that bank is only $150,000. Its portion of the public deposits is no less a sum than $784,764.75. Now, Sir, where is this money? It is not in specie in the bank itself. All its specie is only $51,011.95; all its discounts, loans, &c., are only $500,000, or thereabouts. Where is the residue? Why, we see where it is; it is included in the item "due from banks, $ 678,766.37." What banks have got this? On what terms do they take it? Do they give interest for it? Is it in the deposit banks in the great cities? and does this make a part of the other liabilities of these deposit banks in the cities? What are these other liabilities? But as to these "other investments," I say again, I wish to know what they are. Besides real estate, loans, discount, and exchange, I beg to know what other investments banks usually make.

In

my opinion, Sir, the present system now begins to develop itself. We see what a complication of private and pecuniary interests have thus wound themselves around our finances. While the present state of things continues, or as it goes on, there will be no lack of ardor in opposing the land bill, or any other proposition for distributing or effectually using the public money.

We have certainly arrived at a very extraordinary crisis; a crisis which we must not trifle with. The accumulation of revenue must be prevented. Every wise politician will set that down as a cardinal maxim. How can it be prevented? Fortifications will not do it. This I am perfectly persuaded of. I shall vote for every part and parcel of the fortification bill, reported by the Military Committee. And yet I am sure, that, if that bill should pass into a law, it will not absorb the revenue or sufficiently diminish its amount. Internal improvements cannot absorb it; these useful channels are blocked up by vetoes. How, then, is this revenue to be disposed of? I put this question seriously to all those who are inclined to oppose the land bill now before the Senate.

Sir, look to the future, and see what will be the state of things next autumn. The accumulation of revenue may then probably be near fifty millions; an amount equal, perhaps, to the whole. amount of specie in the country. What a state of things is that! Every dollar in the country the property of government!

Again, Sir, are gentlemen satisfied with the present condi

tion of the public money in regard to its safety? Is that condition safe, commendable, and proper? The member from South Carolina has brought in a bill to regulate these deposit banks. I hope he will call it up, that we may at least have an opportunity of showing, for ourselves, what we think the exigency requires.

PAYMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC LANDS IN

GOLD AND SILVER.*

MR. PRESIDENT,- I should be fully justified, in common with those with whom I am accustomed to act, in taking no active course in regard to this resolution; in sitting still, suppressing, if possible, our surprise and astonishment, and letting these schemes and projects take the form of such laws as their projectors might propose.

We are powerless now, and can do nothing. We have resisted since 1832 all these measures affecting the currency of the country and the security of the public treasure. We have done so unsuccessfully. We struggled for the recharter of the Bank of the United States in 1832. The utility of such an institution had been proved by forty years' experience. We struggled against the removal of the deposits. That act, as we thought, was a direct usurpation of power. We strove against the experiment, and all in vain. Our opinions were disregarded, our warnings neglected, and we are now in no degree responsible for the mischiefs which are but too likely to ensue.

Who will look with the perception of an intelligent, and the candor of an honest man, upon the present condition of our finances and currency, and say that this want of credit and confidence which is so general, and which, it is possible, may ere long overspread the land with bankruptcies and distress, has not flowed directly from those measures, the adoption of which we so strenuously resisted, and the folly of which men of all parties,

* Remarks made in the Senate of the United States, on the 23d of April, 1836, on the following Resolution, submitted by Mr. Benton :

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Resolved, That, from and after the day of ―, in the year 1836, nothing but gold and silver ought to be received in payment for the public lands; and that the Committee on Public Lands be instructed to report a bill accordingly."

however reluctantly, will soon be brought to acknowledge? The truth of this assertion is palpable and resistless.

What, Sir, are the precise evils under which the finances of the government, and, I believe, of the country, now suffer? They are obviously two; the superabundance of the treasury, and its insecurity. We have more money than we need, and that money, not being in custody under any law, and being in hands over which we have no control, is threatened with danger. Now, Sir, is it not manifest that these evils flow directly from measures of government which some of us have zealously resisted? May not each be traced to its distinct source? There would have been no surplus in the treasury, but for the veto of the land bill, so called, of 1833. This is certain. And as to the security of the public money, it would have been at this moment entirely safe, but for the veto of the act continuing the bank charter. Both these measures had received the sanction of Congress, by clear and large majorities. They were both negatived; the reign of experiments, schemes, and projects commenced, and here we are. Every thing that is now amiss in our financial concerns is the direct consequence of extraordinary exercises of executive authority. This assertion does not rest on general reasoning. Facts prove it. One veto has deprived the government of a safe custody for the public moneys, and another veto has caused their present augmentation.

What, Sir, are the evils which are distracting our financial operations? They are obviously two. The public money is not safe; it is protected by no law. The treasury is overflowing. There is more money than we need. The currency is unsound. Credit has been diminished, and confidence destroyed. And what do these two evils, the insecurity of the public money and its abundance, result from? They trace their origin directly to the two celebrated experiments; the veto of the bank bill, followed by the removal of the deposits, and the rejection of the land bill. No man doubts that the public money would have remained safe in the Bank of the United States, if the executive veto of 1832 had not disturbed it.

It was that veto, also, which, by discontinuing the national bank, removed the great and salutary check to the immoderate issue of paper money, and encouraged the creation of so many State banks. This is another of the products of that veto.

This is as plain as that; the rejection of the land bill of 1833, by depriving the country of a proper, necessary, and equal distribution of the surplus fund, has produced this redundancy in the treasury. If the wisdom of Congress had been trusted, the country would not have been plunged into its present difficulties. They devised the only means by which the peace and prosperity of the people could have been secured. They passed the bank charter; it was negatived. They passed the land bill, and it met the same fate. This extraordinary exercise of power, in these two instances, has produced an exactly corresponding mischief, in each case, upon the subjects to which it was applied. Its application to the bill providing for the recharter of the Bank of the United States has been followed by the present insecurity of the public treasure, and a superabundance of money not wanted has been the consequence of its application to the land bill.

The country is the victim of schemes, projects, and reckless experiments. We are wiser, or we think ourselves so, than those who have gone before us. Experience cannot teach us. We cannot let well enough alone. The experience of forty years was insufficient to settle the question whether a national bank was useful or not; and forty years' practice of the government could not decide whether it was constitutional or not. And it is worthy of all consideration, that undue power has been claimed by the executive. One thing is certain, and that is, there has been a constant and corresponding endeavor to diminish the constitutional power of Congress. The bank charter was negatived, because Congress had no power under the Constitution to grant it; and yet, though Congress had no authority to create a national bank, the executive at once exercised the power to select and appoint as many banks as he pleased, and to place the public moneys in their hands on just such terms and conditions as he pleased./

There is not a more palpable evidence of the constant bias of this government to a wrong tendency, than this continued attempt to make legislative power yield to that of the executive. The restriction of the just authority of Congress is followed in every case by the increase of the power of the executive. What was it that caused the destruction of the United States Bank, and put the whole moneyed power of the country into the hands