of another State; and second, to define clearly the class of criminals to be surrendered. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

The words "treason, felony or other crime," in their plain and obvious import, as well as in their legal and technical sense, embrace every act forbidden and made punishable by a law of the State. The word "crime" of itself includes every offense from the highest to the lowest in the grade of offenses, and includes what are called misdemeanors as well as treason and felony. Comm. v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; Ex parte John L. Clark, 9 Wend. 212; Ex parte Benjamin T. Greenough, 31 Vt. 279.

The word "crime" is a nomen generalissamum, and has always been considered as embracing every species of indictable offense. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

All persons who are guilty of minor offenses, such as assaults, libels and the entire train of similar misdemeanors are embraced in the words of the Constitution. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

The word "crime" embraces an act which was not criminal at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, but was made so by a subsequent statute. Ex parte Wm. H. Hughes, Phillips, 57; Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182.

This clause includes every offense made punishable by the law of the State in which it was committed, and gives the right to the executive authority of the State to demand the fugitive from the executive authority of the State in which he is found. The right given to demand, implies that it is an absolute right, and it follows that there must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference to the character of the crime charged or to the policy or laws of the State to which the fugitive had fled. Comm. v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

A person who commits a crime within a State, and withdraws himself from such jurisdiction without waiting to abide the consequences of such act, must be regarded as a fugitive from the justice of the State whose laws he has infringed. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

It is the right of the sovereignty whose laws have been violated to decide what offenders it will pursue, and the State upon which the demand is made can not rightfully call in question that decision. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

It is not necessary to show that the person is guilty. It is not necessary, as under the comity of nations, to examine into the facts alleged against him constituting the crime. It is sufficient that he is charged with having committed a crime. Ex parte John L. Clark, 9 Wend. 212; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182.

The executive authority of the State is not authorized by this article to make the demand unless the party is charged in the regular course of judicial proceedings. It is equally necessary that the executive authority of the State upon which the demand is made, when called on to render his aid, should be satisfied by competent proof that the party is so charged. Comm. v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

The duty to surrender is not one resting in discretion. If the demand is made in due form, and the requisite documents exhibited showing that the fugitive is charged with crime, the duty to surrender becomes merely ministerial. Under such circumstances, to refuse to authorize the extradition, is a clear infraction of the rule prescribed by the Constitution. The Constitution has made the surrender of a fugitive from justice, which, by the law of nations depended on the concessions of comity, a rule of law of perfect obligation and entirely imperative in its character. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

The executive of the State upon whom the demand is made for the surrender of the fugitive, is not authorized to look behind the indictment or affidavit in which the crime against the State is charged, and inquire whether, by the laws of his own State, the facts alleged would constitute a crime in his own State. To refuse to deliver up a fugitive from justice, on the legally authorized demand of the executive officer of the State from which he fled, on the pretext that by the laws of the State in which the fugitive is found, he is not guilty of any criminal offense, would be an open, palpable violation of the Constitution. Johnston v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97.

The Constitution does not assume to deal with the question before the proper executive demand has been made, nor undertake, in the absence of a demand, to define the duties nor limit the authority of the State within which the fugitive may be found. A State law providing for the arrest and detention of a fugitive until a demand can be made, is valid. Ex parte John White, 49 Cal. 433; Comm. v. Tracy, 46 Mass. 536; Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 435.

A State law requiring the officer making the arrest to take the party before the nearest judge for identification, is valid. Robinson v. Flanders, 29 Ind. 10.

A State law which makes it the duty of the executive to issue the warrant upon a proper requisition, is constitutional. Ex parte Joseph Smith, 3 McLean, 121.

A State law which is intended to aid in the enforcement of the act of Congress relating to the surrender of fugitives from justice, is valid. Comm. v. Hall, 75 Mass. 262.

Congress has the power to vest in any national officer the authority to cause the arrest in any State of a fugitive from the justice of another State,

and to surrender such fugitive on the requisition of the executive of the latter State. Ex parte Peter Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141.

Every sovereign nation has the right to surrender fugitives within its territory. No State is bound to harbor criminals within its borders, but may, at its option, surrender them to the government against whose laws they have offended. Hence a fugitive from justice from either of the United States, may, under the provisions of the Constitution, be arrested and detained preparatory to his surrender before a requisition is actually made by the executive of the State where the crime is committed. It is an exercise of power essential to the full operation of the Constitution. In re Wm. Fetter, 23 N. J. 311; People v. Schenck, 2 Johns. 479; In re Thomas F. Goodhue, 1 Wheel. Crim. Cas. 427; vide People v. Wright, 2 Caines, 213; Ex parte Edwin Heyward, 1 Sandf. 701.

