STEVENS, J., dissenting

452 U.S.

this case, however, because the statute does not give a clue as to the federal interest regarding contracts between unions, and because there is thus no federal scheme to follow, district courts will have little choice but to borrow state law.12 Moreover, in the absence of some guideposts planted in federal interests, the ability to obtain-and the need for-uniformity will be greatly reduced. It is difficult to conceive how the Nation's interest in industrial peace will be served by the creation of a body of federal law which will be based on state law and which will in large part vary from State to State.

I believe that this case presents no substantive federal ques

state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.

"The importance of the area which would be affected by separate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of federal law particularly compelling. The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. With due regard to the many factors which bear upon competing state and federal interests in this area, California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 730-731; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230-231, we cannot but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." 369 U. S., at 104-105.

12 The petitioners agree that the "federal common law" will be borrowed from state law, and as the following statement by petitioners' counsel at oral argument illustrates, existing federal law may contribute little to the formulation of the new "federal" rule:

"Where the federal courts have to create a body of law, we don't believe that the normal course is to start from scratch. It's a process of incorporation except in the case of incompatibility. It's difficult for me to visualize an incompatibility between federal law and state law if the dispute is on whether a local union which owes another local union that is unrelated $500 has in fact violated a promissory note." Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

tion.13 The case does not arise under "the laws of the United States," and the Court of Appeals was quite right in holding that it had no subject-matter jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent.

13 This case is important not because of its unremarkable holding that a

union constitution is a contract but because the case is a striking example of the easy way in which this Court enlarges the power of the Federal Government-and the Federal Judiciary in particular-at the expense of the States.

HEFFRON, SECRETARY AND MANAGER OF THE MINNESOTA STATE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY BOARD OF MANAGERS, ET AL. v. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA

No. 80-795. Argued April 20, 1981-Decided June 22, 1981

A rule (Rule 6.05) of the Minnesota Agricultural Society (Society), a Minnesota public corporation that operates the annual state fair, provides that sale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material, except from a duly licensed location on the fairgrounds shall be a misdemeanor. As Rule 6.05 is construed and applied by the Society, all persons, groups, or firms desiring to sell, exhibit, or distribute materials during the fair must do so only from fixed locations. However, the Rule does not prevent organizational representatives from walking about the fairgrounds and communicating the organization's views to fair patrons in face-to-face discussions. Space in the fairgrounds is rented in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a firstcome, first-served basis, and Rule 6.05 applies alike to nonprofit, charitable, and commercial enterprises. Respondents, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), an organization espousing the views of the Krishna religion, and the head of one of its temples, filed suit in a Minnesota state court against state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that Rule 6.05, on its face and as applied, violated their First Amendment rights. ISKCON asserted that the Rule suppressed the practice of Sankirtan, a religious ritual that enjoins its members to go into public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna religion. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 6.05, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.

Held: Rule 6.05, requiring members of ISKCON who desire to practice Sankirtan at the state fair to confine their distribution, sales, and solicitation activities to a fixed location, is a permissible restriction on the place and manner of communicating the views of the Krishna religion. Pp. 647–655.

(a) Rule 6.05 is not based upon the content or subject matter of speech, since it applies evenhandedly to all persons or organizations,

whether commercial or charitable, who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds. Nor is the Rule-which involves a method of allocating space on a first-come, first-served basis-open to the kind of arbitrary application that is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation as having the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view. Pp. 648-649.

(b) The State's interest in maintaining the orderly movement of the crowd at the fair is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a time, place, or manner restriction must serve a significant governmental interest. The significance of that interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved. Because the fairgrounds comprise a relatively small area where an enormous variety of goods, services, entertainment, and other matters of interest are exhibited to large crowds on a temporary basis, the State's interest in the orderly movement and control of such an assembly is a substantial consideration. Pp. 649-651.

(c) The justification for Rule 6.05 cannot be measured solely on the basis of the disorder that would result from granting members of ISKCON an exemption from the Rule. Inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual does not entitle church members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior to those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do not purport to ritualize the process. And if Rule 6.05 is an invalid restriction on ISKCON's activities, it is no more valid with respect to other social, political, or charitable organizations seeking to distribute information, sell wares, or solicit funds at the fair. Pp. 651-654.

(d) Similarly, Rule 6.05 cannot be viewed as an unnecessary regulation on the ground that the State could avoid the threat to its interest posed by ISKCON by less restrictive means, such as penalizing disorder, limiting the number of solicitors, or imposing more narrowly drawn restrictions on the location and movement of ISKCON's representatives. Since the inquiry must involve all other organizations that would be entitled to distribute, sell, or solicit if the booth rule may not be enforced with respect to ISKCON, it is improbable that such alternative means would deal adequately with the problems posed by the large number of distributors and solicitors that would be present on the fairgrounds. P. 654.

(e) Alternative forums for the expression of respondents' protected speech exist despite the effects of Rule 6.05. The Rule does not prevent ISKCON from practicing Sankirtan anywhere outside the fairgrounds, nor does it exclude ISKCON from the fairgrounds. Its members may mingle with the crowd and orally propagate their views, and ISKCON

Opinion of the Court

452 U.S. may also arrange for a booth and distribute and sell literature and solicit funds from that location on the fairgrounds. Pp. 654–655. 299 N. W. 2d 79, reversed and remanded.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 656. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 663.

Kent G. Harbison, Special Assistant Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Warren Spannaus; Attorney General, and William P. Marshall, Special Assistant Attorney General.

Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Barry A. Fisher and David Grosz.*

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented for review is whether a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may require a religious organization desiring to distribute and sell religious literature and to solicit donations at a state fair to conduct those activities only at an assigned location within the fairgrounds even though application of the rule limits the religious practices of the organization.

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Shirley Adelson Siegel, Solicitor General, and Thomas J. Maroney and George M. Levy, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of New York; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Gary Elson Brown, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Ohio; and by John H. Larson and DeWitt W. Clinton for the County of Los Angeles. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. Albert Woll, Marsha Berzon, and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and Charles S. Sims for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by John Jordan for the Gujarat Cultural Association, Inc., et al.; and by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., for the India Cultural Society of New Jersey et al.