Public Values in Constitutional Law
The United States Supreme Court contends that it must weigh constitutional claims against critical government interests - considerations of public policy so compelling that constitutional rights may be sacrificed to them. Although these interests have been an explicit part of constitutional law since 1961, there has been little discussion of the nature, weight, and application of such claims. Increasingly, these interests are merely tolerated out of necessity in apparent derogation of the Constitution.
This timely volume provides a critical examination of the concept and substance of compelling interests, probing the significance and implications of their unwritten and discretionary character, ultimately illuminating the scope of values developed as compelling interests.
Public Values in Constitutional Law has no parallels, predecessors, or close cousins and so will fill an important niche in the study of constitutional law, proving indispensable to jurists, scholars, and attorneys concerned with the litigation and development of constitutional law.
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Overriding Public Values
Introduction to Part 1
Unfocused Governmental Interests
StateInterest Analysis and the Channeling
Introduction to Part 2
A Mandated Minimum Income Judge Posner
Silence on the Street Corner
Introduction to Part 3
Categorization Balancing and Government Interests
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