ployees to have union representatives without the formality and safeguards of a Labor Board election.

In the light of these objectives we shall now proceed to examine the principal bills before your committee. We refer to the McGovern bill, H.R. 3028, which seems to be identical with Senator Kennedy's new bill, S. 505, the Barden bills, H.R. 4473 and H.R. 4474, and the Kearns bill, H.R. 3540, also known as the administration bill as it was prepared in the Department of Labor. What we have to say about the McGovern bill applies also to the identical bills subsequently introduced by Representatives Green and Roosevelt, H.R. 3302, H.Ř. 3372, and to a number of other bills paterned to a great extent upon the Kennedy draft, viz: the Bowles bill, H.R. 3711, the Thompson bill, H.R. 3766, the Udall bill, H.R. 4610 and the Hechler bill, H.R. 1122.

Of all these measures, the proposed Barden legislation, viewed in combination, is best calculated to carry out the three basic objectives of a comprehensive reform measure. One of his bills, H.R. 4474, deals forthrightly with the practice of unionizing a company from the top down by proposing specific amendments intended to prohibit organizational picketing and secondary boycotts. His other, H.R. 4473, is the only bill thus far introduced in the House which deals in a comprehensive fashion with safeguarding the rights of the individual employee to participate in union affairs and to create certain minimum standards of due process.

This bill also contains a number of effective requirements with respect to the accounting of union funds and prohibiting the diversion of such money for the personal enrichment or political aggrandizement of union officials.

The Kearns bill also recognizes the weakness of existing law in the field of organizational picketing and secondary boycotts, but as we shall subsequently point out, the language of these provisions on the subject is not effectively framed. This bill also has some provisions intended to improve the voting rights of union members, does seem to require fiduciary standards of union officers, and includes a number of sections with respect to financial reporting and disclosure.

In contrast to these two measures, the Kennedy-McGovern bill deals only in a minor way with the problem of the civil rights of union members with respect to the management of unions, does not require fiduciary standards of union officials, and adds little to existing law as we shall have occasion to point out, so far as the requirements for reporting and expenditures of union funds are concerned. Although hailed as a labor reform bill, it completely ignores the subject of organizing from the top by omitting any provisions with respect to organizational picketing or secondary boycotts. According to its Senate sponsor, such provisions deal with industrial relations problems which should be in a separate bill dealing with TaftHartley Act revisions.

Somewhat inconsistently, however, in what purports to be a bill concerned only with labor reform, provisions have been included having nothing whatsoever to do with the subject. In fact, one whole title of the bill, title VI, is devoted to wholly irrelevant, yet highly controversial amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act. One of these, for example, changes the definition of the term "supervisor," although

no evidence has been presented to this committee or to any Senate committee to justify the proposed version, so as to open to possible union domination thousands of supervisors. Another amendment would change the Labor Board rules so as to permit nonemployees to vote in Board elections-a bitterly contested issue in the past, despite Mr. Meany's recent characterization of it as noncontroversial There are others which also deal with industrial relations issues not germane to racketeering.

It is extremely unfortunate that a bill purportedly dealing with labor reform should also raise so many issues bearing no relationship to the subject. It was this technique which blocked labor reform at the last Congress. A repetition of such tactics this year raises the question of whether some of the union spokesmen who publicly champion the cause of labor reform are not more interested in preventing any legislation on the subject.

I would like to pass now to the provisions in the bills dealing with boycotts and organizational picketing.

The most disturbing practices uncovered by the McClellan committee stem from various aspects of the seemingly unbridled power of the Teamsters Union. I refer not only to the infiltration of many important segments of this union by racketeers, but also to the numerous instances in which the union has imposed its will upon employees in manufacturing, retail, and service industries whom the union did not represent. If the tactics of the Teamsters Union are analyzed, it becomes clear that the tremendous power of its officials depends almost entirely upon the use of two weapons, secondary boycotts and ability to honor or disregard picket lines thrown up on the premises of various industrial establishments which rely upon trucking to deliver supplies and transport their products. In short, this is the power to intervene in the affairs of other employers and their employees. If secondary boycotts and organization picket lines were effectively prevented, the activities of the Teamsters Union would be confined to the channels where they properly belong, viz: participation in primary disputes between the trucking companies and such of their employees as have voted to have the Teamsters represent them.

It is true that neither secondary boycotts nor organizational picketing were intended to be protected by existing law. Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B), the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act dealing with secondary boycotts, were intended to stop unions like the Teamsters from refusing to handle certain materials or to strike in order to put pressure on their own employers to cease doing business with other employers.

