in all its phases, including research, development, and field testing by obtaining reasonable production quantities of these aircraft, then I believe development of this type will proceed with much nearer the same speed that development of our conventional aircraft proceeds. Also, we may be surprised then by the rapidity with which rotary-wing aircraft will expand its field of practical utility for all military and commercial purposes. Kellett Aircraft Corporation has devoted itself unremittingly to this field for the past 15 years and is the Nation's oldest rotary-wing manufacturer. In this time, through the use of our own resources and the assistance of the United States Army Air Forces we have been able to devote a few hundred thousand manhours of engineering time to the problems of developing practical rotary-wing aircraft. This has not been enough. In 15 years, we have been able to manufacture hardly more than 50 of these aircraft in all. I have read in the aviation press that there have been fewer than 100 helicopters produced in the United States to date. The quicker five or ten million more engineering man-hours can be applied to rotary-wing aircraft, and the sooner a few hundere various types can be produced and put to work, even in their present stage of development, the better the chances will be of fulfilling our military needs, creating employment, and establishing our position in world markets. NATIONAL PIANO MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. Chicago, Ill., June 22, 1944. Hon. JAMES E. MURRAY, Chairman, War Contracts Subcommittee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIR: Your good letter of the 15th addressed to me as president of the Everett Piano Co., to which I am taking the liberty of replying as president of the National Piano Manufacturers Association, has not been answered earlier by reason of my absence. The copy of bill S. 1730, print 3, which was attached has been read with considerable interest and with the conclusion that this would be a very constructive piece of legislation. It is being passed along to our associa.ion and commented upon accordingly. We welcome the opportunity to tell you briefly about the problems faced by the piano industry now and in the reconversion era. It can be said at the outset that our industry is very easy to reconvert; in fact, were certain matters such as price approval by Office of Price Administration handled more expeditiously, we would not today be subject to about an 80 percent shut-down and could be at least in partial production, doing our part to take up the slack of unemployment which is present over a great section of this country, whether or not it is admitted officially. War Production Board has already authorized a certain number of pianos to be manufactured for a limited usage, such as teaching and institutional purposes, and if today our industry were permitted to price the product produced by it on a realistic basis, taking into account authorized wage and material cost increases, we would be in production on a fairly high scale. Our industry is a small one, but it is none the less vital since our product certainly fills a necessary place in our present-day standards of civilization, and of course any shut-down is of the utmost concern to those who depend upon the industry for a livelihood. We have about 35 assembly and supply units scattered over the country east of the Mississippi River employing in normal times about 8,000 workers. Many of these units are located in group 2 and 3 areas. In the retail end, which must secure its product from the manufacturers, there are probably 8,000 more persons employed, and perhaps what is more important this group is composed largely of small retail units which do not have large accumulations of working capital. The skill of our industry which among other things must produce highestgrade wood fabrication was utilized to a considerable extent in carrying out the wooden aircraft program. As you probably know, this program is now largely suspended, and if we are to keep together a business nucleus which will furnish employment in the future, relief must be forthcoming, and soon, this because as an industry we do not have the financial strength to go through any extended period of idleness and still have remaining sufficient working capital to build up a future operation on anything like the required scale. As we see it, the reconversion problems of our industry are relatively easy, if they do not become lost in a maze of irrelevant discussion and misconception. Lumber is the only critical material, and many of our plants have a sufficient stock of this on hand to at least make a start and probably continue production until the situation is relieved by the slackening off of war needs. We have the help and plants available and certainly tremendous pent up demand for our product. It is estimated that it will take us a year to stock up our retail dealers with normal inventories. The hitch is now with Office of Price Administration, who so far have not conceded that pianos must be sold at a higher price than the one established in March 1942. Certainly prices must be increased, unless we can induce suppliers to lower the cost of raw materials and reduce the wages of labor to the scale prevailing at the base period. It is manifestly impossible to reduce raw materials, and it would seem to be against public interest to attempt to reduce the wages of labor. In other words, given cooperation we can soon be back in production and take up our share of the slack in employment. In fact, we should