the Queen here by his assent of increase adjudged, which damages in the whole do amount to 261. And the said Humphrey Morley in mercy, &c.1

1

NOTE: The court gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the action of general assumpsit lay although the defendant made no subsequent promise to pay the debt, his only promise being that which was made at the time the debt arose.

THE record in Slade's Case is an excellent example of an old common law record in an action at law. The student will note that nothing that happened at the trial appears in the record. In the modern record on appeal, illustrated by the example which follows, the proceedings at the trial are often the principal subject-matter, except of course where the case is decided entirely upon the pleadings. The old common law records were enrolled on parchment and preserved as plea rolls; modern records are printed or typewritten and are kept in filing cabinets. But today as in the time of Lord Coke the court often can look only at what is "in the record".2

1 The words represented by &c. are: of our lady the Queen. In 1602, this amercement of the unsuccessful defendant on the theory that he had wilfully delayed the royal justice by not immediately rendering the plaintiff his due was still a reality. The form still continued two centuries later, although there was no actual amercement. See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, *376, *398; 4 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3d ed. 1937) 536-537.

2 Cf. Ch. VIII, infra. See also Ch. VI, § 5 (2), infra.

RECORD IN PALSGRAF v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD CO., 248 N. Y. 339.

This action was commenced by the service of a summons on the 2d day of October, 1924. The complaint was served on the 14th day of November 1924. The answer was served on the 3rd day of December, 1924.

Matthew W. Wood appeared as attorney for the plaintiff and Joseph F. Keany appeared as attorney for the defendant. The names of the parties are given in full above. There has been no change or substitution of parties or attorneys.

1 The following is the complete "Case on Appeal" as filed with the Court of Appeals in printed form. It indicates the course of a litigated tort case in which a trial was had, under the procedure now followed in New York. The title of the case and the names and addresses of counsel appearing on the titlepage of the record are omitted, as is the Index (table of contents) which follows the title-page.

2 See N. Y. Rules of Civil Practice (1921), Rule 234, as amended and in effect February 26, 1926.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, The Long Island Railroad Company, hereby appeals to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in and for the Second Judicial Department, from the judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered in this action on the 31st day of May 1927, in the office of the Clerk of Kings County, for the sum of Six thousand, one hundred forty two and forty five one hundredths Dollars ($6,142.45), and the defendant appeals from each and every part of this judgment.

That the defendant, The Long Island Railroad Company also hereby appeals to the said Appellate Division of this Court from the order made denying said defendant's motion for a new trial and entered in said Clerk's office on the 27th day of May 1927, and that the defendant appeals from each and every part of said order.

Dated, June 14th, 1927.

JOSEPH F. KEANY

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant,
Pennsylvania Station,

New York City.

To:

WILLIAM E. KELLY, Esq.,

Clerk of Kings County. MATTHEW W. WOOD, Esq.,

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT

You are hereby SUMMONED to answer the complaint in this action, and to serve a copy of your answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this summons, to serve a notice of appearance, on the Plaintiff's Attorney within twenty days after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service; and in case of your failure to appear, or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default, for the relief demanded in the complaint.

Plaintiff complaining of the defendant through MATTHEW W. WOOD, her attorney, alleges:

FIRST: Upon information and belief, that at all of the times hereinafter mentioned the above named defendant was and still is a railway corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.

SECOND: Upon information and belief, that at all of the times hereinafter mentioned the above named defendant owned or leased and operated and managed or controlled a railroad with the attendant tracks, crossings, locomotives, cars and stations all used by it as a common carrier for hire in and about Long Island, State of New York, and particularly in and through the Borough of Brooklyn, City and State of New York.

THIRD: That at or near the tracks of the defendant's railroad in or near a locality known as East New York, City of New York, the defendant maintained a passenger station and a platform for the use of passengers in entering or leaving its trains at said place, which said station is commonly known as the "East New York" station.

FOURTH That it was the duty of the above named defendant at all of the times hereinafter mentioned to operate its trains so that the plaintiff and other persons, who might be similarly situated, could use the said platform or station at the said East New York station without danger of being injured by the passing of defendant's trains through said station, and it was the further duty of the defendant to provide a suitable and sufficient number of employees or agents at said station at a time or times when, to the knowledge of the defendant, there was habitually accustomed to be a large number of passengers congregated on said station for the purpose of boarding defendant's said cars at said station, and when at said time and place it was known to the defendant as a habitual custom that passengers at said station congregated in such large numbers that they were accustomed to be jostled and pushed about in boarding defendant's cars in such a manner as to endanger the life and limb of such passengers, and it was further the duty of the defendant to make and enforce proper rules and regulations for the guidance and control of its employees and particularly its guards and platform men at said station at said time, so that while defendant's trains were stopped at or were passing through said station the persons on the platform thereof might be reasonably free from injury. It was further the duty of the defendant to prevent the bringing upon its passenger stations or platforms and the transportation upon its passenger trains or cars of fireworks or other inflammable and combustible substances, and to exercise such care, caution and prudence in the premises that passengers or other persons would not be allowed to bring upon and into its said stations or cars or trains any fireworks or other combustible or explosive substances.

FIFTH That the defendant was negligent and remiss in the performance of one or more of its several duties in that on Sunday, the 24th day of August, 1924, between the hours of ten and eleven o'clock in the forenoon of said day, it failed and neglected to provide a suitable and sufficient number of employees and agents at said sta