Section 8(b) (1) (A) forbids labor organizations from restraining employees in the exercise of their rights and it is obvious that the resort by outsiders to a recognition picketing line is an instance of such restraint. Unfortunately, the courts have placed such narrow construction on these subsections that the intent of Congress has been largely thwarted. Consequently, it seems appropriate at this time to analyze the remedial legislation now under consideration by this committee with respect to strengthening existing law in these respects. The statement goes into this point in some detail about some of the loopholes in existing law. Rather than take the time of the com

mittee I would simply like to say that three of the bills which you have before you seem to be directed at closing virtually all these loopholes. I refer to section 503 (a) of the Kearns bill, section 1 of the Barden bill, H.R. 4474, and the Labor bill, a rather short bill dealing primarily with boycotts and picketing, H.R. 5545.

The complete text paraphrased was as follows:

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One of the major defects in existing law is that it does not specifically prohibit a union from bringing direct pressure on an employer to cause him to cease doing business with a company which the union or some other labor organization in alliance with it, is seeking to organize. Sometimes this pressure is exerted by a direct threat to the neutral employer. Other times it is accomplished by drawing his attention to the fact that he has signed a "hot cargo" contract under which he has agreed not to deal with companies which the union has labeled as unfair. Where there is a "hot cargo" clause, the Labor Board holds that such a clause does not permit a union to appeal directly to the employees of the secondary employer to cease work or to refuse to make delieveries in oraer to enforce it. These holdings have been affirmed by the Supreme Court. No decision has held, however, that collective bargaining for such clauses is illegal. Consequently, many employers, particularly in the trucking industry will refrain, even without a work stoppage, from servicing companies on a union blacklist in order to avoid trouble with the Teamsters.

Another serious loophole in the law has been the holding of the Supreme Court that if a picket line has the effect of causing individual truckers to depart without loading or unloading goods, that is not an inducement to "concerted" action and hence is outside the statute.' The Board itself created another loophole by holding that in a primary strike, a union has a right to picket even though it is obvious that the object of the picketing is to induce the employees of other companies to stop handling goods for the struck employer. This is the doctrine known as situs picketing. Other loopholes in the law include interpretations which sanction incitements to secondary boycotts by employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, public employees, and agricultural workers. It has also been held that the phrase "in the course of their employment" which appears in the act justifies a union in refusing to permit members to be hired on a construction project where the contractor is using the materials not bearing a certain union label."

Section 503 (a) of the Kearns bill, section 1 of the Barden bill (H.R. 4474) and the Lafore bill (H.R. 5545) appear to close most of the loopholes which have been mentioned.

Mr. REILLY. It would be desirable if the language of the first two bills would make clear that a "hot cargo" contract is illegal even though agreed to voluntarily by both parties. The Lafore bill does make this point explicit. From the standpoint of simplified drafting, it is also the best bill on the subject generally.

One unfortunate feature of the Kearns bill is that it would create a special immunity for the building trades unions-unions which the NLRB reports cause nearly 30 percent of the secondary boycotts in the country. We refer to the provisions allowing secondary boycotts

at construction sites.

If boycotts by the Teamster Union or industrial unions are bad, it is difficult to understand why they should be condoned when instigated by building trades unions. An unfair act is an unfair act, no matter whether it is done in a factory or at a construction site.

Moreover, the exception in the Kearns bill relating to "farmed-out" work is so broadly drafted that it goes beyond the equities of such

1 International Rice Milling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 1950, 183 F. 2d 21, 26 LRRM 2295; reversed in part on other grounds, 341 U.S. 665, 28 LRRM 2105 (1951).

In re United Electrical Workers et al. and Ryan Constr. Co., 85 NLRB No. 76.

3 Joliet Contractors Assn. et al. v. N.L.R.B., 202 F. 2d 606.

situations. The Barden bill also contains a provision on "farmed-out" work, but qualifies this exception to permit secondary activity only (1) if the primary strike is not in violation of a collective bargaining agreement, (2) was called by a union the primary employer is required to recognize, and (3) the refusal of the secondary employees to perform services is limited to work which would ordinarily be performed by the striking primary employees.

The provisions in the Lafore bill and the Barden bill, H.R. 4474, stop organizational and recognition picketing.

The corresponding provisions in the Kearns bill (section 504) are relatively ineffective. That section would prevent picketing for recognition purposes in the following instances:

(a) Where another union has been recognized and a representation question cannot be appropriately raised under section 9 (c).

