Mr. Chit Posayanonda, former Director General, now Counselor, to the Bureau of Narcotics. Police Maj. Gen. Surapol Chulabrahm, Police Department (Border Patrol Police). Police Maj. Gen. (M. R.) Nilya Bhanumas, Secretary General, Thailand Central Bureau of Narcotics. Mr. M. R. Chiravadee Kasemsri, Chief, U.N. Division, Department Technical and Economic Cooperation (participated in U.N. Narcotics Survey). Mr. Sayom Ratanawichit, Chief, Social Studies & Planning Division, Dept. of Public Welfare. Mr. Nikom Khamnuanmasok, Social Development Branch, Chief, Social Projects Div., National Economic Development Board. Visit to Hilltribe Research Center, Chiang Mai University. Visit to Border Patrol Police Hilltribe Handicraft Center. Flyover Mae Kong Soon poppy-growing area. Also participated in a Staff Conference on Control of Drug Abuse and Traffic with representatives from U.S. Mission in Southeast Asia. Saigon April 17–19: Hon. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador, South Vietnam. Mr. John E. McGowan, Special Assistant. Mr. Terrence G. Grant, Political/Military Affairs Officer, Control Officer. Mr. Stephen Winship, Political/Military Affairs Officer. Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, Dep. Commanding General, U.S. Army, Vietnam. Lt. Gen. Michael Davison, Commanding General, II Field Forces, Vietnam (II FFV). Col. George Webb, Deputy Chief of Staff II FFV. Col. James H. Hyndman, Provost Marshal General II FFV. Lt. Col. Alfred R. Jefferson, Deputy Provost Marshal, MACV. Maj. Robert Schwartz, Joint Customs Section, Security and Invesgations Division, Provost Marshal Office, MACV. Tong Kong-April 19–20: Mr. David L. Osborn, prinicipal officer, U.S. consulate. Mr. David Dean, International Relations Officer General. Mr. Keith S. Shostrom, Chief, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous rugs, Hong Kong. Cdr. R. L. Vomies, Liaison Officer, 7th Fleet, Hong Kong. Cdr. R. L. Stanford, Officer in Charge, Commander, U.S. Naval orces Phil. Det. Hong Kong. Mr. Wayne Crawford, Resident Agent, Naval Investigative Serv es. Mr. Vincent E. Durant, U.S. Customs, Foreign Liaison Officer, Hong Kong (TDY). Tokyo-April 21–22: Hon. Armin H. Meyer, U.S. Ambassador, Japan. Mr. Lester E. Edmond, Economic/Commercial Officer. Mr. Ronald A. Gaiduk, Consular Officer, Control Officer. Mr. Rustam Aruslan, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Tokyo. Mr. William J. Cunningham, Political Officer. Mr. Thomas C. Stave, Economic/Commercial Officer. Mr. Segoro Usukura, Police Superintendent and Chief of Second Vice Section, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Dept. Mr. Hiromasa Sato, Chief of Narcotics, Second Section, Ministry of Health and Welfare; Briefing by Office of Special Investigations. US Air Force, Naval Investigation Service Office, and Criminal Investigation Detachment, US Army, Japan. 1 1 Congressman Steele only. APPENDIX NOTE OF PRESENTATION (TRANSMITTAL SHEET TO LAO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY) CONCERNING THE DRAFT LAW ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE GROWING OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE, CONSUMPTION, SALE, PURCHASE, AND POSSESSION OF OPIUM Importance of the opium problem is manifest equally from the domestic and the international point of view. On the domestic side, the economic aspect of the problem is tied to its political aspect by the fact that the culture of the opium poppy constitutes the principle source of revenue of our ethnic minorities. However, it would be useless in the present state of affairs to think that we would be able to avoid international control of drugs. The idea of considering opium as an important source of revenue is best rejected. Traffic in drugs in Laos was formerly an administrative offense governed by the Decree of Haussaire [High Commissioner] No. 247/3101 of 3 September 1948 which is no longer in effect. The Royal Government, by letter No. 2595/PC/AG of December 10, 1958 addressed to the Ministry of Finance gave its agreement to the principle of the complete revision of their legislation concerning drugs to replace the Decree of 3 September 1948 of the High Commissioner of France in Indochina, regarding the establishment of the opium regulation. Such is the draft text prepared by our experts and followed by an explanation of the rationale attached to this note. In view of the events which continuously preoccupy us it would be appropriate to develop a clear policy concerning the campaign against illicit traffic in drugs. It is recalled that in 1963 the Royal Government decided to withdraw the membership of Laos in the Single Convention of 1961 regarding drugs. ORAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE CULTIVATION OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE AND CONSUMPTION, SALE AND PURCHASE OF OPIUM Article 1.-For a period of five years following the publication of this law he mountain dwelling population who traditionally devote themselves to the ultivation of the opium poppy may only continue to consume the opium which hey produce. Authorization to grow and consume may be granted by provincial governors nly to men over thirty years of age. The area of land to be cultivated will be determined in relation to the needs f the person requesting it by a provincial consultative commission chaired by he provincial governor and including a representative of the Ministry of National Education. This area will be reduced each year so that at the expiration of the ve year period indicated above no authorization to cultivate the poppy and to onsume the opium which may be drawn from it will be granted. Article 2.-With the exception of the specific cases covered by the preceding Article, the culture of the opium poppy, the manufacture, possession, consumption nd the vending of opium are forbidden throughout the territory of the Kingdom. The sale and purchase of opium are forbidden to all persons including those xceptionally authorized to cultivate the opium poppy and who may consume nly the product of their cultivation. Article 3.