It is estimated that there are five, and possibly ten, groups operating at any one time with up to 100 individuals employed. Each group appears to have its own courier and trafficking and purchasing operations. Over the past 10 years every narcotics case in Marseilles has involved one or more of four Corsican families: the Venturi brothers (Jean and Dominic), Marcel Francisci, Antoine Guerini and Joseph Orsini. (Orsini himself served a prison term in the United States and was deported in 1958.) There are offshoots of these four families and ad hoc groups may appear from time to time, but these four families are the heart of illegal heroin production in Marseilles. The problem is that in France, as well as in the United States, the police must have evidence upon which to base a case. The police cannot put the finger on the families or people involved. French authorities are hampered by the secret Swiss bank accounts as much as are U.S. authorities. French mechanism for control

Though France does not suffer to the same extent from heroin abuse as the United States, there is a problem developing in that country. This has been a major factor in prompting French authorities to increase their efforts to combat the availability of heroin in France. An indispensable element in this endeavor has been a growing willingness to cooperate with the United States in its efforts to fight heroin abuse.

A French-American agreement setting up close cooperation between the agencies specializing in the fight against the illegal traffic in drugs in France and the United States was signed on February 26, 1971. by Raymond Marcellin, French Minister of the Interior, and U.S. Attorney General John M. Mitchell. Under the terms of the agreement both governments have agreed to exchange narcotics agents in order to facilitate cooperation. Very considerable credit belongs to Mr. Marcellin for assigning high priority to the anti-heroin effort.

The fight against drug abuse in France is centralized in the Office of the Chief of National Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Bureau.

There are three groups which deal with narcotics matters: the Central Office, the Marseilles Service, and the Narcotics Service in Paris. In 1969 there were 40 agents assigned to narcotics duties; today there are 120 with the probability that this number will be increased shortly.

In addition, between 6,000 and 7,000 police and gendarmerie and others have been given training in narcotics control practices.

It was pointed out that under the centralized French system, numbers were not as important as emphasis.

If any information becomes available to any French authority, it will be transmitted to the Central Office, although at the present time French authorities are working largely from information provided by the United States.

The French authorities believe that the effort against drug traffickers must be secret. In their opinion the nature of the problem is such that the less known about police methods and tactics, the better the chances are for successful results. As a result, police throughout the country sometimes work on narcotics cases without being completely

aware of all the facts surrounding the case. This approach also serves to prevent police corruption.

French police do very little undercover work. Under French law even police officials are not permitted to get involved in narcotics traffic. If they do, they are liable to criminal prosecution. In addition, if it could be shown that the evidence was provoked by police activity the case would be thrown out of court. As a consequence, the French police depend upon U.S. personnel for their information.

Difficulties in controlling illegal heroin production in France

The French police have been able to locate and close only 13 laboratories over the past 20 years. Two were closed in 1969; one in 1964. One of those closed in 1969 was located in a villa approximately 25 kilometers outside of Marseilles. Finding this one was a result of fine police work by both the French police and United States BNDD agents working closely with the police. A man suspected of being implicated in the narcotics racket was released from arrest. He went directly to the villa and was followed by the authorities. When the police raided the villa, the laboratory was in full operation.

The study mission inspected another building in the suburbs of Marseilles which had housed the illicit laboratory that was closed in 964. It was an innocent looking building, and if the authorities had not been told by an informer that a laboratory was located in that paricular building it would not have been discovered.

As a result of visiting these two locations, it became evident to us hat looking for an illegal heroin-producing laboratory is like looking or a needle in a haystack. They can be set up anywhere in a short eriod of time and they can be moved just as quickly.

At present, the only practical method by which they can be located s through the use of informers. This takes time and money. Money must also be available to pay the informer as well as for making a urchase of the heroin from illegal sources in order to develop leads. Both French and American authorities voiced confidence that their forts were progressing satisfactorily and that the Marseilles Service nd the Central Office were developing a force capable of effective ction in discovering and closing the illegal laboratories. There is a eadily increasing spirit of aggressiveness on the part of the French uthorities in their efforts to stop the illegal production of heroin in

rance.

The French authorities were also hopeful that scientific and techological developments would greatly assist them in their investigaons. For example, now in the process of development is a sensory evice which, when perfected, will "smell" illegal laboratories in beration. These devices will be mounted in helicopters which will e used by the police to patrol the area. Unfortunately, the device ust be in an area when a laboratory is in operation if it is to be eful to the police.

Helicopter-borne patrols are of considerable assistance to the police nd should be used. If nothing else, they can increase the sense of olice pressure that the narcotics manufacturer is beginning to feel France. The authorities were emphatic in their belief that, because French narcotics laws and police pressure, the laboratory oper

ators are beginning to "panic." Police pressure should, therefore, be increased.

Consideration should be given to making helicopters and trained pilots available to the French until they develop their own capabilities. If arrangements can be made with French governmenta officials it might be possible to place U.S. helicopter units assigned to U.S. Forces in Europe on temporary duty in the Marseilles area. While this would be only an interim solution to the problem, it would be useful and it would enable the authorities to utilize one more weapon in the struggle to stamp out illicit heroin production during the period when the French are developing their own airborne patro capability. ITALY

Italy is a transshipment point. It is estimated that 30 to 40 percent of the raw material used to produce heroin either passes through Italy or is hidden in vessels destined for France which stop at Italian ports.

