to speak out and to institute legal action because of what they considered to be an unfair or rigged union election.

Since the type of work is of a closed-shop nature, their expulsion from the union was an extreme penalty; it was tantamount to depriving them of their very means of livelihood.

These 19 employees, and hundreds and thousands more rank-andfile union members like them, will not be able to understand any legis lation which purports to give them the right to have democracy within unions, yet subjects them to the ultimate in reprisals if they dare to exercise it.

I am not so concerned with whether these members were right or wrong in their appraisal of the particular union election. What does concern me, however, and what should concern all of us, is the real danger which their expulsion from the union represents to basic individual liberties, for freedom of speech is fundamental in our system of government.

Any legislation which is publicized to give the individual worker the right to speak out and does not provide the necessary safeguards to protect him in that right is a sham. It is a fraud on our people. 5. It deprives employers of their right of free speech;

6. It invades the attorney-client privileged relationship;

7. It is silent and would leave unchanged the present loopholes in the secondary-boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act;

8. It would leave untouched the immunities of unions in conducting organizational and recognition picketing, notwithstanding the fact that the employees do not want or have affirmatively rejected the union. This is blackmail picketing and, as the McClellan investigations revealed, is one of the great sources of power and corruption.

9. It is further deficient on the so-called jurisdictional void. It would require the Board to assist jurisdiction in all cases, inevitably leading to a further bogging down of Board process. Even with minimum jurisdictional standards set up by the Board, the Board is physically unable and geographically unable to handle the thousands of labor cases promptly and efficiently.

The Kennedy bill does not provide the answer of an immediate, prompt, and effective remedy. To the extent that it does not, abuses will continue, and the rights of employees will continue to be jeopardized.

Now, I would like to devote my time principally to the question of organizational and recognition picketing and secondary boycotts and the problem of jurisdiction, and the problem of reporting requirements for employers.

Insofar as internal union reforms are concerned, I would simply point out to you the testimony of Godfrey Schmidt, witness before a Senate subcommittee who, as one of the three teamster monitors appointed by the court, is probably one of the most qualified persons in the country to testify concerning the problem of internal union

reform.

He aptly pointed out that S. 505, in addition to its failure to outlaw blackmail picketing, was seriously defective in not providing proper safeguards to insure union democracy.

It did not contain provisions which would prevent union reprisals against members who would dare speak out against the entrenched union bosses.

We believe that the Barden bill, H.R. 4473, with its provision providing for minimal standards in union constitution and bylaws to insure freedom of assembly and speech, and freedom from improper disciplinary action, and establishing proper safeguards for the employees, will be far more effective.

EMPLOYER REPORTING

I wish to point out another serious defect in S. 505 and H.R. 3028. Section 103 (a) requires reporting by an employer of arrangements he makes with a labor relations consultant by which such consultant undertakes activities where an object thereof directly or indirectly is to persuade employees not to exercise or as to the manner of exercising the right to organize.

Subparagraph 2 contains the same reporting requirements with respect to expenditures in excess of $2,500 with certain exceptions. Section 103(b) also requires labor relations consultants to report such arrangements.

These sections create the presumption and proceed on the premise that there is some impropriety in persuading employees to refrain from organizing.

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees to employees this right, and section 8 (c) gives to the employer the right to persuade provided such persuasion contains no threats of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

The restriction which S. 505 would place upon the employer's right to persuade is an impairment of free speech under the Constitution and, as a practical matter, would repeal one of the most substantial provisions of the Taft-Hartley law, section 8 (c), which gives the employees the right to speak out. Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution so long as it contains no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit.

As a practical matter this provision of the Kennedy bill would repeal section 8(c) of the present Taft-Hartley law and it is significant-this is not a quid pro quo or what is good for one is good for the other, but it is significant that S. 505 does not require unions to report the money they spend to influence employees in organizational campaigns.

We can imagine the cries of foul play from labor leaders if they were required to make reports of their expenditures to influence employees, or to give a detailed statement of the terms of any agreement made with other unions to organize employees. We are in favor of legislation to ban any collusive deals.

The employer reporting sections are so broadly written that an employer would be in constant jeopardy not knowing whether his arrangement with a labor relations consultant is merely advice which is exempt or indirect persuasion which must be reported. This dilemma will make many employers reluctant to inform their employees fully on the facts and their rights, and employees will be making uniformed decisions, all to the advantage of the union organizers.

Certainly this would encourage more and more misleading propaganda by persons seeking to organize employees.

Mr. Meany, incidentally, to the contrary, notwithstanding, I read in the Kansas City Star an AP dispatch a couple of weeks ago where Meany said, according to this article:

The big-business lobby is going to extreme length to torpedo the KennedyErvin bill because it would require business firms to make public reports on expenditures for labor spies.

Well, I am not a big business firm, and many of our employers, thousands of the people who are members of the ARF, are small employers, and when Mr. Meany says that large firms or small firms are against publishing reports on expenditures for labor spies, that is wrong.

We are not against it. I think it is a smokescreen simply to get a bill through that he knows would seriously restrict employers in their rights of freedom of speech and give unions a free hand.

Remember, if this Senate bill became a law with this employeeemployer reporting requirement, here is what it would do:

I am a practicing lawyer in Kansas City, Mo., and I represent employers. We had the retail, wholesale, and department store employees union trying to represent the employees of a store there in Kansas City, Mo. All we did-and I consulted with the employerwas to tell the employees that the three leading officers of that union, Arthur Osmond, Jack Paley, and Sam Kavinetski, were members, or had been members of the Communist Party, or at least, had taken the fifth amendment when they were called before a House congressional committee and asked about their Communist affiliations.

