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tinue during the war. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129; Kimball v. Taylor, 2 Woods, 37; Powell v. Boon, 43 Ala. 469; Burke v. Tregre, 22 Lą. Ann. 629; Armistead v. State, 43 Ala. 340.

While the State authorities are subverted, the question whether any and what civil government shall be permitted is a matter in the discretion of the Federal Government. During the military occupation, the laws of the State can only operate so far as it chooses to allow, and can only be administered by such agents as it pleases to appoint. The President can cause all the laws of the State to be administered and executed, or he can cause the whole to be disregarded and set at naught. Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119.

A provisional government established over an insurrectionary State may levy and collect taxes under the municipal laws of the State which are not superseded by the will of the conqueror. Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Cold. 554.

Taxes levied for municipal purposes under a provisional government may be collected after the military occupation has been terminated by the re-establishment of the State government. Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Cold. 554.

When the President provides for calling a convention to form a State government, he may exclude those who have participated in the rebellion and not been pardoned, from voting for delegates. Ex parte Wm. H. Hughes, Phillips, 57.

If a rebellion overthrows a State government, the President may adopt measures to enable the people to meet in convention to form a State gov ernment. Ex parte Wm. H. Hughes, Phillips, 57.

The power of the President to establish a military government must be exercised in subordination to the Constitution. Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119.

When an insurrection is suppressed, Congress may provide for the transfer of cases pending in a provisional court, and of its judgments and decrees, to the proper Federal courts. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129.

The powers of a provisional governor are not restricted to the particular subjects specified in the proclamation appointing him, for the proclamation is not necessarily his only authority. Whatever power is possessed by the President may be delegated by him to the governor, and in the absence of any evidence that any particular act of the governor is disapproved by the President, it must be presumed that it was authorized beforehand, or subsequently ratified and adopted. Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119.

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Pardons.

(b) The language used in the Constitution conferring the power to grant reprives and pardons must be construed with reference to its meaning at the time of its adoption. At that time, both Americans and Englishmen attached the same meaning to the word "pardon." Without such a power of clemency to be exercised by some department or functionary of the government, it would be most imperfect and deficient in its political morality, and in that attribute of deity whose judgments are always tempered with mercy. Ex parte William Wells, 18 How. 307.

The word "pardon" was not meant to be used exclusively with reference to an absolute pardon, exempting the criminal from the punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. In common parlance it is forgiveness, release, remission; forgiveness for an offense, whether it be one for which the person committing it is liable in law or otherwise; release from pecuniary obligation; or it is the remission of a penalty to which one may have subjected himself by the non-performance of an undertaking or contract; or when a statutory penalty in money has been incurred and it is remitted by a public functionary having power to remit it. In law it has different meanings, which were as well understood when the Constitution was made as any other word in the Constitution now is. Such a thing as a pardon, without a designation of its kind, is not known in the law. Time out of mind in the earliest books of the English law, every pardon has its particular denomination. They are general, special or particular, -conditional or absolute, statutory, not necessary in some cases and in some grantable of course. Ex parte William Wells, 18 How. 307.

The President may grant a conditional pardon. The language of the Constitution is general, that is, common to the class of pardons, or extending the power to pardon to all kinds of pardon known in the law as such, whatever may be their denomination. A conditional pardon is one of them. In this view of the Constitution, by giving to its words their proper meaning, the power to pardon conditionally is not one of inference at all, but one conferred in terms. Ex parte William Wells, 18 How. 307.

The power is unlimited with the exception stated. It extends to every offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.

The power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him can not be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender, and when the pardon is full it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. Congress can not exclude him from a previously acquired right, by the exaction of an expurgatory oath covering the offense. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.

333.

If a person under the terms of a pardon, became entitled to a restoration of abandoned property, Congress can not provide that the Supreme Court shall dismiss a cause for want of jurisdiction, when it ascertains that he was entitled to the property by the pardon. U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall.

128.

The grant to the President of the power to pardon, must be held to carry with it, as an incident, the power to release penalties and forfeitures which accrue from the offenses. Osborn v. U. S. 91 U. S. 474.

