mutual jealousy, since every proceeding against a representative would indirectly affect the honor and interest of the State which sent him. But the express grant does not imply that the Senate or House of Representatives can not punish for contempt. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Ex parte John Nugent, 1 Am. L. J. 107.

The House of Representatives has the power to punish an individual for contempt of its dignity and authority and a breach of its privileges. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

The Senate has the power to punish contempts of its authority. Ex parte John Nugent, 1 Am. L. J. 107.

The power to punish for contempt does not belong to any other than a legislative or judicial body. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

The Senate has the same power to punish contempts in secret as in open session. Ex parte John Nugent, 1 Am. L. J. 107.

The House of Representatives has the power to subpoena witnesses to testify before it, or before one of its committees, and to compel their attendance from any portion of the territorial limits of the United States. It is a necessary incident to the sovereign power of making laws. Wilckins v. Willett, 4 Abb. App. 596; s. C. 10 Abb. Pr. 164.

The power to punish for disobedience and contempt is a necessary incident to the power to require and compel attendance. Wilckins v. Willett, 4 Abb. App. 596; S. C. 10 Abb. Pr. 164; Stewart v. Blaine, 1 McArthur, 453.

A warrant of commitment need not set forth the particular facts which constitute the alleged contempt. Ex parte John Nugent, 1 Am. L. J. 107.

A warrant to commit for contempt may be served anywhere within the boundaries of the United States. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

The power to punish for contempt only extends to the power of imprisonment. It may, at first view, and from the history of the practice of legislative bodies, be thought to extend to other inflictions; but every other will be found to be mere commutation for confinement, since commitment alone is the alternative where the individual proves contumacious. And even to the duration of imprisonment a period is imposed by the nature of things, since the existence of the power that imprisons is indispensable to its continuance, and although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

No court, on a writ of habeas corpus, can inquire into the question of contempt, and discharge the prisoner, for the legislative body is the only

judge of its own privileges and contempts. Ex parte John Nugent, 1 Am. L. J. 107.

3. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

The journal can not be kept secret unless the proceedings themselves are kept secret. Hence each house has a right to hold secret sessions whenever in its judgment the proceedings shall require secrecy. Ex parte John Nugent, I Am. L. J. 107.

4. Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

SECTION VI.

1. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

The word "arrest" has a definite meaning, both technical and common, and necessarily implies corporal restraint, and does not apply to a summons which is served by a mere notice of it to the party. Wooley v. Butler, 1 B. L. T. 35.

There is no privilege which exempts a member of Congress from the service or the obligation of a subpœna as a witness in a criminal case. U. S. v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 341.

A member of Congress can not have a continuance of a pending case as a matter of right, because he is in attendance on Congress. Nones v. Edsall, 1 Wall. Jr. 189; contra, Doty v. Strong, I Pinney, 84.

A member of Congress is privileged from arrest both on judicial and

mesne process, and from the service of a summons or other civil process, while in attendance on his public duties. Nones v. Edsall, 1 Wall. Jr. 189; Coxe v. M'Clenachan, 3 Dall. 478.

This privilege is to be taken strictly, and is to be allowed only while the party is attending Congress, or is actually on his journey going to or returning from the seat of government. Lewis v. Elmendorf, 2 Johns. Cas.

222.

The duration of the privilege does not extend to forty days or more before and after each session of Congress, but is limited to a convenient and reasonable time in addition to the actual session of Congress, for each member to go to and return from such session. Hoppin v. Jenckes, 8 R. I. 453.

This provision applies to a delegate from a territory as well as to a member from a State, for with the exception of the power to vote, he is a member of the House of Representatives, and entitled to the same constitutional privileges. Doty v. Strong, I Pinney, 84.

2. No senator or representative shall, during the. time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

SECTION VII.

1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

A bill for regulating postal rates for postal service is not a bill for raising revenue, and may originate in the Senate. U. S. v. James, 13 Blatch. 207.

2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become. a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to recon

sider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

There are two courses of action by the President in reference to a bill presented to him, each of which results in the bill becoming a law. One of them is by signing the bill within ten days, and the other is by keeping it ten days and refusing to sign it. Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499. The only duty required of the President, in regard to a bill which he approves, is that he shall sign it; nothing more. The simple signing his name at the appropriate place is the one act which the Constitution requires of him as the evidence of his approval; and upon his performance of this act, the bill becomes a law. Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499.

When the President approves a bill, it is not required that he shall write on the bill the word "approved;" nor that he shall date it. Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499.

When no time is fixed for the commencement of a statute, it takes effect from its date. Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. 164; Warren Manuf. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co. 2 Paine, 501; In re Ankrim, 3 McLean, 285.

Where the question is as to the effect of a proceeding instituted on the same day on which an act affecting the validity of such proceeding was passed, the precise time at which the act became a law may be inquired into. Fractions of a day or of an hour may be allowed, whenever it will promote substantial justice. In re Richardson, 2 Story, 571; In re Wynne, 4 B. R. 23; S. C. I Chase, 227; In re Ankrim, 3 McLean, 285; contra, In re David Howes, 21 Vt. 619; Welman's Case, 20 Vt. 653; U. S. v. Williams, 1 Paine, 261.

Every bill which is approved by the President takes effect as a law only by such approval and from the time of such approval. It is the act of approval which makes it a law, and until that act is done it is not a law. The

approval can not look backwards, and by relation make that a law at any antecedent period of the same day which was not so before the approval, for the general rule is lex prospicit, non respicit. In re Richardson, 2 Story, 571.

In cases of doubt, the time should be construed favorably for the citizens. The legislature have it in their power to prescribe the very moment in futuro after the approval when the law shall have effect, and if it does not choose to do so, a court of justice is not called upon to supply the defect. In re Richardson, 2 Story, 571.

A general statute is not to be proved as an issue of fact, but the courts take judicial notice of it. Whenever a question arises as to the existence of a statute, or the time when a statute took effect, or the precise terms of a statute, the court which is called upon to decide it has a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question, always seeking first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule. Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499.

When the president retains the bill, it is his action in retaining it for ten days which makes it a law, and no evidence is required of him by the Constitution to show that he has ever received or considered it. Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499.

If the bill on its return is approved by two-thirds of the members present in each house, that is sufficient, although they do not constitute twothirds of the whole house. See 19 Law Rep. 196.

3. Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment, shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

SECTION VIII.

The Congress shall have power

1. To lay and collect taxes, (a) duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but