the use of three remote-controlled countermine systems- Badger, Panther, and a mini-flail. The Mobile Training Team also

assisted in the installation and use of anti-blast or

fragmentation protection blankets, Body Armor Individual Countermine (BASIC), and bolt-on protection kits for HMMWV and 5-Ton vehicles. Additionally, the team demonstrated

developmental countermine equipment such as, Thermal Mine Avoidance System TMAS, Barret Rifles w/explosive rounds and the Field Expedient Countermine System FECS (detonates magnetic fused mines).

The Badger system is designed to perform countermine route detection missions. Badger is a remote controlled 5-ton truck that mounts two IR cameras to detect mines thermally, a metallic mine detector head and a mine marking apparatus.

The Panther system is designed to perform countermine route detection, clearance and proofing missions. Panther is a remote-controlled M60 tank with mine clearing rollers.

The mini-flail is for dismounted soldiers. The mini-fail is a small, remote-controlled tractor that pounds short lengths of chain into the earth to detonate or destroy antipersonnel mines, thus clearing a 1 meter wide foot path for dismounted soldiers.

The Field Expedient Countermine System is designed to

detonate magnetically-fuzed mines. The system mounts on the front of a vehicle and projects a magnetic field in front of the vehicle.

The Anti-Blast/ Fragmentation protection kits for HMMWV and 5-Ton vehicles were designed by ARPA for Somalia. The HMMWV kit includes front and rear exterior blast deflectors, interior floor pans for all four positions, armored front and rear seats, tail gate doors for all positions and ballistic windshields. The 5-Ton kit consists of external blast deflectors, cab (floor) fragmentation protection and energy-absorbing seats with four point personnel restraints.

The Thermal Mine Avoidance System (TMAS) is also known as "INFRACAM." The TMAS is a hand-held infrared camera capable of detecting surface laid and buried mines.

The Barret Rifle is a highly-accurate .50 caliber rifle designed to hit and pierce mine cases and detonate or otherwise neutralize mines.

There is no "silver bullet" to the complex mine threat. We train our soldiers and their leaders, write and apply effective doctrine, develop responsive organizations, and field a suite of high-, medium- and low-tech equipment. The Thermal Mine

Avoidance System is an example of high technology, the Barret Rifle of medium technology, and a simple mine probe-- lowtechnology. Each has its place and all these efforts assist and enhance field countermine operations. Our efforts are focused on developing an mine-aware and mine-alert soldier.

We believe that US Forces are trained and equipped in countermining to the best standards in the world.

In preparation for deployment to Bosnia, we have conducted rigorous mission-based countermine training. Units deploying and individuals designated for replacement or support within the area received training on the mine threat, recognition and detection, reporting and recording, and other actions prior to deployment. In addition to their countermine and other protective equipment, we have gathered up promising, but as yet not generally fielded equipment from many sources. The Army Engineer School is developing the techniques, tactics, and procedures for employing new equipment and is overwatching the testing community. Any equipment that shows significant promise is a candidate for "fast-track" fielding. A fundamental "truth" to how we wish to defeat mines is to seek increased distance and enhanced protection from the explosive device to the soldier. We are also using some robotics countermine technologies in Bosnia.

We have taken a host of measures to improve our

capabilities from the standpoints of doctrine, equipment, and training?

The premier source of US Army countermine doctrine is Field Manual 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, published in late 1992 in the aftermath of the Gulf War Key doctrine on unexploded ordnance is found in Field Manual 21-16, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures, also revised and published after the Gulf War. The senior Army warfighting doctrinal publication is Field Manual 100-5, Operations, published in 1993. Doctrine provides the general framework by which we orchestrate military operations. We believe that our doctrine is sound. We have an engineer team in Bosnia that will provide doctrinal feed-back. Additionally, we have the networking capability in place to share specific and timely countermine techniques, tactics, and procedures. We believe that the troop list includes a doctrinally sufficient amount of combat engineers to conduct countermine operations beyond the capability of other US units in Bosnia.

We have also published the Engineer Contingency Handbook (Former Yugoslavia) that details the specific threat faced by our soldiers deployed to Bosnia. This publication provides color photographs of the mines that may be encountered as well as the techniques, tactics, and procedures that the belligerents

have used to lay mines. The information is vital to our soldiers' awareness of the threat.

Specific countermine equipment in the hands of our soldiers in Bosnia include the AN/PSS-12 mine detector, tank-mounted rollers and plows, the "MICLIC" rocket propelled line charge. Additionally, we have several developmental items in the field as described earlier.

The training has consisted of initial entry and advanced individual training that all soldiers and leaders receive, unit collective training, and specific mission training developed for

Bosnia.

NATO has a common tactical countermine doctrine and we have borrowed freely from capabilities existing in other allied forces.

We actively share countermine initiatives among the NATO alliance and "borrow" good ideas from others. A11 NATO forces conduct similar countermine operations although there are minor differences in specific techniques, tactics, and procedures as well as equipment. NATO countermine doctrine is developed collectively through the NATO "panel" procedure. While there are no significant differences at the macro level, we certainly share many tactical ideas developed by our allies. As only one