ment for an integrated and inclusive State Bar in each state, which has made considerable headway in the last decade,1 seems likely to promote improvements in procedure and in judicial organization and administration.2 3 It must not be forgotten, however, that procedure has no existence apart from the substantive law. If the substantive law is faulty, no perfection of procedure can obviate those faults; indeed, the more perfect the procedure, the more glaringly the defects in the substantive law will appear. If the substantive law tries to decide cases on the basis of "facts" which cannot actually be ascertained, no procedure will work. For example, the attempt to administer the allocation of the risks of the automobile by applying the law of negligence to automobile accidents, involves assumptions as to the possibility of a court or jury ascertaining "facts" and applying a legal standard to those "facts" long after the accident in litigation which in many cases are simply untrue. That the courts of our larger cities are crowded with automobile tort cases and that the procedural system tends to break down in handling them may be not so much a criticism of the adjective law as evidence that some other method of dealing with compensation for automobile accidents — perhaps by a system of insurance and compensation without regard to "fault" or "negligence" is needed. Adequate adjustment of the substantive law to the needs of the society in which it operates is just as essential to the satisfactory working of the procedural system as is an adequate adjective law and efficient human agencies for its administration. - 5 1 There are now such inclusive and largely self-governing organizations of the bar in 25 states. 2 English experience indicates, however, that the real force behind procedural reform may come from the laity rather than from the lawyers. See Sunderland, "The English Struggle for Procedural Reform," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1926). As to defects in the present English system, see Greenbaum, "English Justice through English Eyes," 18 A. B. A. J. 448 (1932). 3 In some cases, to be sure, defects in the substantive law may be covered up by a procedure which allows the jury or other trier of the fact to disregard the law. See Arnold, "The Rôle of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 617, 642-647 (1932). 4 See Landis, Book Review, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1428 (1932). 5 See Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (1932) 199-217. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PART ONE THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM PAGE CHAPTER II. JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION 1. The earlier English courts. Record in Slade's Case, 4 Co. 92b (Q. B. 1596–1602).. Record in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339 PART TWO. ACTIONS AT LAW [cont'd]. CHAPTER IV. THE FORMS OF ACTION [cont'd]. SECTION 2. TRESPASS, CASE AND TROVER [cont'd]. Chamberlain v. Hazlewood, 5 M. & W. 515 (Exch. 1839). |