are, so we could develop a strategy to either avoid the minefield or clear it if necessary, or breach it if necessary to support combat operations. That technology is on the horizon. It is very exciting. It is a fusion of some technologies we talked about earlier, so I think those capabilities that we are looking at, that are on the horizon, will give us this enhanced capability to clear and to breach that you speak of. Mr. MCHALE. General, I thank you. The second question probably would be more appropriately placed to the first panel of witnesses, and I apologize if it is inappropriately placed to you. Could you give me briefly, a thumbnail sketch, what is the scope of our mission in Bosnia regarding mine clearing? To what extent are we proactively searching out minefields in order to clear them, primarily as a benefit to the permanent residents of that region? To what extent are we clearing minefields only in proximity of our troops for their personal safety? [The following information was received for the record:] OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TO BREACH A LANE THROUGH A MINEFIELD There are currently three systems in development that would change how we breach a minefield in the future. The first system is a man portable system which is being developed in a joint effort with the Marine Corps. This system is known as the Anti Personnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS). It consists of two backpacks containing a rocket propelled line charge with grenades on the line. It will create a path through wire obstacles and threat minefields. The system is scheduled for initial production beginning in Fiscal Year 1998 and will be fielded in the Fiscal Year 2000 timeframe. The second system is the Explosive Standoff Minefield Breacher (ESMB). This system is a rocket launched net with thousands of shape charge munitions at the nodes of the net. It is designed to clear a path 5 meters wide by 145 meters long by firing the shape charges into the soil to initiate the buried mines. Fielding of this system is expected to commence in Fiscal Year 2002. The final system in development is the M1 Breacher or Grizzly. The system is comprised of a full width mine plow and a telescopic excavating arm on an M1 tank chassis. The system is designed to have the same survivability as the M1 tank. A Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision is scheduled for Fiscal Year 1998 and fielding is expected to begin in Fiscal Year 2000. There is another technology that can be developed to give U.S. forces an added dimension for breaching threat minefields. The Off Route Smart Mine Clearance System employs multispectral signature reproduction technologies (acoustic and seismic), advanced threat signal processing emulations, low observable technologies and teleoperation to clear routes of smart side and emerging top attack mines. The use of teleoperation provides operator survivability. The platform for the advanced technology demonstration is a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) which provides a low cost, easily transported solution. This effort is currently not funded in the development cycle. With funding commencing in Fiscal Year 1998, a fielded capability could be had in 4-5 years. Mr. WELDON. If the gentleman will yield, Colonel Barlow is here, and we will ask him to come up and he can go through it again. Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to inconvenience him. Mr. WELDON. I think a quick response from him would be appropriate. Mr. MCHALE. If it is not inconvenient. Colonel BARLOW. The only mining operations that we are doing militarily are for the protection of the force. Now, there are some supporting type missions that when we have completed all of our principal missions, and in order to provide some security necessary to do the operations that the civilian side needs, the United Na tions side needs, they can make special requests. If we have the resources and if we are not bogged down with the principal activities, we can give some secondary effort to being able to do those. But it is very clearly delineated what the three parties are responsible for and that the Uunited Nations DHA, along with our own transitional team, civilian team, receive basically from our civilian agencies, who will be working the other piece. We are trying to keep, in essence, the mission creep down, to keep our operational side of it completely free from the civilian side of it. This is going apace, and those kind of plans are being discussed in the Bosnia executive committee. Mr. MCHALE. I expected that would be the answer. I wasn't sure that would be the answer to my question. I think it is safe to say, in light of the scope of our mission as we have defined it, this is going to be a pretty nasty situation still remaining in Bosnia when we redeploy at the end of one year. I think it is likely an awful lot of mines will remain buried and potentially dangerous in that nation. Colonel BARLOW. I wanted to follow up on that one, as well. For the first time in a mission like this the reconstruction plan by the World Bank now includes $200 million earmarked for the humanitarian demining effort. Again, that hasn't been done before. They are collecting the moneys as we speak, so that effort isn't really going to get underway until perhaps, you know, later this year, but at least there is cognizance of the problem that you just mentioned, and there is