This is superfluous because section 8(b) (4) (C) of the Taft-Hartley Act defines such activity as an unfair labor practice. Picketing, however, has been upheld if a union can show it is for so-called organizational purposes. The Kearns bill should close this loophole, but it fails to do so.

(b) Where a representation election was held within the preceding 12 months.

(c) Where the union cannot establish a "sufficient interest" on the part of employees in having that union represent them (sec. 504 (a)). This is a vague term. The present NLRB rules require that a union make a showing of a "substantial interest." This has been defined as an interest by some 30 percent of the employees of the proposed bargaining unit. A "sufficient interest" could be interpreted to mean 5 percent of the employees, and could mean less than the percentage attributed to the term "substantial interest." The term "sufficient interest" is so vague as to almost surely cause confusion.

(d) Where picketing has occurred "for a reasonable period of time" and an election has not been conducted (sec. 504 (a)).

This again is confusing. It would take years of litigation before a final pronouncement would be forthcoming from the Supreme Court on what constituted a "reasonable period of time." Small employers could be out of business if picketed for a week.

In sum, the Barden and Lafore bill would effectively stop racket picketing by union officials. But the Kearns bill would be only a halfway measure in meeting the problems.

As we have already said, the Kennedy-McGovern bill is silent on these subjects. Defenders of this legislation, however, point to section 602 of the bill which makes it an unfair labor practice to instigate picketing for personal enrichment. Obviously this section could easily be circumvented, because even the notorious "paper" local conduct picketing for the ostensible purpose of getting a union contract. Moreover, in some respects, this proposed amendment is worse than useless. What it really does, is to make extortion an unfair labor practice. But under the laws of virtually every jurisdiction, extortion is now a criminal offense. Making it an unfair labor practice, however, may under the Federal preemption doctrine render the extortionists immune from criminal prosecution.

I would like to turn now to the question of rights of union members within the union.

One of the great weaknesses of the Kennedy-McGovern bill is that it does not prescribe, as do the laws of many States for corporations, certain minimum requirements for insertion in the constitution and bylaws of labor organizations; for example, requirements that corporate bylaws must contain certain safeguards with respect to the voting rights of stockholders, annual audits, notices of meetings, proxy statements, and changes in the capital-stock structure.

The Kennedy-McGovern bill does require (sec. 101(a)(5)) the filing of a detailed statement with respect to the material contained in union constitutions and bylaws with regard to such subjects as membership qualifications, the calling of meetings, financial assessments, imposition of fines, the formulation of bargaining demands, and the calling of strikes. It does not compel unions, however, to have any democratic procedures with respect to the adoption of such policies, irrespective of how unfair or dictatorial a union's constitution or laws may be in these respects. In fact, the bill does not even require a union to have a constitution, although Mr. Godfrey Schmidt, the Teamster monitor, has testified that more than half the locals affiliated with the Teamsters do not have constitutions.

In contrast to the Kennedy-McGovern proposal, the Barden bill (H.R. 4743) provides that all union constitutions and bylaws must contain certain rules with respect to the rights of members and the conduct of officers in order to have access to the National Labor Relations Board and to retain their immunity from taxation. The first title of this bill sets forth a number of provisions long advocated by the American Civil Liberties Union as essential if unions are to be run in any sort of democratic fashion.

I refer to such rules as those relating eligibility to membership, freedom of speech and assembly, the right to participate in fixing dues and initiation fees, salaries and expense allowances, due process union trials, and the right of appeal. Title I also contains language insuring secret ballots in union elections, majority voting on such questions as strikes or the instruction of delegates, forbidding the abridgement of civil rights of members and denying union office to persons convicted of certain crimes. Enforcement is provided by registration at the Department of Labor and granting the Secretary of Labor power to conduct investigations, and to cancel or suspend registrations not in conformity with the title.

It is obvious that the draftsman of the bill has drawn heavily upon the code promulgated by the AFL-CIO. That is the code of ethical practices, which contains many praiseworthy provisions.

As an instrument of accomplishing any real reform, however, it has been ineffective. Some powerful international unions have preferred to withdraw from the federation rather than comply, and the federation itself has temporized with some of the most flagrant violations when the unions involved have been influential in the AFL-CIO Council. Unless the code of ethics is to be anything more than a scrap of paper, its principles should be embodied in legislation. Accordingly, the opposition of the top leadership of the AFL-CIO to the major provisions of title I of the Barden bill is difficult to understand, if the professed solicitude of these officials for rank-and-file union members is to be taken at its face value.