 191; Thorndike v. Stone, 11 Pick., 2 Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, 487, 491; 3 Kent, 360. § 1483. If the conditions which alone authorize the master to pledge the ship did not in fact exist, the lender can enforce the contract of bottomry only when after due diligence and inquiry, he had reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of such conditions. Walden v. Chamberlain, 3 Wash. C. C., 290; The Prince of Saxe Coburg, 3 Hagg. Adm., 387; The Orelia, 3 lien, nature § 1484. The contract of bottomry gives the lender a Bottomry specific lien upon the ship, but does not bind the owner of. personally, except so far as he is in possession of the thing pledged, or its value. But this lien does not vest in the lender an absolute and indefeasible interest in the ship, but it is lost by omission to enforce it within a reasonable time. The Virgin, 8 Peters, 554; The Tartar, 1 Hag. Adm., 13; § 1485. A bottomry lien is preferred to every other lien or claim for the voyage upon which it is given, excepting only the lien of the seamen for wages,' and the lien of material men for supplies or repairs, indispensable to the safety of the ship.' 1 Madonna v. Idra, 1 Dods. Adm., 37, 40; Sydney Cove, 2 The Jerusalem, 2 Gall., 345. Preference lien over of bottomry other liens. § 1486. Of two or more bottomry liens on the same ship, Preference the later in date has preference. The Exeter, 1 Rob. Adm., 173. of one bottomry lien over another. Respondentia, what. Who may borrow upon respondentia. Respondentia by own er. Responden tia by master Rate of interest. Lien of rcspondentia. CHAPTER V. RESPONDENTIA. SECTION 1487. Respondentia, what. 1488. Who may borrow upon respondentia. 1489. Respondentia by owner. 1490. Respondentia by master. 1492. Lien of respondentia. § 1487. Respondentia is a contract whereby one agrees to repay money loaned on the security of a cargo, with the interest, if any be stipulated, on condition that the cargo survive certain risks during a specified voyage or period. 3 Kent Com., 354. § 1488. Money may be borrowed upon respondentia by the owner of the cargo, or by the master of the ship upon which it is laden. 1489. The owner of the cargo may pledge it upon respondentia, at any time and place, and for any lawful purpose. § 1490. The master of the ship may pledge the cargo by respondentia only in a case in which he would be authorized to hypothecate ship and freight, but is unable to borrow money upon the security of those, for the repairs or supplies which are necessary for the successful accomplishment of the voyage. The Gratitudine, 3 Rob. Adm., 214; ship Active, 2 § 1491. The provisions of § 1481, respecting interest upon bottomry loans, apply equally to loans on respondentia. § 1492. The contract of respondentia gives the lender not only a personal claim upon the borrower, but also a specific lien upon the cargo; but it may expressly or by implication give the owner the right to dispose of it, as discharged from the lien. 3 Kent Com., 354; 2 Bl. Com., 458. DIVISION FOURTH. GENERAL PROVISIONS. APPLICABLE TO PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND OBLIGATIONS, OR TO TWO OF THOSE SUBJECTS. PART I. Relief. II. Debtor and Creditor. III. Nuisance. IV. Maxims of Jurisprudence. V. Definitions, and General Provi- PART I. RELIEF. TITLE I. Of the Different Kinds of Relief. II. Compensatory Relief. III. Specific Relief. IV. Preventive Relief. TITLE I. OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIEF. SECTION 1493. Compensatory relief. 1494. Specific and preventive relief. § 1493. As a general rule, compensation is the relief or remedy provided by law for the violation of private rights, and the means of securing their observance. Compensadamages. tion in Preventive and specific relief. § 1494. Specific and preventive relief may be given in certain specified cases, and in none others. TITLE II. COMPENSATORY RELIEF. CHAPTER I. General principles. CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. ARTICLE I. Definition and general provisions. II. Interest. III. Exemplary damages. Right to damages. What inju ries create damages. ARTICLE I. DEFINITION AND GENERAL PROVISIONS. SECTION 1495. Right to damages. 1496. What injuries create the right to damages. 1497. Injuries resulting or probable after suit brought. 1499. Partial breach. § 1495. Whoever suffers loss or harm' by the unlawful act or omission of another, is entitled to have from him a compensation in money therefor; which is called Damages. 1 Sedgwick on Damages, 31, 32; 22 Verm., 231. The references to Sedgwick are according to the original paging. § 1496. In order to create a right to damages the loss or the right to harm must be the direct and immediate [or proximate and natural'], consequence of the unlawful act or omission complained of, or such a consequence as was foreseen, or could be [or may reasonably be supposed to have been'] foreseen at the time of such unlawful act or omission, or, if the loss occurred through a breach of contract, then at the time of making the contract; but nothing in this section applies to contracts for the payment of money only. 3 1 Per MARCY, J., Armstrong v. Perry, 5 Wend., 535, 538. 2 Code of Louisiana, Arts. 1928, 2294, 2295. 3 Sedgwick Dam., 112. resulting or after suit § 1497. Damages may be given for loss or harm which Injuries resulted after the commencement of the action or which cer- probable tainly will result in the future; except that no damages can be awarded for the merely probable consequences of a breach of contract. Sedgwick Dam., 104; Wilcox v. Ex'crs of Plummer, 4 § 1498. No damages can be given for a mere part performance of an obligation under an entire contract, except as hereinafter provided in the Title on SPECIFIC RELIEF. 18 Wend., 187; 5 Denio, 406, and cases cited. brought. Partial breach. ARTICLE II. INTEREST AS DAMAGES. SECTION 1499. Interest, where there is an agreement to pay it. 1500. Interest on default in contract. 1501. In actions other than on contract. where there is an agreement to pay § 1499. Interest is always properly chargeable as dama- Interest ges when there is either an express or an implied agreement to pay it.' 1 Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend., 315. § 1500. Where a debtor is in default for not paying money, delivering property or rendering services on or before a day certain, in pursuance of his contract, whether the value is liquidated or not, he is liable for interest thereon from such day.' Where a demand is necessary to put the debtor in default, except in the case of loans or advances of money, interest is to be given only from the demand. 1 Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N. Y., 141; Livingston v. it. Interest on contract. default in |