indeed a 3-year plan to address it. Mr. MCHALE. Gentlemen, I thank you very much. General BEAUCHAMP. If I may add one thing for Mr. McHale, I would note the M-1 minefield breacher is the number one item on the priority list for the Engineer School. It is a breaching and clearing system. That is another system that we have under development that is very high priority for us, as well. Mr. MCHALE. That is known as a last-minute plea to take note where you need some help. You kept a straight face. I noted your request. I think it is an area where we have an important responsibility to respond, because that piece of equipment will in all Îikelihood be used on some future battlefield. Mr. WELDON. I thank each of you for your excellent testimony. In bringing today's hearing to a close, I want to summarize and make some observations about what we have heard today from our witnesses. Obviously the landmine threat in Bosnia is significant. I understand we have had 250 casualties for forces up until this time. There have been 12 allied casualties and one U.S. casualty involving land mines. We have heard Department of Defense has taken a number of measures to improve the capability of the United States forces to deal with the threat and carry out the mission in Bosnia. I, too, am concerned about mission creep in this regard, and that is something we will be monitoring very closely. Nevertheless, we have heard that deficiencies do exist. Landmines which contain little or no metal, so-called plastic mines, are obviously difficult to detect and are a problem. However, we have heard there is no silver bullet system or technology currently available that will provide a solution to the problem which would be near 100 percent detection with a near zero false alarm rate. Historically, the U.S. countermine program is focused on breaching a landmine barrier, with little attention to technology and capabilities for area clearance. That focus continues today. However, with examples of Somalia, Bosnia, and other Third World areas in which United States forces have been committed, it appears that increased emphasis needs to be placed on the development and procurement of area clearance technologies and capabilities in countermine and related programs. The area clearance problem is common to tactical countermine operations and to humanitarian demining. The technologies and capabilities developed for one are generally applicable to the other. Countermine, unexploded ordnance and humanitarian demining programs in the Department of Defense are fragmented among several different agencies. Our understanding is at this point in time there is no single agency of the Department. I have read one report where there are 21 separate departments and agencies of the Federal Government which have responsibilities in this area. Although we have heard today there are steps being taken to consolidate the responsibility, there is no such agency in the Department to which a user can turn to to address the issues or which has joint authority with regard to policy, doctrine and/or operational requirements in these closely related areas. Nor is there currently a single development activity with authority for oversight and management of each of these programs. I believe that these organizational programmatic issues need to be addressed by the Department, and we have stated that publicly today. The attitude of the Department and the military services toward countermine programs I think is similar to an attitude we had toward chemical, biological defense programs in the past: When the threat is real, as chemical, biological and landmine threats were in the Gulf War and with the landmine threat in Bosnia today, we scrambled to get the force ready and provide increased funding as we seek new capability and new technologies to solve the problem. In the times between conflicts, however, peacekeeping or other operations when the threat is not so immediate, we slack off on training, cut funding and reduce resource development and procurement. That cannot be allowed for the future, and this Congress has addressed this problem over the past several years. Given the difficulty of the countermine problem, and for the countermine capability to be available when the troops are deploying, increased emphasis needs to be placed on the countermine program both from the standpoint of tactical programs and on demining. Short-term funding increases, such as those injected by the Congress and humanitarian demining programs, have limited impact. Significant progress will only be made in the detection, neutralization, marking, clearance and protection when a focused, coordinated, funded and sustained program is established which addresses clearly defined operational requirements and incorporates the best efforts of government, industry and academia. We look to the Department of Defense, the Secretariat, the Joint Staff and military departments to establish such a program, and you can tell from the tone of the questions here, we are going to be monitoring this very closely. Gentlemen, we thank the members of both panels for your excellent testimony. We support what you are doing and encourage you to tell us how we can support you to go even further and quicker in supporting the long-term solution as well as the short-term needs to the problems confronting the troops in the field. Thank you. This hearing now stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] |