To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon, and it is granted without limit. Pardon includes amnesty. It blots out the offense pardoned, and removes all its penal consequences. Congress can not change the effect of a pardon. U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128.

The power to grant reprieves is not only to be used to delay a judicial sentence, when the President shall think the merits of the case, or some cause connected with the offender, may require it, but extends also to cases ex necessitate legis, as where a female after conviction is found to be enceinte, or where a convict becomes insane, or is alleged to be so. Ex parte William Wells, 18 How. 307.

The power of pardon is conferred on the office of President, and prior to delivery one President may recall and cancel a pardon granted by his predecessor. In re Moses De Puy, 3 Ben. 307.

A pardon is a deed, to, the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered. U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150; In re Theophilus C. Callicott, 8 Blatch. 89.

Until a pardon is delivered, all that may have been done is mere matter of intended favor, and may be canceled to accord with a change of intention. In re Moses De Puy, 3 Ben. 307.

Although a pardon has been properly signed and sealed, and sent to the marshal, it may be recalled and canceled before it is delivered to the warden of the prison where the criminal is confined. In re Moses De Puy, 3 Ben. 307.

The President may grant a pardon after the expiration of the term of sentence. The power to pardon continues so long as any of the legal consequences of the offense remain. Stetler's Case, 1 Phil. 302.

2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, (a) provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers (b) of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. But the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

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Treaties.

(a) The power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in general terms, without any description of the objects intended to be embraced by it, and consequently it was designed to include all those subjects which in the ordinary intercourse of nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty, and which are consistent with the nature of our institutions, and distribution of powers between the general and State Governments. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; U. S. v. 43 Gallons, 93 U. S. 188.

The power to make treaties is given without restraining it to particular objects in as plenipotentiary a form as it is held by any other sovereign in any other community. This principle results from the form and necessities of the Government as elicited by a general view of the Federal compact. Before the compact, the States had the power of treaty making as potentially as any power on earth. It extended to every subject. By the compact they expressly granted it to the Federal Government in general terms, and prohibited it to themselves. The General Government must therefore hold it as fully as the States held it, with the exceptions that necessarily flow from a proper construction of the other powers granted and those prohibited by the Constitution. People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381.

The recognition and enforcement of the principles of public law being one of the ordinary subjects of treaties, were necessarily included in the power conferred on the General Government. As the rights and duties of nations towards one another, in relation to fugitives from justice, are a part of the law of nations, and have always been treated as such by the writers upon public law, it follows that the treaty making power must have authority to decide how far the right of a foreign nation, in this respect, will be recognized and enforced when it demands the surrender of any one charged

with offenses against it. This power can not be exercised by the States. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321.

A State can not regulate the surrender of fugitives from justice to foreign countries, although no action has been taken by the Federal Government. People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321.

A State law relating to the surrender of fugitives from justice from foreign countries, is void. People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321.

A treaty allowing a reasonable time to those, after the death of the owner, who would be entitled to real estate upon the death of the owner, if they were not aliens, to sell the estate and withdraw the proceeds without molestation, is valid. People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381.

A treaty may give aliens the right to purchase and hold land in the United States. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259.

The political rights of the people of the several States as such are not subjects of treaty stipulations. Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 336; S. C. 5

How. 504.

An Indian treaty providing for a cession of land may stipulate that the law prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquor in the ceded territory shall remain in force, although it lies within the limits of a State. U. S. v. Lariviere, 23 I. R. R. 305.

The right of eminent domain is inseparably attached to national empire and sovereignty, and accompanies the right of making peace, whether that right be vested in one or many. Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine, 688.

Citizens abroad must look to the President for protection of person and of property, and for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended for their protection. For this purpose the whole executive power of the country is placed in his hands under the Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof. Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451.

As the executive head of the nation, the President is made the only legitimate organ of the General Government to open and carry on correspondence or negotiations with foreign nations in matters concerning the interests of the country or its citizens. Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451.

The duty of interposing for the protection of the lives or property of citizens abroad, must of necessity rest in the discretion of the President. Where the public act or order rests in the discretion of the executive, neither he nor his authorized agent is personally responsible civilly for the consequences. Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451.

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