—With the exception of medicinal products containing opium or such roducts intended for the manufacture of medicines which remain subject to egulations regarding the sale, conditions and use of poisonous substances, imortation, even with the intention of reexportation, transit, storage and transhipment of opium are prohibited. Article 4.-Any person who shall cultivate the poppy or shall consume oplum without the authorization specified in Article 1 or who shall not respect the limits of such authorization as he shall have received, shall be punished by a fine from 5,000 to 200,000 kip and by imprisonment of three months to three years, or by one of these two penalties only. In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine shall be applied. Article 5.-Any person will be punished by a fine from 5,000 to 10,000 kip and by imprisonment from six months to five years or one of these two penalties only, who shall have: 1. Manufactured opium outside of the special cases covered in Article 1; 2. Transported or possessed or given opium either freely or for payment, or who will have bought or received free; 3. Forged, false authorization to cultivate or to consume or who will have falsified authorization granted by provincial governors by the substitution of names, of photographs, or by false notification or false declarations of civil status; 4. Participate in the preparation and the introduction into circulation of false authorization or falsified authorization; 5. Sale of an authorization or who will have given such authorization free; 6. Bought an authorization or will have received it free; 7. Who will have obtained or tried to obtain more than one authorization: 8. Who will have imported opium, stocked it, had it transshipped, or had it transited in Laos territory. Further in the cases covered by sections 5, 6 and 7, the authorization will be withdrawn. In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine will be applied. Article 6.-Any keeper of an opium smoking den will be punished by a fine from 10,000 to 1 million kip and be imprisoned from six months to five years or by one of these two penalties only. In case of repetition of the offense the maximum fine will be applied. Article 7.-Infractions covered by this law will be prosecuted by the Department of the Public Prosecutor. In every case opium seized will be confiscated and destroyed. Means of transportation will be seized and sold on behalf of the state if it is established that their owners are the perpetrators of the infraction, prosecutors or accomplices of such perpetrators. Materiels, furniture and special objects such as beds, sofas, lamps, pipes, etc.... found in the possession of keepers of opium dens will be seized, confiscated and destroyed. Opium found abandoned in Lao territory will be seized and destroyed on demand of the Public Prosecutor. Article 8.—All previous dispositions contrary to the present law are annulled. Certified that the present text is adopted by the National Assembly at its meeting of THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. Senator HUGHES. Thank you, Congressman Murphy. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. STEELE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to keep my remarks to 3 minutes. I am very grateful for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee. I am well aware of the excellent work you have been doing for over a year now, on this problem. I think that you, having been on top of this problem for as long as you have, will agree that we have now an opportunity in the United States now that the concern with the military heroin addict has reached the extent it has, to channel the necessary resources into a broad-based program to treat all our addicts across the country. I think that there is no point in dwelling on the size of the problem in South Vietnam. Congressman Halpern very ably detailed some of it and it was very thoroughly detailed in the report Congressman Murphy and I submitted some weeks ago. What I am more concerned about at this time is precisely what the Department of Defense is doing to move against this problem. I would like to outline some areas which I think would be profitable to discuss. First of all, it is very clear that the military has been very late in recognizing the size and the seriousness of this problem. As late as July of 1970, the commander of 2nd Field Force, Vietnam, commanding some 40,000 men in South Vietnam at that time, asked every one of his unit commanders if they had a heroin problem in their units. Every unit commander, to a man, came back and said no. Indeed, it wasn't really until December of 1970, 1 year after this problem began to get out of control, that the military began to move gainst it. The problem has been one of education, of both the miliary command itself and of the troops. I think the latter has been a dismal failure. I am also concerned that although the military command, and alhough the Department of Defense has increasingly recognized this problem, there are still some areas where we are not getting all the ecessary information. For example, the military continues to trongly contend that heroin addiction has had no appreciable effect n combat capability in South Vietnam. I would cite the statistics rom Pioneer House as an indication of the likelihood that that is ot true. We do know that heroin addiction increases as you move back rom the combat units. Nevertheless, among the military personnel -ho enrolled themselves in Pioneer House between October 5, 1970, nd March 31, 1971, a full 26 percent were from combat units, which think indicates that the problem among combat units and the eroin problem as it effects combat capability and combat readiness - far more serious than the military has to date been ready to acnowledge. |