Along with the above, after reserving a suitable stock pile of up-to-date instruments and accessories for emergency use, the declared surplus of such instruments and accessories is to be allocated proportionately to the above recipients. Means are to be provided that no such surplus instruments and accessories be resold by any of the recipients of such material. Any quantities remaining after this allocation are to be rendered useless and disposed of as materials, the proceeds of such sale being covered into the Treasury of the United States. Question No. 8: What plans should be made for a post-war national defense program for the aircraft industry? through research and development? through stand-by capacity? through other methods? The aircraft industry requires for post war national defense the following: (a) A sound manufacturing and engineering industry. (b) Legislation to provide separate budgets for general procurement and the procurement of service test quantities on aircraft and equipment. (c) Fullest encouragement should be given to research and developments by providing funds for the purpose of advanced engineering developments in all phases of aviation both commercial and military. For stand by capacity, see paragraph 7. (d) Domestic air transport should be expanded now so that it can be ready to absorb the vast army of returning pilots, mechanics, and other specialists. APPENDIX II DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Washington, July 10, 1944. Hon. JAMES E. MURRAY, Chairman, War Contracts Subcommittee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR SENATOR MURRAY: In reply to your letter of June 28, we are not conversant enough with the Army and Navy program to express an opinion on questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of those submitted with your letter. Commenting on question 5, it appears that this could be best accomplished by cutting back, first, if possible, the manufacturers of civil air transport aircraft, such as Douglas, Beech, Lockheed, etc., and let them deliver some of their Army and Navy cargo models to domestic and foreign air lines. Also, cut back on manufacturers of personal civil aircraft, such as the Aeronca, Piper, Taylor, Cessna, Waco, etc., and let them start producing civil types. With reference to question 6, we should immediately decide on a post-war civil airport policy, as to whether or not Federal aid should be given, and, if given, on what basis it will be distributed. We should also allow companies to complete and test prototypes of new civil aircraft, and to build a reasonable number for demonstration purposes with which to line up dealers and interest potential customers. With reference to question 7, aircraft factories should be sold, if possible, to aviation concerns at low prices and on long-term credit. Our recommendations for the disposition of aircraft are to utilize as many of the cargo types as possible in demobilization work, scrap the well-worn ones, and sell those not needed in military service to commercial operators, domestic and foreign, on an installment purchase basis. Liaison types that will meet the requirements for commercial certificate and are in airworthy condition should be sold to civil purchasers, domestic and foreign. Trainer and combat types, excess to the military needs for active and reserve training, should either be scrapped or sold at low cost to friendly nations whom we should like to have build up their air forces, or develop their civil aviation. Some of these can also be distributed to educational institutions for shop training. Airfields should be made available to States, cities, or counties for civil use, so far as practical, keeping those that appear desirable in a stand-by status and selling the remainder, in whole or in part, to anyone who will purchase them. Under question 8, this should be done through research and development, and the purchase of newly developed aircraft yearly, retiring obsolescent types, even though little used. It is our opinion that stand-by capacity should be maintained at a minimum. because the moment this war is over the type of combat aircraft now in use will rapidly become obsolete; therefore, to maintain stand-by capacity for planes which no longer are combat worthy is a waste of money. We believe that the most effective program for National Defense would be one emphasizing the continued development of civil aviation through widespread use of the airplane by the public. The familiarity of our boys in the military forces with automobiles and mechanics in general has been a great factor in our present successful prosecution of the war, and so undoubtedly will success in future conflicts be measured in direct proportion to aviation knowledge and superiority. Very truly yours, J. E. SOMMERS, Deputy Administrator. UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION, Hon. JAMES E. MURRAY, Chairman, War Contracts Subcommittee, United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR MURRAY: This will acknowledge your letter of June 15, 1944, relative to the termination of certain work under contracts between the Commission and MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corporation. This was a case of partial termination of work under the contract, the contractor being notified of such partial termination on August 3, 1943, or approximately 10 months prior to the date on which the unterminated portion of the contract was completed. When the partial termination was decided upon, the contractor was asked to come to Washington and a revision of his contract was agreed to whereunder a lesser number of concrete barges would be constructed. In September of 1943 I wrote to the Secretary of Navy and Secretary of War stating that the Government-owned shipyard at which MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corporation had been performing contract work would probably be available for use in connection with other Government work in the late spring of 1944. Both Secretaries replied to my letter stating that their Departments had no use for such shipyard. The War Production Board was advised of the change in the concrete program. The partial termination of the contract effected in August of 1943 did not have the effect of requiring any reduction in employment in the shipyard at such time, nor was any substantial reduction made in the number of employees in the shipyard for several months thereafter. The regional office of the War Manpower Commission was advised that no further work would be available for the shipyard and was furnishied with schedules showing anticipated reductions in employment. Sincerely yours, E. S. LAND, Chairman. WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, Washington, D. C., June 30, 1944. Senator JAMES E. MURRAY, Chairman, War Contracts Subcommittee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR MURRAY: I am writing in reply to your letter of June 15 in which you request certain information about the closing down of the MacEvoy shipyards at Savannah, Ga., for the use of the