Opinion of the Court

452 U.S. peal, Local 334 on August 22, 1977, filed suit against the International in the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking to enjoin enforcement of the order of consolidation. Local 334 alleged in its complaint, inter alia, that § 86 did not permit division of the membership of a local into separate work classifications, that the action of United Association did not constitute a consolidation of local unions, and that the general president had abused his discretion. Complaint ¶ 11, id., at 21. Claiming that it would suffer "substantial and irreparable injury to plaintiffs' [sic] property and property rights as members of Local 334" unless the consolidation was prevented, Complaint ¶ 13, id., at 21, the Local requested equitable relief enjoining United Association to return the Local's charter and seal, directing it to process the Local's internal appeal to the International's General Executive Board, and preventing it from threatening the Local's officers and members with expulsion and loss of membership. Id., at 22.*

The International removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1441.5 Local 334 filed a motion to remand the case to the state court, which the District Court denied. App. 98-99. Following completion of discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of the International. The court first concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the Local had failed

The Local subsequently amended its complaint, alleging in addition that the general president abused his discretion within the meaning of § 86 "by failing to specify facts which would support his conclusion that Local 334 is a 'superfluous' local union insofar as the Morris County, New Jersey area is concerned or that the elimination of Local 334 would be in the best interests of the United Association, locally or at large." Amended Complaint, Second Count 4, App. 61.

5 Immediately following removal, Local 334 obtained a temporary restraining order against United Association enjoining enforcement of the order of consolidation. Id., at 66-67. The temporary restraining order was subsequently dissolved when the District Court denied the Local's request for a preliminary injunction.

to exhaust internal union remedies. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a-23a. In the alternative, the court ruled on the merits that there was "ample basis for the [International's] interpretation of the Constitution as well as the application of that interpretation in the Order of Consolidation of August 4, 1977." Id., at 28a.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sua sponte, raised the question of federal-court jurisdiction under § 301 (a) and requested supplemental briefing on that issue from the parties. 628 F. 2d 812, 813 (1980). After canvassing treatment of this issue by other Courts of Appeals, the court held that "[s]uits concerning intra-union matters that do not have a significant impact on labor-management relations or industrial peace are outside the scope of § 301 (a)." Id., at 820. Examining Local 334's allegations in its complaint, the court concluded that any alleged potential effect of the order of consolidation on labormanagement relations or industrial peace would not pass the "significant impact" test and that the District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction under § 301 (a). Ibid. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded with instructions to remand the case to the state court. Ibid. We granted the International's petition for certiorari, 449 U. S. 1123 (1981), to resolve this important question of labor law. We reverse.

II

Section 301 (a) establishes federal district court jurisdiction for "[s]uits for violation of contracts... between any.. labor organizations [representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter]." 29 U. S. C. § 185 (a). On its face, the statute appears to comprehend the instant dispute. First, United Association's constitution may be fairly characterized as a contract between labor organizations. We have described a union constitution as a "fundamental agreement of association." Coronado Coal Co. v.

Opinion of the Court

6

452 U.S. Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 304 (1925); see Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212, 217 (1979). The Courts of Appeals are unanimous that a union constitution can be a "contract between labor organizations" within the meaning of § 301 (a). See, e. g., Alexander v. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 624 F. 2d 1235, 1238 (CA5 1980); Studio Electrical Technicians Local 728 v. International Photographers of the Motion Picture Industries, Local 659, 598 F. 2d 551, 553 (CA9 1979); Local Union No. 657 v. Sidell, 552 F. 2d 1250, 1252–1256 (CA7), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 862 (1977); Trail v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 542 F. 2d 961, 968 (CA6 1976); National Assn. of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Sombrotto, 449 F. 2d 915, 918 (CA2 1971); Parks v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 916-917 (CA4), cert. denied, 372 U. S. 976 (1963).