Now, if this bill of Senator Kennedy's had become a law, we could not have pointed out to those employees that those three officers of the union did do this before the congressional committee and what would have happened to those employees?

I do not think that any legislation which would require an employer to keep his mouth shut in situations like that is good legislation. You know what we did in that case.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Will the witness refer to the specific section of the Kennedy bill which he is talking about?

Mr. BROWNE. Section 103 and section 112. I think it is 112(a) and 103, Congressman.

I might say in that case all we did was to give these employees and lay on the table copies of the Congresssional Record and let them see what happened.

I know another case where we called to the attention of the employees the fact that the Teamsters Union was not exactly an honest union with lily-white hands in every respect. That is all we did. We called their attention to certain newspaper articles.

We would have been effectively precluded from doing that because we would have had to report it and if we had not reported it we would have been subject to criminal penalties.

Now, in our testimony before the Kennedy committee we also said that those reporting requirements would require an attorney who was also a labor relations consultant and the employer to disclose a confidential relationship between them.

Actually that is what it would do because we would have to report, according to this provision of the Kennedy bill, on the details of any arrangement that the labor relations consultant and the employer,

the attorney and the employer, had with respect to anything which would directly or indirectly influence the employees.

That, of course, covers a multitude of things.

But that was not changed in committee, I notice, and later the American Bar Association, the house of delegates, passed a resolution advocating exactly what we had done.

They say, among other things, that:

The American Bar Association urges that in any proposed legislation in the labor management field your traditional confidential relationship between attorney and client be preserved and that no legislation should require report or disclosure by either attorney or client of any matter which has traditionally been considered as confidential between a client and his attorney, including, but not limited to the existence of the relationship between attorney and client, the financial details thereof of any advice or activities of the attorney on behalf of his client which falls within the scope of the legitimate practice of law.

It be further resolved that the officers and councils of the section of labor relations law of the American Bar Association in corporate, banking, and business law, be directed to bring the foregoing resolution to the attention of members of the proper committees of Congress in connection with any proposed legislation in this field, and to oppose legislation contrary to the principles urged in said resolutions.

I might say this: I am a member of these committees of the bar association where they have management representatives and union representatives, lawyers on both sides are representing them, and honestly we can never get together on anything because there is always such great feeling, we are always so opposed.

But on this thing, the section of the bar association the labor relations section, we agreed.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question at that point.

There was an individual that appeared before the McClellan committee as a labor consultant by the name of Shefferman; was he a lawyer?

Mr. BROWNE. No, he was not.

Mr. DENT. If he was a lawyer under your proposal here he would not have been permitted to appear before the McClellan committee and give any testimony, would he?

Mr. BROWNE. Now, let me say this: I don't know so far as the rules of the House are concerned, what you can require and what you can't require.

Mr. DENT. Would not we be violating the relationship between client and attorney?

Mr. BROWNE. If Shefferman had been a lawyer he would have been disbarred, he would not have practiced law.

Mr. DENT. What is that?

Mr. BROWNE. He would have been disbarred. He would not have been permitted to practice law.

Mr. PERKINS. Proceed.

Mr. LANDRUM. May I ask the gentleman one question on the point you are bringing out here?

Is it not true that in the committee of the American Bar Association. passing this resolution you are talking about, there were also lawyers who represent unions as well as employers?

Mr. BROWNE. Yes, Congressman, that is correct.

I might say that the Barden bill in my opinion, correctly answers this whole field. It exempts attorneys and insofar as labor relations consultants are concerned, it gets at the Shefferman type of activity. We go for it. We think that it is correctly handled in the Barden bill.

Mr. LANDRUM. But the bona fide attorney, regardless of which side of the table he is operating from, as counsel, does not object to the recommendation that you and the American Bar Association have passed?

Mr. BROWNE. That is correct.

Congressman Barden's bill, H.R. 4473, exempts the attorney and client from making reports which would eliminate this confidential relationship. At the same time, H.R. 4473 effectively prevents the Shefferman type of abuse disclosed by the McClellan committee.

If Congress feels that reporting is necessary, then it should be confined to cases where the employer either directly or through an intermediary has made a payment to his employees which violates rights guaranteed to them under section 7 of the Taft-Hartley law, or engages in espionage activities.

However, we believe they already are outlined by section 8(a)(1). Section 112 of S. 505, subparagraph 3, also amends the LaborManagement Relations Act-section 302 (a) (3), by making it unlawful for an employer or any person acting on his behalf to make any payment to an employee or group of employees for the purpose of causing such employee or group directly or indirectly, to influence any other employees in their right to organize.

Subsection (c) exempts payment by the employer to any of his employees

whose established duties include acting openly for such employer in matters of labor relations or personnel administration.

This section would apparently permit employers to make payments to members of their industrial relations or personnel departments. However, only the very large employers have industrial relations or personnel departments, so that the small employer who has no such department is discriminated against.

As retailers, we have in every union organizational campaign seen the benefits of organization greatly and falsely magnified by the union organizers.

If the employees are to know the truth with respect to such claims, the information must, of necessity, be furnished by people in the management hierarchy.

For example, the buyer who is closest to employees, since his estab lished duties do not include "acting openly in matters of labor relations," could not be used to inform the employees of the facts and their rights if S. 505 becomes law.

Is our supervisor for the small employer to be judged guilty of a crime for expressing legal viewpoints because his "established duties" do not include "acting openly for such employer in matters of labor relations or personnel administration"?