War Contracts Subcommittee. The MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corporation is completing its contracts. They were awarded a contract for 5 concrete barges in November 1941 and an additional contract for 18 concrete barges in May 1942. Performance under the contracts was unsatisfactory to the Maritime Commission and the progress in completing them so slow that on August 3, 1943, the Maritime Commission canceled 16 of the 18 barges in the second contract. At that date, no barges had been delivered. I am informed that at that time letters were sent to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy advising them of the anticipated availability of the facilities. The War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission have been currently informed of the situation at the MacEvoy shipyards through regular reports on the progress of construction and prospective manpower requirements. The last of the concrete barges remaining in the two contracts after the cancelation of August 3, 1943, is scheduled to be delivered this month. The MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corporation has been aware since August of the prospective completion of its contracts. I am informed by the War Manpower Commission that the peak employment at the MacEvoy shipyards was approximately 1,500 workers and that already approximately half of this number have been placed in other employment. The yards are located in an area classified as an area of critical labor shortage. The War Manpower Commission anticipates no difficulty in placing the remaining workers when they are released. The Senate Committee on Investigation of the National Defense Program made an investigation of the MacEvoy Shipbuilding Corporation, the summary of which was published as appendix III of its report on Shipbuilding and Shipping (Rept. No. 10, pt. 8). If you have further questions that you wish to put to the War Production Board with reference to this case, we shall be glad to answer them. Sincerely, C. E. WILSON, Chairman. APPENDIX III AIR POWER AERONAUTICAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF AMERICA, INC. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE AERONAUTICAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF AMERICA, LOS ANGELES, APRIL 26, 1944 The board of governors of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, in order to "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," and in order to insure that the airplane which America created shall be used to maintain peace and secure the blessings of peace to mankind, does unanimously recommend the early formulation of an American air power policy under the following guiding principles: The United States should maintain an air power sufficient (in conjunction with other forces) not only to win this war but also to keep the peace: 1. By maintaining adequate air forces at such strength and in such state of readiness as to preclude a successful assault upon our country or its possessions. II. By acquiring and maintaining air bases essential to our security and that of overseas trade. III. By facilitating the orderly and economic expansion of domestic and international air transport and of private flying. IV. By preserving a strong aircraft-manufacturing industry. AN ESTIMATE OF AMERICAN AIR POWER-THE RECORD TO DATE Let us quickly review the past as the first step toward an estimate of the future. No matter how well known the record may be to some of us, it is worth while to restate it here. We recall that upon the outbreak of World War I, the United States was wholly unprepared. This was particularly true in avia.ion, for whereas Europeans had looked upon the airplane as an instrument of war, we Americans saw it as a new vehicle of peace. Thus, we entered the war with no military airplane designs and no military engines of our own. We sought to overcome this disadvantage by adapting foreign designs to automotive mass production, and belatedly trying to create new ones of our own. And though a valiant effort was made, the brief 19 months of our participation was not enough to bring American designed aircraft into combat. The sudden unexpected armistice of November 11, 1918, found us as unprepared for peace as April 6, 1917, had found us unprepared for war. We had neither adequate policy, program, or organization for terminating war contracts or for the custody, storage, or disposal of surplus goods or plants. As a result, there was vacillation, confusion and hardship. "War profits" proved illusory. Companies without adequate reserves or surplus failed. Automotive companies went back to automobiles. What little remained of the aircraft industry floundered in the doldrums. Some even thought the Army and Navy should design and build their own aircraft. The Army, the Navy, and the Congress took some cognizance of this situation. A number of committees and boards made recommendations. But nothing came of them. Then, in 1925, in response to outspoken charges by Brig. Gen. William E. Mitchell, and to an aroused public opinion, President Coolidge appointed the "Morrow Board." This Board was requested by the Secretaries of War and Navy. These requests were in turn the result of representations by the aircraft industry whose importance to the Army and Navy was pointed out. The Morrow Board consisted of nine members appointed by the President of the United States. Their number included a retired general, a retired admiral, two outstanding engineers qualified in aeronautics, a member of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, a member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs (the Hon. Carl Vinson), the chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, a judge of the circuit court of appeals, and a prominent lawyer and banker, Dwight Morrow. The Board was nonpartisan and nonpolitical, and no member was directly interested in commercial or military aviation. The character and integrity of its members were such as to assure public confidence in their findings. It heard nearly 100 witnesses and many conflicting opinions. At that time, the state of the aeronautical art was such that little could be drawn from experience, yet the public had strong confidence in the future of aviation. After a short but active inquiry, the Board submitted a unanimous report. Against the background of charge and countercharge incident to the Mitchell controversy, the Board's findings were unexciting. Yet they were so sound in principle that the report (not out of print), deserves reading and rereading today even by those familiar with it. Congress accepted its recommendations and embodies them in the Air Corps Act of 1926. It created the office of Assistant Secretary for Air in the Departments of War, Navy, and Commerce. The Board held, in effect, that a strong air force is vital to national security, that the backbone of this air force must be a strong, private industry, and that a long-term, continuing program of procurement is essential to the creation of adequate engineering staffs and the