Détente: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, on United States Relations with Communist CountriesU.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 - 524 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
agree agreement American arms control arms race believe BERGSON Brezhnev CHAIRMAN Chiang Kai-shek China Chinese cold war committee Communist concerned Congress countries credits danger deal defense détente DINERSTEIN economic relations effect emigration Europe example fact feel forces foreign policy give going important interest issue KENNAN Khrushchev limited means MEANY MEDVEDEV ment Middle East military million MIRV missiles Moscow most-favored-nation nations NATO negotiations Nixon nomic nuclear test nuclear war nuclear weapons party peace percent political possible President problem question reduce relationship restraint RUSK Russians SALT Secretary KISSINGER Senator CHURCH Senator HUMPHREY Senator JAVITS Senator SPARKMAN Senator SYMINGTON SERVICE Shanghai Communique side situation Soviet Government Soviet leaders Soviet Union statement superpowers Taiwan talk tensions test ban things tion trade treaty United USSR warheads Warsaw Pact West Western
Popular passages
Page 139 - And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?
Page 247 - For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.
Page 60 - Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Hermann-Oberth Gesellschaft Honor Ring in 1971.
Page 247 - ... if peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other goal, other values will be compromised and perhaps lost; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values, along with everything else, will be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. However competitive they may be at some levels of their relationship, both major nuclear powers must base their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its will on the other without running an intolerable risk. The challenge of...
Page 250 - By acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West, the Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation.
Page 269 - Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace - not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values, too.
Page 253 - To a degree, this is true. Our strategic nuclear forces must not only be strong enough. They must be known to be strong enough to deter the Soviet Union from using its strategic nuclear forces against us or our allies. But a lead in...
Page 374 - Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.
Page 347 - It is to the advantage — and not to the disadvantage — of other nations, when any nation becomes stable and prosperous; able to keep the peace within its own borders, and strong enough not to invite aggression from without. We heartily hope for the progress of China. And so far as by peaceable and legitimate means we are able, we will do our part toward furthering that progress.
Page 257 - The temptation to combine detente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union will grow. Such an attitude would be disastrous. We would not accept it from Moscow; Moscow will not accept it from us. We will finally wind up again with the Cold War and fail to achieve peace or any humane goal.