Chairman HAYS. In conclusion I would merely like to say, as I have said repeatedly to the press, this is a new venture in the United States. Inevitably it couldn't all be 100 percent perfect. Inevitably you people who have worked hard on it couldn't foresee all of the problems and have all of the answers ready at hand. It is hoped that the visit of this subcommittee will be of mutual benefit to us and to you. We are pleased to see as much progress in the physical structure as has already been made in a short time. Perhaps we will find it possible to come back next year and take a look at exactly what has transpired in the intervening year. We are convinced that this is a very vital program for America and for the world, and while it may seem small when viewed against all the complexities of the situation in the world, it is important for the far-reaching contribution it can make. We want to be as constructive as we can; we want to keep in as close communication with the project as we can; we want to give you as much advice as we can that would be helpful and constructive, and we would like you to feel free at any time to come to the Foreign Affairs Committee with your problems. Unfortunately, under the system which has been in effect since 1920, we only have legislative jurisdiction, not appropriation jurisdiction; that's in another committee. It used to be that we did it all. Each legislative committee had both legislative and appropriation jurisdiction. Anyway, we want to be as helpful as we can, and we are convinced that the project is being successfully run, and we will do what we can to see that you get adequate funds to continue. It would seem if you have any difficulty in getting $40 million in the next 5 years, it would be somewhat of a sad commentary on a civilization that would appropriate $40 billion a year for weapons construction but couldn't appropriate $40 million in 5 years for constructive educational purposes, and I don't think you will find the Congress wanting in that respect. Thank you very much.

(The subcommittee thereupon adjourned at 12:10 p.m.)

CENTER FOR CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL INTER

CHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

(East-West Center)

MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 1962

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room G-3, the Capitol, the Honorable Wayne L. Hays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Chairman HAYS. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are meeting this morning to hear from the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Honorable Philip H. Coombs.

As you know, four members of the subcommittee held some hearings in Hawaii on the East-West Cultural Center, mainly due to some complaints we had heard from various Members of Congress who requested that we, having legislative jurisdiction, look into this activity. We have quite a few pages of testimony, the last of which only got here this morning. We thought before Dr. Coombs left for an extended trip that he might like to comment on the testimony adduced in Hawaii. We asked him if he would like to and he indicated he would, and that is the purpose of the meeting. He is leaving day after tomorrow for some weeks and not knowing exactly what we would get into in the way of hearings we thought we would like to get this matter completed and report written perhaps before he gets back.

So, Mr. Coombs, we will be happy to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP H. COOMBS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. COOMBS. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the inconvenience to which your committee members have gone in scheduling an early hearing, and I want to express at the outset the gratitude of the Department of State and myself personally for the very constructive work which the committee has been doing with respect to the East-West Center.

The document which you produced November 1, 1961, is an exceedingly useful compilation of the pertinent documents on the Center. The trip which you have recently taken to Hawaii-and I did have the opportunity to read the first day's transcript which came in a

little earlier-obviously was a stimulus to the Center and I think should be very helpful to your colleagues in Congress and certainly to those of us in the Department of State who are concerned with the Center.

I think we all recognize that the Center is a rather unusual enterprise, not only for a university to become involved in, but for the Federal Government to become involved in. Thus, we have to learn as we go along how to make this Center as effective as possible in the national interest.

In the 10 months that I have been in office I have enjoyed excellent cooperation with all of the officials of the university and the Center. I think there is a mood on the part of the Center and the university and the Department to work together in close partnership and tackle some of the yet unresolved problems.

What surprises me, frankly, is not that there are some unresolved problems still in this area, but that there are not more than there are and that such remarkable progress has been made in such short time. I know some of the members of Dr. Clark Kerr's committee of consultants told me when they came back that as experienced people on university campuses they were very struck with the speed with which the Center got into action. They said that in their view the campuses they had lived on on the mainland could never have produced such action so rapidly.

I think that the principal officials responsible for getting things underway at the Center, particularly Dr. Snyder, Dr. Turnbull, and Mr. Wachter, deserve particular commendation for the skill and devotion they have given to the Center. It is one of the most remarkable instances in American education, I think, of rapid translation of a good idea into action. After all, the first appropriation for the Center did not come until August 1960. The first contract between the Department of State and the Center was not consummated until October 1960. Thus in the 15 ensuing months there has had to be a very great deal of constructive effort to have 231 students from over 20 countries actually on the campus now.

I think that the progress report submitted by the Center dated September 1961 is an impressive record of actions taken.

Having said that, it seems to me we still need to focus on some of the unfinished business, some of the unresolved problems and opportunities which will require the close attention of the officials of the Center and the Department of State in the months ahead.

You, I think, are generally familiar with the background of the actions taken by the Department of State since I came into office in March. Let me review very briefly how the situation looked to me at that time and what steps we have taken, and then suggest some of the steps we propose to take in the immediate future.

