DISCUSSION OF WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS AND IT SOCIAL CONDITIONS MILES M. DAWSON New York City T is singular that among the various proposals to reform and improve methods of legislation the adoption, with appropriate alterations, of the republican government plan long in use in Great Britain, her dependencies and other countries, has not been more frequently advocated. The cause is, seemingly, that our written constitutions in state and nation do not lend themselves readily to insensible, gradual modification, and when they were adopted, responsible government had not so far developed, even in Great Britain, that its true nature was comprehended. Even at this day, while the parliamentary government of Great Britain is well understood by students of governmental theories, it is not understood by the mass of our population, though such a system has been in use for many years in Canada and its superiority is the boast of all Canadians. We are too prone to assume that responsibility of government to the voters prevails so generally that Americans must have understood and deliberately discarded it. Such is by no means the case. Scarcely half the countries of Europe enjoy parliamentary government with a responsible ministry. The Norwegians separated from Sweden to obtain it. In Sweden and in Denmark, the voters are still struggling without success to wrest from the crown the right to hold the ministry responsible. Finland enjoyed this right till recently. In Germany, Austria, Russia, and other countries, responsible parliamentary government does not exist. Except in the United States, however, it is found wherever free government exists; without excepting the United States, it may be said that it is found in every country where government is not frequently a failure, in failing to execute the policies approved at the polls. Witness the complete breakdown of successive administrations at Washington and in our largest and most important commonwealths. It is not unusual to have the President or governor, with the veto power, at loggerheads with one or both houses of the legislature. As a result, there is little legislation-virtually none-which the people have passed upon at the polls and approved by putting in power that party which promised to enact it. Not only do we see a political party opposed to the executive in control frequently of one or both legislative chambers, but even when one party is in complete control of the government, it has so little sense of its responsibility to carry out its promises, that not infrequently the administration goes to pieces. Moreover, when this occurs, although at the commencement of an administration, the country must patiently await its end before it can change these conditions, and experience has shown that usually it exchanges one mechanism which will not work for another no better. So intolerable has this become that a President or a governor of strong views and powerful character must declare his own policies and force them on a reluctant legislature under a pressure somewhat similar to the dissolution of parliament where responsible government exists, viz., by a threat to appeal to the people, that is, to attack the legislators in their home districts before and after nomination, if necessary. This is certainly an awkward substitute for responsible government, in which the party and its leaders are held accountable without introducing anything foreign to the scheme of legislative government, such as executive interference which, however necessary, is rightly regarded as tyrannical. Moreover such a plan is not practicable unless the executive has policies which he is determined to carry out, and the power to make an appeal to the people effective. Under responsible government, such a man becomes the leader of his party— the head of the cabinet when it is in power-and would retain his position so long as he retained popular support. Under the substitute for such responsible government which necessity caused Roosevelt, Hughes and LaFollette to introduce, we are compelled, in order to continue their effective leadership, either to keep them in executive office indefinitely, or permit them to assume the rôle of political bosses when not in office; or in such an office as United States senator, which has nothing to do with state legislation, to have them dominate state policies by threatening to appeal from the legislators to their constituents. In brief, conditions are so complex, inarticulate and dissociated that this can scarcely be called a legislative mechanism, but merely the triumph of some powerful personality, a triumph achieved despite the want of machinery through which the leader's proposals may be given effect by the voter's approval. It would be well if responsible government were tried in one of the more advanced states. It would solve our legislative problem if this could be brought about in the near future, so that, for instance, Roosevelt's wonderful qualities of leadership could be utilized to the full and his policies carried into effect if approved by the voters without the necessity that he remain. President or that another man as President be compelled to pursue the legislative policy of a party leader out of office. It is a good rule which causes American voters to hesitate to confide the executive power too frequently to one man. But where responsible government exists, the head of the state is virtually powerless, except as an administrator with executive powers only; the legislative power includes the legislative policy of the administration, and all matters that require the consent of the legislature are entrusted to a cabinet, which must hold its confidence and retain its support or retire from office, or else dissolve the legislature and appeal to the people. Under such conditions, liberty is best conserved by continuing a leader in power so long as his leadership exists, instead of jealously guarding against his too long continuance, as is considered necessary if he is at the same time chief executive. The solution of our governmental problems would be easier, could we keep at the front the strongest, wisest and best men throughout their entire lifetime, like Gladstone in Great Britain, instead of ending their influence upon legislation with their retirement from executive office. We not only waste the powers of our most serviceable citizens, but permit the complete breakdown at times of our legislative system as a means of carrying into effect the policies approved by the voters. THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE METHODS OF W SELECTING AND REMOVING JUDGES' HARLAN F. STONE Dean of the Law School of Columbia University HEN our judicial system was established in the United States, two of its features were peculiarly adapted to its separation from political influence and activity. The general policy adopted in all of the states down to 1812 of appointing all judicial officers with life tenure of office was cal-culated to remove the selection of judges from political controland from the influences of the strife and passions of political campaigns. Their appointment for life or during good be-havior removed the temptation to seek a new election or appointment as a reward for political or party service. The other feature of our judicial system which has tended hitherto to keep the American judge from the political arena has been the fact that in the exercise of his power to interpret statutes or to declare statutes unconstitutional, he judges the law only in order to judge a case involving the rights of individuals. He does not appear in the role of an assailant of the law, nor, on the other hand, is his professional conduct as a magistrate in determining the law made even indirectly the occasion of reward or punishment by the electorate. As De Tocqueville stated in commenting on this fact: It will be readily understood that by connecting the censorship of the laws with the private interests of members of the community, and by ultimately uniting the prosecution of the law with the prosecution of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. He might well have added that the judicial interpretation of laws 'Introductory address as presiding officer at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science, October 25, 1912. - and the constitution was likewise protected by our judicial scheme from the direct political attacks of parties or factions. The system of appointment of judges for life or during good behavior has long since been abandoned in most of our states. Influenced undoubtedly by the democratic tendencies which swept over the country in the first half of the eighteenth century, Georgia first, in 1812, in the case of its inferior judges, and Mississippi in 1832 provided for popular election of judges for limited terms. This method of selecting judges was rapidly adopted by other states, until at the present time I believe the only states retaining the appointive system are Delaware, Massachusetts and New Jersey. By this radical change in our polity the judicial office was cast into the arena of party politics and became potentially at least subject to influences which are wholly inconsistent with that sense of security and freedom which the founders of our government deemed essential to judicial integrity and efficiency. It is perhaps not within my province as the presiding officer of this meeting to attempt to comment upon the merits of the prevailing methods of selecting judges, but it may be permitted to me to say in passing that if there is any substantial basis for the current criticisms of our judges, the system of electing judges for limited terms has not been justified by its results. On the other hand, if our judges the country over were as distinguished for their learning and integrity as are the judges of Delaware, Massachusetts and New Jersey, where the appointive system still exists, there would be little occasion for the serious agitation over and discussion of our judicial system which now prevails. These are significant facts, which should arrest our attention at the very outset of our search for new methods of subjecting our judges to the control of the popular will. I therefore venture to express the hope that the papers and discussions to which we shall have the pleasure of listening this afternoon will turn the light of searching inquiry upon our existing method of selecting judges. With political, as with physical ills, the removal of the cause is likely to prove more efficacious than the application of remedies, especially if they are new and untried. It is to my mind a singular and noteworthy fact that this consideration has hitherto |