be able to increase our pay roll at least 25 percent ahead of where it was in August 1942 when our industry was suspended. If there is any further information you desire, we will be glad, indeed, to cooperate. Should you wish one of our members to appear before your committee, we can arrange to have one of our eastern associates on hand on short notice. Very truly yours, GEORGE H. STAPELY, President. WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF W. LAURENCE LEPAGE, PRESIDENT, HAVILAND H. PLATT, VICE PRESIDENT, PLATT-LEPAGE AIRCRAFT Co., EDDYSTONE, PA. JULY 19, 1944. The Platt-LePage Aircraft Co. was organized in 1938 by Haviland H. Platt and W. Laurence LePage, aeronautical engineers who, individually and together, had been devoting most of their time to the development of rotary-wing aircraft over a period of some 15 years prior to the creation of the manufacturing and development company which bears their two names. In 1940 the Platt-LePage Aircraft Co. won the Army helicopter design competition with its model PL-3 helicopter which later became the Army Air Forces model XR-1, a two-place observation-type machine with a Wasp, Junior, 450horsepower engine. Characteristic of our Platt-LePage helicopters, this machine and its subsequent revision, the XR-1A, has twin rotors laterally disposed, and needs no tail rotor for torque neutralization. The Platt-Le Page machines are, therefore, in many respects similar in general outline appearance to the conventional airplane. The XR-1A helicopter, currently undergoing_tests in the hands of the Army Air Forces, Matériel Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, is a smooth-flying aircraft with substantial lifting capacity and satisfactory high-speed performance in comparison with similar-size helicopters currently undergoing development. These witnesses do not wish to pose as experts on military and naval uses and applications of an aircraft of the helicopter type. Such facts concerning the performance of Platt-LePage helicopters as have been gathered over the past 3 years of actual flight testing do, however, point to obvious and inevitable active-service possibilities. The ability of the XR-1A-type helicopter to take off and climb vertically from areas less than 100 feet square with over one-half ton of useful load, indicates innumerable tactical and emergency uses. Rescue work on land and sea is immediately suggested. The installation of one or two externally mounted litters or stretchers would enable the speedy removal of wounded or injured from confined jungle areas or the sea. An aircraft carrier with one or more such machines on hand would be in a position to retrieve flight crews of planes shot down at sea far more expeditiously than with motor launches. Such helicopters would be equipped with pontoons for water landings, and if the surface were too rough, injured personnel could clamber aboard the hovering aircraft without necessity for an actual alighting. Similar circumstances would, of course, pertain in heavily wooded jungle regions. Other evident military uses of aircraft of the XR-1A type are the laying of telephone cable, the landing and retrieving of secret agents, and, with larger machines, the secret landing of crews to plot and plan invasion tactics. Aerial reconnaissance, spotting, and liaison services also come within the range of inevitable helicopter application. In the field of post-war civilian services, the helicopter with a substantial lifting capacity would have immediate air-transport possibilities of great value to the community. These witnesses are of the considered and conservative opinion that the small private helicopter for family use will be delayed some years while simplicity of operation, manufacturing costs, and service problems are solved to the point where the inevitable "rough and ready" handling by the private owner will no longer seriously damage either his person or his pocketbook. Furthermore, individual flying for the masses is still a serious problem of great magnitude, and the "man in the street" will buy a ticket to fly from here to there long before he is ready to own himself the machine in which he is to make the trip. These witnesses are prepared to go on record as being of the strong and considered opinion that the transport helicopter will be a twin-rotor machine, similar to the Army's XR-1 and XR-1A types, rather than a single-rotor helicopter with torque and control tail rotor. This opinion is based upon vital aerodynamic and mechanical reasoning, the details of which will no doubt be considered by the committee as outside the scope of present testimony. A transport helicopter meeting the requirements is within reach of present helicopter design and construction knowledge. In fact, a 10-place prototype twin-engine helicopter is already in the preliminary stages of design. Large transport airplanes, designed and built after the war from our big-bomber prototypes, will need very much larger airports and longer runways than the great majority of those at present available. Such airports of the present and post-war era are of necessity being located at points removed considerable distances from the centers of our principal cities. Thus, in spite of the ever-increasing speeds of air-transport services, the traveler is becoming more and more inconvenienced and his total travel time greatly increased by that portion of his air-travel schedule which must, at present, be allocated to slow ground transportation between city centers and airports. The helicopter argument is, of course, not new to the members of the