There is also the probability that some of the heroin produced ir France and elsewhere returns to Italy where it is then smuggled to the United States. There are no firm estimates on the amount involved. but it is considered to be substantial by knowledgeable experts. The number of known heroin traffickers seen in Italy, plus the deep involve ment of a number of known Mafiosa in the United States form the basis for this judgment.

There is also the possibility that heroin is being produced in Sicily and Sardinia.

Italian efforts to control the illegal traffic in narcotics

Efforts by the Italian Government to control the illegal traffic in narcotics have not been successful. For example, it is estimated that the Italian authorities seize only about one-tenth of 1 percent of the narcotics which reach that country.

There appear to be a number of reasons for this.

First, the Italian police agencies are fragmented and cooperation depends upon personalities rather than institutional procedures. There are three distinct national police agencies: The Finance Police, the · Public Security Forces, and the Carabinieri. Each is jealous of its prerogatives.

In addition, a Central Narcotics Office (CNO) has been set up the Ministry of the Interior. Charged with the responsibility for coor dinating efforts to control narcotics traffic, the CNO does not always get the cooperation of the police agencies or high-ranking government officials.

Second, the Mafia is deeply involved in the narcotics traffic, and high-ranking Italian Government officials aid that organization throughout Europe. A commission has been appointed to determine the extent of Mafia infiltration of the Italian Government. It will take some time, however, before the results of this study

are known. Third, the Italians do not recognize the seriousness of this problem. According to police authorities throughout Italy, there is no Italian heroin problem. Consequently, there is no feeling of urgency to take

immediate and effective action to coordinate their efforts to combat this problem.

Fourth, the Italians will not take action to improve international cooperation to stop the illegal traffic of heroin. They do not coordinate their activities with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in spite of the fact that that organization maintains complete files on all known international criminals. Nor will they pass information to Interpol. They have also refused to put any pressure on Turkey to do anything about this problem. Another indication of Italian attitudes is their refusal to participate in the Special Drug Abuse Control Fund established by the United Nations until at least three-fourths of the members have contributed.

Italian cooperation with the United States

There are BNDD agents in Italy working with the Italian authorities in an effort to interdict morphine passing through Italy and to stop heroin from returning. These efforts are hampered by the need to coordinate activities within the several Italian police agencies. Nevertheless, BNDD is helping and encouraging the Italians to improve their capability to halt the drug traffic while waiting for the Italian Government to centralize its operations in this area. Right now, there is little or no cooperation between the Central Narcotics Office and the several police agencies, including the local police. As a matter of fact, the only successful seizures and arrests made in Italy since 1962 have been made with BNDD assistance.

Ambassador Graham Martin has met with Italian Government officials on at least three occasions requesting more cooperation from the Italian Government, to no avail.

These efforts must be intensified. The United States must keep the pressure on the Government of Italy to take effective action and should be prepared, if necessary, to supply aircraft, helicopters, vehicles, communication and other equipment to help increase Italian capabilities to deal effectively with the illegal traffic in

narcotics.

If there were no opium production in Turkey, however, the illegal laboratories in Marseilles could not exist. Nor could the illegal trafficker profit in Italy. Solution to the problem has to be found in Turkey. If efforts to close the illegal laboratories in Marseilles, or to stop he Italian trafficker are successful, the operation will move some place lse. Without morphine base it is impossible to produce heroin. The Middle East-European aspect of the illegal international traffic in arcotics can only be stopped at the source-in the poppy fields of urkey.

Background

THE ROLE OF TURKEY

Poppy cultivation is a tradition in the Anatolian region of Turkey dating back to about 1900 B.C. During the 19th century, as word trade greatly expanded, the demand for opium increased and betwee 1850 and 1900 cultivation spread and expanded throughout the entire country as a cash crop and an important export. In addition to opiat gum, other important by-products include seeds for flavoring and 62, both of which have become a standard part of the Turkish farmer's diet.

Although by 1900 the addiction and abuse of opium and its derivatives had become a serious world health problem and the need for controls was recognized, the political, cultural, social and economic differ ences between nations made achievement possible only through a progression of treaties, culminating finally in their codification in a Single Convention in 1961. The Single Narcotics Convention which came into force in 1964 was ratified by Turkey in December 1966 and by the United States in 1967. Under this agreement Turkey is recog nized as an opium exporter to the legal market.

Attempts to control opium production

Since 1967 Turkey has reduced the number of provinces legally per mitted to cultivate poppies from 21 to 7 for the 1971 harvest. It has announced a further reduction to four provinces for 1972. During this same period the legal production of opium gum has been reduced from 368 tons to an estimated 100 tons in 1970. It is estimated by reliable authorities, however, that illegal production could be at least as much and possibly twice that amount-more than enough to satisfy the 4 to 5 tons of heroin required by the addict population in the United States.

Turkey has also tightened procedures for surveillance of poppy fields, purchase from farmers, and curbing of illegal traffic, and instituted efforts to encourage crop substitutions.

Under current practice, worldwide opium trade requirements are determined by the United Nations Control Board. Based upon this. the Turkish Government estimates how much opium Turkey should produce in the following year. The Ministry of Agriculture then determines how much acreage should be planted and in which provinces. The Cabinet then passes an approving decree. The Ministry does not tell the farmer how much land he can plant. Instead, the farmer declares to the village headman how much he intends to farm and the expected yield. These estimates are then passed to the Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer is expected to abide by his declaration, but under present law he is not required to obtain a license.

Control teams will be organized in each of the four provinces to monitor the growing of poppies. These teams will inspect the fields continually from the time of planting through the harvest. The con(12)