6 In Coronado, one of the issues in the case was whether the International union could be held liable for damages to property caused by a local strike called by an affiliated district organization. The International's constitution provided: "No district shall be permitted to engage in a strike involving all or a major portion of its members, without the sanction of an International Convention or the International Executive Board," and "Districts may order local strikes within their respective districts on their own responsibility, but where local strikes are to be financed by the International Union, they must be sanctioned by the International Executive Board." 268 U. S., at 299-300. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, observed that "it must be clearly shown in order to impose... liability on [the International union] that what was done was done by their agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement of association." Id., at 304.

In Smith v. United Mine Workers of America, 493 F. 2d 1241, 1243 (1974) (emphasis added), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appeared to suggest that the word "contracts" in § 301 did not encompass union constitutions, although the court also noted that the controversy in that case "relates only to the construction and application of the union constitution and has nothing to do with labor-management relations," thus leaving open the question whether a constitution affecting labor-management relations might be a "contract" in the view of that

court.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, without deciding, has given

Indeed, even the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on review here recognized that a union constitution would be a "contract" within the meaning of § 301 (a) as long as the plaintiff made "specific factual allegations of actions which have a significant impact on labor-management relations or industrial peace." 628 F. 2d, at 820. And respondent in its complaint alleged that "[t]he relationship (rights and duties) between Local 334 and the International is governed by the said Constitution." Amended Complaint, First Count 3, App. 55.

We have also noted that the prevailing state-law view is that a union constitution is a contract. Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 618-619 (1958) (discussing that aspect of union constitution constituting a contract between members and union). In particular, the view of a union constitution as a contract between parent and local unions was widely held in the States around the time § 301 (a) was enacted. See, e. g., Locals 1140 and 1145 v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 232 Minn. 217, 221–222, 45 N. W. 2d 408, 411 (1950); International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink & Distillery Workers of America, C. I. O. v. Becherer, 4 N. J. Super. 456, 459, 67 A. 2d 900, 901, cert. denied, 3 N. J. 374, 70 A. 2d 537 (1949); Local

strong indication that a union constitution can be a "contract" within the meaning of § 301 (a). In Local Union 1219 v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 493 F. 2d 93, 96 (1974), the court noted that a charter given by an international to a local union could be a "contract." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in 1199 DC, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees v. National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, 175 U. S. App. D. C. 70, 72-73, 533 F. 2d 1205, 1207-1208 (1976), asserted that it "need not face the issue whether a union constitution is a § 301 (a) contract," absent the factual allegation of "actual threats to industrial peace."

8 Even respondent concedes that a union constitution is a contract, albeit one "between members and their union and only secondarily between affiliated bodies of a labor organization." Brief for Respondent 14-15, n. 10.

Union 13013, District 50, U. M. W. v. Cikra, 86 Ohio App. 41, 49, 90 N. E. 2d 154, 158 (1949); Bridgeport Brass Workers Union, Local 320 of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers v. Smith, 15 Conn. Supp. 505, 511-512 (Super. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 136 Conn. 654, 74 A. 2d 191 (1950); Textile Workers Local 204 v. Federal Labor Union No. 21500, 240 Ala. 239, 243, 198 So. 606, 609 (1940). See also Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 289 N. Y. 91, 96-97, 43 N. E. 2d 825, 827 (1942). See generally 87 C. J. S., Trade Unions §§ 42–43, pp. 836-842, 837, n. 39, 838, n. 53 (1954).

Second, just as a union constitution is a "contract" within the plain meaning of § 301 (a), so too is it clear that United Association and Local 334 are "labor organization [s] representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter." As defined in the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (5), the term "labor organization" means

"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."

We have entertained numerous cases brought under § 301 (a) where one of the parties was an international union, see, e. g., Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696 (1966), or a local union, see, e. g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370 U. S. 254 (1962). Indeed, in Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, we did not even pause to question the existence of § 301 (a) jurisdiction in a suit brought by a coal company against an international union, an affiliated district union, and three affiliated local unions. 444 U. S., at 214.

If the plain meaning of the "contracts between labor orga nizations" clause of § 301 (a) supports jurisdiction in the instant case, its legislative history hardly upsets such an inter