committee. Small downtown landing areas for transport helicopters will permit air shuttle services to speed up over-all air-travel time by large percentages and will pull into the air-transportation map communities, towns, and even cities which otherwise could not economically be served. We desire to make clear to the committee our confidence that these forecasts for the helicopter in civilian service are real and practical but will be realized only as a result of an aggressive pursuit of present development programs. Helicopter design and development to date has called for an application of the most advanced mathematical, aeronautical, and mechanical abilities. Truly remarkable strides have been made and the helicopter, as a practical aircraft, has at last been established, but the development costs have been tremendous and will continue at a high level if the early future, as outlined, is to be realized. Our company has spent large sums of its own funds in this development during the past 51⁄2 years and has enjoyed some considerable financial support from its development contracts with the Army Air Forces. Nevertheless substantial losses have been and are being sustained in our company operation. These burdens are worth while only if the continuity of the work is to be maintained. COMPOSITE ANSWERS SUBMITTED BY AVIATION SECTION, NEW YORK BOARD OF TRADE, TO QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION ON AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IN Response TO REQUEST OF SENATOR MURRAY, CHAIRMAN OF WAR CONTRACTS COMMITTEE, AS COMPILED AT A MEETING OF THE SECTION'S EXECUTIVE BOARD ON JULY 14, 1944 Question No. 1: To what extent is it necessary to achieve better coordination between the cut-back program of the Navy Department and that of the War Department? How can this best be achieved? We believe that Joint Chiefs of Staff should appoint a committee, in case one does not already exist, to coordinate cut-back programs between the Navy Department and War Department with the view of accomplishing the following: (a) Avoiding impairment of facilities necessary to the post-war national defense. (b) Avoiding widespread unemployment. Question No. 2: Once it is decided to cut back a given program by a given amount, what yardsticks should be used in deciding which companies are cut and how much each company is cut? In the cut-back of a given program, utmost consideration should be given: (a) To the convertibility of the plant involved. (b) Avoiding unemployment. Question No. 3: What should the policy governing advance notice of cut-backs for (a) the company? (b) the subcontractors? (c) the employees? and (d) other Government agencies? It is our recommendation that the Government observe the utmost frankness in giving maximum advance notice on cut-backs to the prime contractor and to the subcontractor. Both the foregoing have interest in advising their employees as soon as definite information regarding cut-backs is received. Insofar as other Government agencies are concerned, advance notice to such agencies should be given when they are concerned in the matter from the standpoint of finance, manpower, facilities, etc. There will be certain advantages both to corporations and to companies to eut back on the basis of tapering off rather than complete terminations. It is suggested that upon cancelation of the balance of a contract, it affect a stoppage of 25 percent of the work immediately, an additional stoppage of 25 percent in 30 days, a further 25 percent in 60 days, and the balance in 90 days. This would not only ease the labor situation but would have the advantage from the Government standpoint of tapering off on the production line instead of immediately turning it down, so that if conditions changed within 3 months, production could easily be resumed. Question No. 4: What provision should be made for employees who are released from wartime aircraft production? through unemployment compensation? through retraining? through transportation to other localities? The most important provision that can be made for employees who are released from wartime aircraft production is the expediting of production work on civilian requirements. Severance pay should be provided. It is not thought that retraining is especially necessary. In cases where employees have been removed from their original homes, transportation back to their original homes or to a point equidistant where work is available, should be provided to them. Question No. 5: How can production cut-backs in aircraft best be integrated and synchronized with the development of other types of war production? This might be achieved by assigning the problem to the committee suggested under paragraph I. Question No. 6: What are the important steps that the Government and industry can take now to promote the rapid development of civilian aircraft production? The Government should cooperate with industry now to permit the rapid development of civilian aircraft production by— (a) Releasing when possible additional engineering for civilian aircraft design. (b) Allocating materials now for the fabrication of prototypes. (c) In certain cases ordering service test quantities of new devices calculated to add to safety, economy, and ease of operation of civilian aircraft. (d) A general policy regarding international aviation must be decided upon and the necessary steps taken to arrange for the use of foreign bases, etc. A definite policy as to the carrying of all mail by air and the clarification of the granting of new air routes will do much to promote the industry. A 5- or 