When I came into office the situation was that an appropriation request had already been submitted to Congress for an additional $9,693,000 as the second appropriation for the Center. There had already been a $10 million appropriation and that had been written into the contract in October 1960 between the Department and the university.

As the official in the executive branch responsible for justifying this new appropriation to Congress, I frankly felt that I was not yet

prepared to make a good justification, so I requested Mr. Rooney of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for the opportunity to defer consideration of this particular item until I could get myself better informed.

I had certain initial reactions from what I could learn about the Center, and these reactions tended to be confirmed when I spent 3 days at the Center and the university discussing matters with all interested parties.

It seemed to me, first, that with a few months of actual operating experience behind them, now was the critical time to reappraise the general plan and to make any changes desired in the direction of clarification of the program, a sharper focus of the program, and any adjustments in administrative and other arrangements.

I was convinced that the Center had a very good potential for serving the national interest, because there were in Hawaii many favorable and unique factors, but the problem was how to capitalize on these favorable factors and how to develop quality and distinction and a high reputation for this Center.

I was concerned also that the speed with which the original plan proposed to have the Center grow might not be compatible with the building of quality into the institution from the outset. I felt that perhaps a somewhat lower rate of growth would result in a better and more efficient use of funds.

I felt also that the plan as originally contemplated in the university's plan was perhaps too diverse. It stretched not only over the evident strong points in the university's setup but also embraced less strong points, and if this Center was to be built into a top quality operation it had to lead from strength and not from weakness. Therefore, it seemed to me that the program they undertook ought to focus on the strength and uniqueness of the Hawaiian situation. The Center should not get a reputation as a second-class operation in a field where the university had not yet had a chance to build national distinction.

I thought also that the program ought to take into account the priority needs, especially the manpower needs, of the Asian countries that could not be met by those countries in their own institutions and could not be met by other American institutions or European institutions.

I felt further, from what knowledge I had of the university world, that if this new and unique kind of institution was to grow in a creative way, it needed more independence from the detailed procedures and direction of the university itself. A university that has generally an institutional function is one thing and requires certain procedures and salaries and the like. The Center, however, is not a university and hence can have more administrative flexibility; it should not be bound by the practices and, if you will, the folklore of the university.

Chairman HAYS. Secretary Coombs, since you are speaking from notes and not a prepared statement, it might be useful, if a member has a question, to interrupt right there, if you do not mind.

Mr. COOMBS. Not at all.

Chairman HAYS. I might say at this point, that is one of the things I think the people who were out there decided pretty quickly, that

the East-West Center did need more independence from the University of Hawaii. We did think that they should be separate but very closely related institutions. That is, that they should be separate in the administrative sense. This was a tentative conclusion I think I can say the subcommittee agreed on when we were there. Do you agree with that?

Mr. COOMBS. I do. I think the important thing is to strike the proper balance between administrative flexibility and autonomy. Mr. FARBSTEIN. May I ask a preliminary question?

Chairman HAYS. Certainly.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. You said this Center is to be a unique institution! Mr. COOMBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I would like a description or definition of the word "unique" as you envision it; because as I read part of the report there are certain subjects that are to be taught or examined. There is also to be what I interpret as the usual relationship between students of foreign countries and local students similar to that which takes place in ordinary institutions where there are foreign students who come for the purpose of studying and for meeting students of the West, and so forth. That is why I ask this preliminary question, to know what you envision in this whole business that makes it different from the other institutions.

Mr. COOMBS. Congressman, by "unique" I mean simply that the East-West Center should undertake to do those things which are important to do and which it can do better than any other institution in the United States.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Well, will you be more specific?

Mr. COOMBS. It should examine, as it has, the special conditions and assets of Hawaii, its climate, its population, its traditions, its university strengths, its other institutional strengths in the local government, those things which set it apart and make it different from other parts of the United States.

For example, there are climatic and soil conditions in Hawaii that are not duplicated elsewhere, and out of that fact has grown a certain competence in such fields as tropical agriculture, oceanography, meteorology, and the like. This would be an example of the unique assets of Hawaii that should be capitalized upon in working with Asian countries.

There are, of course, important social conditions- sociological conditions if you will-in Hawaii which make it a relatively outstanding example of how different ethnic and cultural streams can flow together and become harmonized to create something new and distinctive and valuable. This is another uniqueness of Hawaii.

There are certain factors in the local economy which distinguish it from mainland economies. The scale of the Hawaiian economy is sufficiently small that a visitor from a small country of Asia can encompass the total economic system of Hawaii. If he wants to study, say, the problem of electric power, he has there a power system he can comprehend, whereas if you threw him into New York City, for example, this is something he could not readily comprehend.

Or take the case of agricultural extension work. There again he has an agricultural economy small enough for him to comprehend. It does not baffle him by hugeness and complexity.