Mr. HOFFMAN. Are you familiar with the case in Philadelphia, the Dock Street case?

Mr. VOORHEES. I certainly am.

Mr. HOFFMAN. There was no particular violence there after they got through with the marine, was there?

Mr. VOORHEES. No.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Those fellows that got the money just represented three unions, did they not, or four? Three anyway.

They convicted them and that case was never reversed.

Mr. VOORHEES. I think there was violence proven or fear of vio lence. There was fear of violence proven in that case.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That might be. It might have been fear.

As I recall, at the tail end where they were convicted, the acts for which they were convicted were just collecting from three groups of employees, the same fellows, three or four of them. What was the ultimate outcome? They was sentenced to jail, but what happened later on?

They were placed on probation because of their good behavior?

Mr. VOORHEES. Yes. That happened about 10 or 12 years ago, did it not? This was during the time that the Hobbs Act was passed. Mr. HOFFMAN. Shortly thereafter and Tom Clark was the U.S. District Attorney. He testified it was not a violation, but the court said it was.

Mr. VOORHEES. Yes.

In most such instances this cannot be shown. The truck just does not get unloaded. This is not necessarily any evidence of violence or fear of violence.

Section 218 of H.R. 4473, and section 302 of H.R. 3302, contain language designed to terminate this practice. A similar provision is included in S. 1555 as reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

We are gratified that after many years, during which millions of dollars have been extorted from farmers by this practice, there seems to be a prospect of corrective action.

Needless to say, we recommend inclusion of this provision in any bill reported by the committee.

Preemption: We strongly recommend that there be incorporated in any bill reported by the committee such language as may be neces sary to preserve the availability of present remedies under State law against racketeering practices and abuse of power by labor union leaders. Otherwise the net effect of the enactment of this bill might well be to narrow and weaken the rights and availability of remedies of the individual worker rather than to broaden and strengthen such rights and remedies.

For example, if blackmail picketing were to be established as an unfair labor practice, without any effort to preserve State authority, it might well be construed by the courts that State authority in this field is extinguished, and persons injured by this practice would be denied a State remedy possibly more effective and expeditious than the Federal remedy.

Section 303 of H.R. 3302 and similar bills, provides that the authorization to the Secretary of Labor to take action with respect to improper election practices is an exclusive remedy.

pectfully submit this is undesirable as a general principle. DOSEVELT. Would you yield at that point, again, just for on?

of the recent Supreme Court decisions of dual liability, or ability, would you feel that it would be proper to say if you the right of both the State and Federal action; however, if me instance, whichever party moved first that this should be that was the right and not left open to a dual or double

ORHEES. This could be. I am sure we cannot be too specific w you work out the jurisdiction. As I have said, we are not -ialists and our board has not taken action on this point. OSEVELT. Thank you.

FFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to interrupt again, but ething I must go to.

of the statement made a few moments ago, I want to put in the statement that Justice Clark, then Attorney General, This opinion, based it on the fact that in his opinion the goods n interstate commerce at the time.

merely a legal matter. I did not mean to let it be int he approved of the conduct of anything of that kind. KINS. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FFMAN. I think it should go in, in fairness.

RHEES. The aggrieved person is denied the right of judicial ess the Secretary of Labor proceeds with the case. The s with the Secretary.

would take away from the individual union member a ow has. This goes in the direction of government by men, If this provision had been enacted into law 2 years ago, the certain Teamsters Union members for judicial relief as a he election procedure that resulted in the election of James eamster president, could not have been considered or acted e court.

tion of officers of all other private organizations is within ction of the courts. We see no valid reason why similar n should not be applicable to labor unions.

efore, strongly favor inclusion in the bill reported by the of a provision such as section 222 of H.R. 4473, and the of any preemptive impact as set forth above.

nan's land: Section 601 of H.R. 3302 and similar bills reNational Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdiction of all ising under the act, as a means of eliminating the no man's en State and Federal authority.

belief that even now it is impossible for the National Labor Board to give judicial consideration to all the cases brought

16,748 cases were filed with the Board. The Board itself S decisions. It seems obvious that this volume of cases cany be handled with the appropriate judicial discretion their

warrants.

belief that there are three alternatives that are preferable roach provided in H.R. 3302. We list them in what we be the order of preference:

First, we recommend that jurisdiction over unfair practice cases be transferred from NLRB to the Federal courts as proposed in H.R 1107 by Congressman Bosch.

Under the present procedure, individuals harmed by the acts of others are denied judicial relief.

We submit it is a basic principle of the American legal system that individuals harmed by another's violation of law should have the opportunity for judicial redress. At the present time even the oppor tunity for administrative redress is limited and dependent upon the decision of one man as to whether or not a particular case will be referred to NLRB for consideration.

It is a fundamental concept of our governmental structure that judicial functions shall be performed by the judiciary, not by an executive branch of the Government.

Furthermore, we believe that if such jurisdiction were to be trans ferred to the courts, the adjudication of the law would be accomplished under circumstances more removed from personalities and political considerations than otherwise would be the case.

Second, it seems to us that it would be desirable for the Congress to enact criteria to define the jurisdiction of a Federal law and to cede a broad area of jurisdiction to the States.

