vance towards popular liberty than the securing of the Charter, because through it the people first gained some voice in the general government. Nevertheless, we must not conclude that in this act De Montfort was impelled by a spirit of liberty in its modern signification. As Mr. Stubbs says of him:

'He was greater as an opponent of tyranny than as a deviser of liberties. The fetters imposed on royal autocracy, cumbrous and entangled as they were, seem to have been an integral part of his policy. The means he took for admitting the nation to self-government wear very much the form of an occasional or party expedient, which a longer tenure of undivided power might have led him either to develop or discard."'

Moreover, the germ of the parliament lay in the primitive institutions of the Saxon race, and while De Montfort has the merit of having been the first to see the immediate uses to which a parliament might be put, in curtailing the absolute power of the king, it cannot be supposed that he conceived the ultimate tendency of that representative government toward the abolition, not only of the king, but of his own class; since indeed the foremost Englishmen of to-day are not altogether ready to admit this result as the final outcome.

The Bill of Rights is another acquisition the influence of which has been largely exaggerated. It was really a bill of particulars. It set forth human

1 Stubbs' "Constitutional History of England," vol. II., p. 108.

rights of the more obvious kind and commanded them to be observed thenceforth. But while the items thus inventoried belong to the category of freedom, they by no means comprehend the whole principle. They were but its adumbrations, since they did not even remotely indicate any rule whereby political rights generally are to be ascertained.

To return to the historical order. During the wars between the houses of York and Lancaster, the rights of the people were to some extent furthered ; but with the advent of the Tudors came a reaction towards absolutism, which culminated during the reign of Henry VIII., when the parliament became little more than the registrar of the royal will. The advance of political freedom, which took place in the reign of Elizabeth, was caused largely by the general awakening which accompanied the Reformation, and which expressed itself in England in a reaction from the tyranny of Henry VIII. and the bigotry of Mary.

With the incoming of the Stuarts, however, the absolute idea again received forcible expression. James I., even before his accession, formulated, in his work on the "True Law of Free Monarchy," the theory of an absolute royalty, and announced that, although a good king will frame his actions to be according to law, yet he is not bound thereto, but of his own will and for example-giving to his subjects." This was a step beyond the absolutism of the Tudors, for, as Mr. Green has pointed out :

"An absolute king,' or 'an absolute monarchy,' meant, with the Tudor statesmen who used the phrase, a sovereign or rule complete in themselves, and independent of all foreign or Papal interference. James chose to regard the words as implying the monarch's freedom from all control by law, or from all responsibility to any thing but his own royal will. The king's blunder, however, became a system of government, a doctrine which bishops preached from the pulpit, and for which brave men laid their heads on the block."

99 1

Mr. Green speaks of this notion as if it were wholly a new one; but while it had never been so definitely expressed before, it is a dogma which has been acted upon by monarchs in one degree or another from the beginning of history. It is, in fact, but a modifica tion of theocracy, which is the oldest form of gov ernment. From the passionate adherence with which James and his successor clung to this theory, the Commonwealth came into being. Then followed in order of time the Restoration, the Abdication, the Act of Settlement, through which the crown was conferred by the people, and the gradual development of the Constitution of England. Through all these processes there were lapses and advances of the liberties of the people, but in the main these liberties were enlarged and better guarded.

The English writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but particularly the eighteenth, made marked progress in the definition of social and economic principles; but they were not so successful

1 "A Short History of the English People," by J. R. Green, p. 472.

in ascertaining and determining the ultimate logical bounds of political liberty. John Locke, in 1690, published two Treatises on Civil Government, in defence of the principles of the revolution against the Tories. This work has been extensive in its influence, and singular in the diversity of that influence upon three peoples, each of whom it helped to an entirely different interpretation of freedom. Thus it confirmed the English people in the Act of Settlement and made the subject contented, under the reign of William, with the new order of things inaugurated by that settlement; it had an important influence in urging the French nation, a century later, to revolution and anarchy; while in America it became one of the chief sources of inspiration for the foundation of the republic. The highest purpose of its author, as he himself says, was "to establish the throne of our great restorer, or present King William; to make good his title in the consent of the people, which, being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom." But the surroundings of Locke forbade him to pursue his reasons to their legitimate conclusion. While in all his discussion he saw the necessity of government to support the individual, the necessity of justice in government, and the right of the people to overthrow unjust governments, he believed unqualifiedly that the government which could best accomplish the ends

1 "Locke on Government,” Preface.

of freedom was one which had a king and an order of nobles, a constitutional monarchy. When we come to analyze his definition, we see that his typical idea of political liberty cannot convey the idea of individual freedom of self-government; for selfgovernment and government founded on hereditary right are not, and cannot be, identical.

Blackstone similarly makes a definition which lacks essential completeness. In his description of civil liberty he says: "That constitution or form of government, that system of law, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points in which the public good requires some direction or restraint." In considering this definition we must take into account the intention of the definer, especially as to that which constitutes the public good. Most persons would cordially agree that the public good is the great end to be desired, but would differ very widely as to those things which constituted this public good, and particularly as to the kind of government best suited to secure it. It is this point that Blackstone's definition leaves undetermined. He tells us in effect that a political structure is best calculated to maintain civil liberty, without defining that structure; and when we measure his definition by the context, we have every rea son to infer that what he regards as a realization of the greatest public good exists in, and is secured by,

"Blackstone's Commentaries," Book I., P. 126.