10-year program for production of new aircraft should be determined upon, probably on some percentage of present business, say 10 to 20 percent, in order to keep our air force adequate and modern and to keep our industry going. A definite training program should be scheduled, something along the lines of the civilian pilot training program, utilizing the colleges and the high schools, together with the local operator, and making available training equipment which will be on hand at the end of the war. We can think of no better way to promote aviation in general than to train one, two, three, or five million boys and girls over the next few years. There should be a definite and coordinated program of instruction in aviation starting in the grade schools and schools and continuing through levels. A certain amount of military training, both pilots, mechanics, and technicians should be handled through the civilian industries, even if it is only in token amounts. All of our research facilities, such as the Ñ. A. T. A. should be continued, and should be augmented through the engineering departments of the industry. Question No. 7: What principles should be followed in handling Governmentowned aircraft factories, aircraft, and airfields? Aircraft factories should be offered for sale or lease to aircraft companies. Such factories as are not disposed of in this manner should be maintained in stand-by condition for future use, provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider such a program necessary to the national defense. Such plants as are not sold, leased, or maintained as stand-by should be closed or scrapped. Government-owned airfields should be offered for sale or lease to communities needing them for feeder operation, fixed-base operation, or current usage for civil purposes. Such field's as are not disposable according to the foregoing formula should be declared surplus and dismantled, the land being sold as land and not as airfields. 98534-44-pt. 9--10 PROPOSALS RESPECTING DISPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT'S DECLARED SURPLUS (AIRCRAFT, POST-WAR) 1. That a principle be established of "regional disposal." This means that such United States owned aircraft and accessories as are declared surplus by the Army and Navy be disposed of in the district (country or territorial region) where it is physically located at the cessation of hostilities. 2. That no part of such surplus aircraft or accessories be returned to the United States for disposal. 3. That no such surplus aircraft or accessories be disposed of in any country, for resale in another country. 4. That any of such surplus aircraft or accessories sold to any given country be used exclusively in that country, except where a sale to air lines domiciled in the country is concerned. 5. That all surplus aircraft and accessories not disposed of according to the preceding formula be dismantled and rendered useless and the materials therein disposed of as materials and not as products, the proceeds of such sale of materials to be covered into the Treasury of the United States. 6. That such surplus aircraft and accessories located in the United States or its possessions upon the cessation of hostilities be disposed of as follows: (a) By sale to air lines, aircraft manufacturers, and other users for conversion into craft utilizable for civil purposes. (b) By gift to accredited colleges, technical schools, museums, etc., for the purposes of aiding in studies. (c) By gift of suitable craft to cities and other municipalities for police usage. (d) By gift to accredited organizations (Red Cross, etc.) for transport usage. (e) By assignment to National Guard unies throughout the United States. 7. That any and all remaining surplus aircraft and accessories be disposed of in a manner identical to that proposed in paragraph 5, in conformity with the policy of "regional disposal.” COMMENTS The prime objective of the foregoing plan is to prevent disruption of normal trade. By utilizing as much as possible normal trade channels for the disposal of surplus aircraft material, the aeronautical industry will be aided greatly in its return to normal status. No surplus aircraft or accessories must be allowed to fall into the hands of speculators, national or international trades unauthorized converters, etc. Whenever possible surplus equipment to be resold, reconditioned, or salvaged, should be channeled through existing established manu facturers and similar agencies. There should be no "throwing on the market” of surplus equipment. Any arguments against the scrapping of surplus material which has been purchased by the taxpayers money, can be offset by the argument that such a practice would be less harmful to the national economy than dumping on the market. Dumping would result in serious impairment of our manufacturing and engineering facilities. Such impairment would not only create unemployment, but would prejudice engineering and research development necessary to national defense. Without attempting to forecast the size of the Government's stock of aircraft and accessories at the close of the war, here is an example of possible disposition under the foregoing program. Suppose on hand (in all parts of the world) American-owned aircraft_. Planes 100, 000 International Police Force - Squadron and trainer requirements, Army and Navy--- 30, 000 U. S. National Guard 5, 000 Technical schools, etc. 5, 000 Municipalities.......... 20,000 Institutions, organizations, and museums. 2,500 Dismantled, rendered unusable, sold for materials. 2, 500 30, 000 Total.. 100, 000 |