A very substantial percentage of the cases involved are basically local in nature, even though some interstate commerce may be involved. Certainly few would contend that labor-management relations law is firm and finally settled.

But it can best be improved as experience demonstrates the advis ability or inadvisability of certain measures or procedures. This is a big country with often significant variations in thinking in different areas. There is, it seems to us, little virtue in a national uniform pattern which leaves no room for local differences and freedom to choose.

Third, it would seem to us that it would be desirable for Congress to provide concurrent jurisdiction as provided in H.R. 4474. We submit that it is consistent with our constitutional form of government that States be encouraged to share in the responsibility of administering this vital phase of public law.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Would you yield for a minute?

Mr. VOORHEES. Certainly.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I am a little confused as to how you reconcile defining the jurisdiction of the States and the Federal Government in your second suggestion and then come down and give them current jurisdiction in your third suggestion.

Mr. VORHEES. We have listed three suggestions, as alternatives to the provisions of H.R. 3302.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Do you prefer the second or the third?

Mr. VOORHEES. We prefer the first.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. You prefer the first, which would give to the Federal courts the jurisdiction?

Mr. VOORHEES. The Federal courts.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Give it to the Federal courts?

Mr. VOORHEES. If we cannot do this, then we must define how do we operate, concurrently, Federal and State. This we have never done, but we have done it in many other aspects of our economy and legal life.

ways do it in the administration of agricultural and marders. These are all concurrently administered.

OSEVELT. I am going to take the position that perhaps my om Georgia here will be in some agreement with me.

g at the Federal docket, which I am not too familiar with, mpression that the Federal courts are already tremendously d. What we would be doing would be to add to that load. is to me that the second suggestion has more appeal to me least there you would be making an affirmative jurisdiction, al court would get some cases and the State courts would get and some of the burden would be taken off the back of the ourts if they are overlooked, as I understand they are. ORHEES. We have left a degree of choice and we have three

5,

es.

SEVELT. Thank you, sir.

KINS. Go ahead.

ORHEES. Political expenditures: We favor the inclusion in be reported by the committee of language designed to pro1 expenditures for election purposes.

position that any organization whose membership is other tary should be prohibited from expending money for politi

es.

el any individual to financially support a political program e may be opposed or to promote candidacies of persons to ay be opposed is politically immoral and violates the spirit of Rights.

ding of the voluminous hearings of the McClellan committee upport the conclusion that much of the racketeering power nion leaders, or of racketeers who have invaded the labor ement, is supported by political power.

EY. Could I interrupt?

KINS. Go ahead.

LEY. Would you want that to apply to the United States f Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, nore organizations that make political contributions? HEES. I think so. They don't have a captive membership; mpulsory membership.

EY. Sometimes I wonder if they do not have a captive

).

MAN. Thomas doubted, too, you remember.

EY. From some of the proposals that they present to the it looks like they are owned body and soul by somebody

HEES. I think we have definitely stated that this applies ip which is other than voluntary. I am not here to defend er of Commerce of the United States, but I think it is a rganization.

VELT. Will the gentleman yield?

understanding that this is presently the law. What you ning about is that it is not properly enforced; is that it? IEES. This could be.

IN. I would like to point out that the Corrupt Practices is part of the Taft-Hartley law, applies only to Federal

elections. There is nothing in the Federal law to prohibit union of corporation contributions to elected State officers and local officers: accordingly, unless State law provides otherwise, a union can directly contribute union dues money for political purposes to candidates for local and State offices.

Now, we have heard all kinds of testimony before this committe and the McClellan committee, attesting that existing laws now outla some of the abuses being exposed, and there has been much complain: that local law enforcement officials are not doing their duty.

I wonder what the gentleman would think about the fact that is Wayne County, Mich., in last November's election, the Teamsters Union contributed $11,000-it was widely publicized, no denial abou it-to the candidate for prosecuting attorney.

Would it not seem that this is one of the abuses that we should do something about?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Will the gentleman yield before the question is answered?

Mr. GRIFFIN. Yes.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Would he also include in his question whether he thinks it is proper for the Federal Government to take action on that, or whether that is the responsibility of the State of Michigan to take action.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I appreciate the gentleman's concern about States rights.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. You see, that is in close association with my co!league, Mr. Landrum, here.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I wonder if there is reason for such a concern in the field of labor relations.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Does the Federal Government have the power to go and say what shall happen in the State election, who should con tribute or who should not?

Mr. GRIFFIN. If the Congress can permit union-shop contracts, 1 form of compulsory unionism, then I think we should be able to do something about the conditions under which compulsory unionism shall operate. I would think that the protection of basic civil rights of union members-the right to the free exercise of political choice. without having their dues money used for political purposes, certainly should be a matter within Federal jurisdiction.

I do not know whether he has an answer to my question, but the witness may have some comments on it.

Mr. VOORHEES. I shall be glad to comment.

Of course, we will assume the premise that it is the result perhaps of Federal law, the administration of it in regard to labor activities. that these situations are created within the States.

Now, if the Federal Government would define its jurisdiction and then say to the States, "This is your problem," then I think the States could be in a better position to go ahead and handle it.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I don't believe that is a good answer to Mr. Roose velt's question because Congress has spelled out the extent of the prohibition in the Taft-Hartley Act.

Congress has said that unions cannot make contributions to candidates in Federal elections.