acceleration of the new technology. Thus, the Board fixed responsibility for American air power jointly upon Government and private industry. We take pride in the fact that the aircraft industry has fully discharged its responsibilities, even though at times the people's desire for peace caused them to falter in support of the Morrow Board's policy. Whereas in World War I we borrowed aircraft from our allies, in World War II, we supplied them. The Board realized the vital strategic importance of advanced engineering. It recognized the handicaps inherent in Government design and appreciated the need of private competition for the development of creative design staffs. It also stressed the impracticability of maintaining a peacetime industry adequate to the requirements of war. It emphasized the need for rapid expansion in emergency and visualized it taking place around a small but potent aircraft industry. This forced aircraft designers to conceive an entirely new theory of quantity production, one that relieved it of the need for freezing designs, and permitted it to expand phenomenally while introducing new and better models. As contemplated by the Morrow Board, the Post Office initiated the development of air transport through contract air mail under private operation. Regulation and airways development were centered in the Department of Commerce. Technical improvements were encouraged by keen, constructive performance competition. Destructive rate competition was avoided. Simultaneously, technological development was encouraged through healthy rivalry between the armed services a great force for progress. Intercompany competition has continued in war, though aircraft manufacturers have shared their experience freely through their war production councils. They have cooperated in this crisis as effectively as they once competed in normal times. The benefits of competition were also shared between the armed services and the air-transport operators to the over-all advancement of both. Aircraft was able to achieve its present dominance because, in the years before the war, this development was permitted by a long-range program evolved by the Morrow Board in 1925. Men have long realized the vital importance to peace and prosperity of free communication by land, but it was not until 1889 that the decisive character of overwater communication became apparent. Then, Capt. A. T. Mahan, in his classic treatise, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, proved conclusively that since the dawn of marine transport, victory in war and prosperity in peace have rested with the nation which exercised control of communication by sea. During the nineteenth century, the world enjoyed unexampled prosperity coupled with spiritual and material progress never before experienced. The combined British and American sea power swept piracy from the high seas and guaranteed the right of innocent passage to all who proceeded on their lawful occasions. With this power in the hands of a free people, the play of natural competitive forces accelerated the development of the arts and sciences. In the twentieth century, this freedom of the seas has been challenged twice in the lifetime of the pioneers of the aircraft industry. In World War I, the Germans challenged with the submarine. The Japanese at first found it expedient to ally themselves with us to obtain German and other Pacific bases. Then, when the Germans tried again with the submarine (their air force being military), the Japanese challenged with naval air power. Thus, twice in the first half of this century, the beneficent sea power of free people has been challenged by autocratic powers seeking to dominate and enslave. We have met this latest challenge by a rapid expansion of land, sea, and air power. Today, our air power is supreme: The combined military and naval air forces of the United States now constitute the world's largest air force. Our aircraft-manufacturing establishment is recognized as the world's No. 1 industrial giant. As to air transport, our private domestic and international systems, already the world's largest and best before the war, have expanded by leaps and bounds. At strategic points along the air lanes of the world, we have built a powerful network of air bases. They are as vital to air power as are naval bases to sea power. With these stepping stones, the Army and Navy air transport commands have rushed men and materials to distant points in support of far-flung operations. Keymen, on the spot, and face to face, have made decisions that insured success in complex operations which would otherwise have failed. delivery of critical materials at the right place at the right time produced results that would otherwise have been denied. We simply could not have fought this war successfully without air transport. The We have extended air lanes in all directions. Though we look at these now as outward flowing streams, we must not forget that they are channels leading to the very heart of the country. Mahan, discussing the decisive influence of sea power upon our Civil War, and referring to the tightening of the northern blockade, said, "The stream that carried the wealth and supported the trade of the Southern States turned against them and admitted their enemies to their hearts." This sea power comprised five basic elements: The merchant marine; strategic bases; the Navy; the shipbuilding industry; and a seafaring tradition. The cost of the Navy was accepted as a proper charge against the cost of water transportyes, even as an investment in world prosperity. Similarly, we see air power comprising the same elements: An expanding commercial air transport; strategic air bases; military and naval air forces; a sound aircraft manufacturing industry; and an air-minded public. The precise influence upon history of air power is now in the process of determination, but air power's influence upon land and sea communications has been made abundantly clear. Fundamentally, the isolation once enjoyed behind land or sea frontiers is forever gone. The aircraft manufacturing industry operates today on a high plateau, having passed successively through three crises. The first crisis involved a shortage of machine tools, the second, a shortage of materials, and the third, a shortage of manpower. Within the latter there is an element of grave danger. Competent management and competent engineering are items whose importance cannot be overstressed. We have brought in management of proven competence from other industries through licensing and subcontracting. We have trained new production management from our own ranks. We have cooperated through the war production councils to increase the efficiency of our own management. But the ability, even the willingness to take responsibility for management is a rare and precious quality. In a highly specialized engineering art like aviation, even men of real aptitude or competence must acquire experience before they are useful. Even then a special quality is necessary for men who must conceive and create new art. |