respect; he would always know that the fight would have to be made at some time in a contest involving not his moral character, but his success in a controversy. The knowledge that such a fight was imminent would be destructive of his independence. We have a remedy by impeachment for misconduct in office: in my time three judges have been impeached in this state and removed from office. I do not object at all to the suggestion that the proceedings for that purpose be facilitated. I should be willing that the bar association, for instance, should present charges; they did so, in fact, in the cases I speak of. That is what the bar association of this city was originally organized for, to present charges against these three corrupt men. We got our hearing from the legislature, though it is true we had to go to the assembly first. Within a few years another such proceeding was taken at the instance of the state bar association. These things are quite within the competence of existing societies. If a judge is accused of corruption, he should be subject to removal, and there should also be provision for removing an incompetent judge. But if you put this matter into the hands of a group of voters, who may choose to bring up an issue, not of whether the judge has done wrong, but of whether the people want to get rid of him, you destroy the judge's independence, and preclude the possibility of getting independent and first-rate men on the bench. It seems to me that the adoption of judicial recall is destructive, and I look upon the men who advocate it as I do upon the men who fired on Fort Sumter. Believe, me, friends,

if this should be adopted our distinctive system of government would be broken down and the security of individual rights of person and of property would be destroyed.

CHARLES HOPKINS HARTSHORNE, Jersey City: It may be of some interest to you to know that in the adjoining state of New Jersey we have more than one system of appointing judges. None are elected except justices of the peace. The judges of one of the strongest courts in the state are neither elected, nor appointed by the governor; the judges of the court of chancery, or, as they are called, vice-chancellors, are appointed for terms.

of seven years by the chancellor without any concurrent authority at all. The constitution of New Jersey provides that "the court of chancery shall consist of a chancellor," so that there may be legally no judge of that court except the chancellor; but some thirty years ago, when it was found that no one man could keep pace with the work of the court, a vice-chancellor was appointed by authority of a statute. The number has since been increased to seven. In theory, they are only referees, but in fact they exercise nearly all the functions of the chancellor, nearly all the powers of the court. The decrees of the court are signed by the chancellor in the form advised by them. No appeals lie from their decisions to the chancellor, but directly to the court of errors and appeals. The chancellor has found it necessary to select for his relief and the credit of his court the best men he could get for that office. I think, of all who have been appointed, there was only one who was not of exceptional ability, and he held office only one term. As to the judges of the other superior courts, they are all appointed by the governor for terms of seven or five years. But there has grown up a practise that has become unwritten law, that a judge of the supreme court who is satisfactory shall be reappointed, and for so long as he gives satisfaction to the bar and the public. I think there has been no case within my memory where a judge of that court has failed of reappointment except from advanced age or illness, with the result that although their terms are for only seven years, we have had judges who have served for thirty years, and few who have served less than three or four terms, and if they have left then it has been because of their own wish or because of advanced age. The result of this practise has been a very satisfactory court.

But when we come to the courts of common pleas, the county courts, the case is different. I am sorry to say appointments to them have been generally regarded as spoils of office. There has been this result, however, from the appointive system, that with one or two exceptions the judges, even of the county courts, have been entirely removed from politics. The sentiment of the state is so strong against a judge mixing in politics that by mere force of that sentiment a judge finds himself com

pelled to withdraw from direct, and even from indirect, connection with politics. From that point of view, at least, I think the appointive system has been successful.

EDWARD D. PAGE, Oakland, N. J.: In raising the question as to whether there was widespread distrust of the courts, Mr. Wheeler injected a note of skepticism which I think it will be of value to continue, as this is one of the two points upon which the proposition of the recall of judges seems to be based. My own experience is that no such widespread distrust of the courts exists. Coming in contact with a great variety of people, both as a recorder in a New Jersey borough and in rather extensive civil litigation in the city of New York, as president of the Merchants' Protective Association, I am led to believe there is almost everywhere a most profound respect for the courts which penetrates the great inarticulate masses-the people who are not glib talkers and who rarely express their opinions in public.

The only other point on which the advocacy of this remedy seems to be founded is that it would be an education for the people to be obliged to discuss and determine for themselves the decisions of law with which they may be dissatisfied. Is it not rather a large undertaking for the people at large to gain the necessary knowledge to inform their judgment so that they may intelligently express opinions about matters such as those who advocate the recall of judges or the recall of decisions would put before them? I think most people would rather not have such a responsibility put upon them, and I think that the real reason why there is now so little interest in the election of judges is that the voters realize that they do not possess the information necessary for them to express an intelligent opinion. They are, therefore, content to leave the matter in the hands of the men who make the nominations, following them because they have better judgment as to the qualifications of a judge. I think whenever you present a question which people know is beyond their judgment they will tend to rely on someone else, and if the boss seems the handiest man, they will naturally follow him. They certainly will follow the district leader, and he is always for the "ticket."

It is a fallacy to believe that the recall is a new question. There was a democracy in Athens, where the recall of the judges prevailed. Was it not Aristides who, when the question of his recall was being voted on, sat beside the urn where the voters were casting their votes, and, asking a man who voted to ostracize him, "Do you know this Aristides?" got the answer, "No, but I am tired of hearing him called 'the Just.'" Socrates also was obliged to suffer the recall and to drink the hemlock because of the vague popular opinion against him. How can people who cannot possibly inform themselves be expected to express an opinion intelligently on such subjects? Are we ready as a democracy to present these questions to the whole body of voters? Can we trust a majority of them, no matter how much we believe in "the people," to express opinions intelligently on subjects on which they cannot be informed? Are we not going rather rapidly with political experiment when we expect the mass of the people, as in Oregon, to read and digest a book of two hundred and fifty pages before they can express an opinion on the questions at issue in a single election? Are we ready to advocate that state of affairs, and may we not, in our zeal for democracy, destroy democracy by its own excess?

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THE FEDERAL BUDGET:

WHAT THE PRESIDENT IS TRYING TO DO BY WAY OF BUDGET MAKING FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'

I

FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND

AM assuming that you wish me to say something concrete about what the President is trying to do by way of budget making for the national government.

The President's Inquiry into Economy and Efficiency The first step which was taken by the President looking toward a revision of methods of making and submitting estimates for the national government was in October, 1910. An appropriation of $100,000 had been made at his request

to enable the President to inquire more effectually into the methods of transacting public business ** with a view to inaugurating new or changing old methods * * so as to attain greater economy and efficiency therein

A preliminary inquiry was first organized under Hon. Charles D. Norton, Secretary to the President. In mapping out the inquiry it was thought that the investigation of methods should bear on one or the other of two subjects, i. e., it should look toward more intelligent and more efficient "planning," or it should look toward the more efficient and economical “execution of plans." One of the first subjects to which attention was given, therefore, was the procedure relative to the making of estimates and appropriations-the subject of "planning" for the next year's business.

The Appointment of a Commission of Experts to Report with Recommendations

March 8, 1911, the President's Commission on Economy and

1 Read at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science, October 26, 1912.