3. No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

Congress has the power to pass laws to carry this provision into effect. Prigg v. Comm. 16 Pet. 539; Henry v. Lowell, 16 Barb. 268; Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean, 469; Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; S. c. 3 Wis. I ; Jones v. Van Zandt, 5 How. 215; S. C. 2 McLean, 596; Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. 499; Ex parte Simmons, 4 Wash. C. C. 396; Ex parte Simeon Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 76; Sims' Case, 61 Mass. 285; Comm. v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193; Comm. v. Fitzgerald, 7 Law Rep. 379; Comm. v. Griffith, 19 Mass. 11; Wright . Deacon, 5 S. & R. 62; Hill v. Low, 4 Wash. C. C. 327; Johnson v. Tompkins, Bald. 571; Kauffman v. Oliver, 10 Penn. 514; Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311; S. C. 14 Wend. 509; Floyd v. Recorder, 11 Wend. 180; Glenn v. Hodges, 9 Johns. 67; Graves v. State, I Ind. 368; Thornton's Case, 11 Ill. 32; Eells v. People, 5 Ill. 498; Fanney v. Montgomery, Breese, 188; Ex parte Perkins, 2 Cal. 424; Donnell v. State, 3 Ind. 480; State v. Hoppess, 2 West. L. J. 289; Ex parte Richards, 3 West. L. J. 563; Gittner v. Gorham, 4 McLean, 402; Opinion of Justices, 41 N. H. 553; Ex parte Long, 9 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 73; U. S. v. Williamson, 4 A. L. Reg. 5; Ray v. Donnell, 4 McLean, 504.

SECTION III.

1. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more

States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

The power to expand the territory of the United States by the admission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of this power by all the departments of the Government, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority. And as the propriety of admitting a new State is committed to the sound discretion of Congress, the power to acquire territory for that purpose to be held by the United States until it is in a suitable condition to become a State upon an equal footing with the other States, must rest upon the same discretion. It is a question for the political department of the Government, and not the judicial; and whatever the political department of the Government shall recognize as within the limits of the United States, the judicial department is also bound to recognize and to administer in it the laws of the United States so far as they apply. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

The new States stand on an equal footing with the other States, and have the same powers and privileges. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; S. C. 29 Miss. 21; Woodman v. Kilbourn Manuf. Co. 1 Abb. C. C. 158.

If an express stipulation were inserted in an act admitting a State into the Union granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would be void and inoperative, because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82; Depew v. Trustees, 5 Ind. 8.

When a condition annexed to a State Constitution is rescinded with the assent of the State Government and the Federal Government, given through the constituted authorities of each, the powers disclaimed may be resumed and immediately exercised by the State authorities. Duke v. Navigation Co. 10 Ala. 82.

If Congress, upon the presentation of a Constitution by a territory, consents to admit it as a State upon condition that certain alterations are made therein, and these alterations are accepted by the territorial legislature, such alterations become a part of the State Constitution. Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198.

2. The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting

the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

The term "territory," as here used, is merely descriptive of one kind of property, and is equivalent to the word lands. Congress has the same power over it as over any other property belonging to the United States. This power is vested in Congress without limitation. U. S. v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526.

66

The words other property," by every known rule of interpretation, must mean property of a different description from territory or land. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

The Constitution confers on the Government the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently it possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.

This clause authorizes the passage of all laws necessary to secure the rights of the United States to the public lands, and to provide for their sale and to protect them from taxation. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.

This clause does not confer on Congress any power to grant the shores of navigable waters, or the soil under them within a State. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.

There can be neither a reservation nor appropriation of the public domain for any purpose whatever, without the express authority of law. Neither the President nor the executive officers in the several departments of the Government possess an absolute and inherent power to do any act not authorized by the Constitution or the acts of Congress. To the Constitution and laws alone they must look for the source of their power and authority, because they can derive them from no other. McConnell v. Wilcox, 2 Ill. 344.

Nothing but an act of Congress can authorize the exercise of the power to grant public property. Seabury v. Field, 1 McA. 1; U. S. v. Fitzgerald, 15 Pet. 407.

Congress can make all needful rules and regulations for the disposition and protection of public lands within the limits of a State, but beyond this it can exercise no other acts of sovereignty which it may not exercise in common over the lands of individuals. U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 517.

Until the Government has substantially parted with the land, and thereby divested itself of the jurisdiction over it conferred by the Consti