Opinion of the Court

452 U.S. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941. The question in this case is whether the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or is limited in application to the former. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress did not intend to include within the definition of "enterprise" those organizations which are exclusively criminal. 632 F. 2d 896 (1980). This position is contrary to that adopted by every other Circuit that has addressed the issue. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 449 U. S. 1123 (1981).

I

Count Nine of a nine-count indictment charged respondent and 12 others with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce

2

1 See United States v. Sutton, 642 F. 2d 1001, 1006-1009 (CA6 1980) (en banc), cert. pending, Nos. 80-6058, 80-6137, 80-6141, 80-6147, 80-6253, 80-6254, 80-6272; United States v. Errico, 635 F. 2d 152, 155 (CA2 1980); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F. 2d 985, 992-993 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 899 (1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F. 2d 523, 525, n. 1 (CA4 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F. 2d 298, 304-305 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F. 2d 564, 568-569 (CA9 1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 946 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 193 U. S. App. D. C. 92, 94-95, 593 F. 2d 1246, 1248-1249 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F. 2d 880, 896-898 (CA5), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 953 (1978). See also United States v. Anderson, 626 F. 2d 1358, 1372 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 912 (1981). But see United States v. Sutton, 605 F. 2d 260, 264-270 (CA6 1979), vacated, 642 F. 2d 1001 (1980); United States v. Rone, supra, at 573 (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese, 542 F. 2d 104, 107 (CA2 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1039 (1977).

2 Title 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (4) provides:

'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."

through a pattern of racketeering activities, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962 (d). The indictment described the enterprise as "a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of state court proceedings...." The other eight counts of the indictment charged the commission of various substantive criminal acts by those engaged in and associated with the criminal enterprise, including possession with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances, and several counts of insurance fraud by arson and other means. The common thread to all counts was respondent's alleged leadership of this criminal organization through which he orchestrated and participated in the commission of the various crimes delineated in the RICO count or charged in the eight preceding counts.

After a 6-week jury trial, in which the evidence focused upon both the professional nature of this organization and the execution of a number of distinct criminal acts, respondent was convicted on all nine counts. He was sentenced to a term of 20 years on the substantive counts, as well as a 2year special parole term on the drug count. On the RICO conspiracy count he was sentenced to a 20-year concurrent term and fined $20,000.

On appeal, respondent argued that RICO was intended

Title 18 U. S. C. § 1962 (d) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." Pertinent to these charges, subsection (c) provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."

Opinion of the Court

452 U.S. solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and that RICO does not make criminal the participation in an association which performs only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. The Court of Appeals agreed. We

reverse.

II

In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing "plain" or "unambiguous" language. Also, authoritative administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled, absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 571 (1965). We nevertheless begin with the language of the statute.

Section 1962 (c) makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." The term "enterprise" is defined as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." § 1961 (4). There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more ex

Had

cludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones. Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, "legitimate." But it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.

The Court of Appeals, however, clearly departed from and limited the statutory language. It gave several reasons for doing so, none of which is adequate. First, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems suggesting that where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). The Court of Appeals ruled that because each of the specific enterprises enumerated in § 1961 (4) is a "legitimate" one, the final catchall phrase— "any union or group of individuals associated in fact"should also be limited to legitimate enterprises. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction and comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 588 (1980); United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936). Considering the language and structure of § 1961 (4), however, we not only perceive no uncertainty in the meaning to be attributed to the phrase, “any union or group of individuals associated in fact" but we are convinced for another reason that ejusdem generis is wholly inapplicable in this context.

Section 1961 (4) describes two categories of associations that come within the purview of the "enterprise" definition. The first encompasses organizations such as corporations and partnerships, and other "legal entities." The second covers

"any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." The Court of Appeals assumed that the second category was merely a more general description of the first. Having made that assumption, the court concluded that the more generalized description in the second category should be limited by the specific examples enumerated in the first. But that assumption is untenable. Each category describes a separate type of enterprise to be covered by the statute those that are recognized as legal entities and those that are not. The latter is not a more general description of the former. The second category itself not containing any specific enumeration that is followed by a general description, ejusdem generis has no bearing on the meaning to be attributed to that part of § 1961 (4).*

A second reason offered by the Court of Appeals in support of its judgment was that giving the definition of "enterprise" its ordinary meaning would create several internal inconsistencies in the Act. With respect to § 1962 (c), it was said:

"If a pattern of racketeering' can itself be an 'enterprise' for purposes of section 1962 (c), then the two phrases 'employed by or associated with any enterprise' and 'the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through [a pattern of racketeering activity]' add nothing to the meaning of the section. The words of the statute are coherent and logical only if they are read as applying to legitimate enterprises." 632 F. 2d, at 899.

The Court of Appeals' application of ejusdem generis is further flawed by the assumption that "any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity" could not act totally beyond the pale of the law. The mere fact that a given enterprise is favored with a legal existence does not prevent that enterprise from proceeding along a wholly illegal course of conduct. Therefore, since legitimacy of purpose is not a universal characteristic of the specifically listed enterprises, it would be improper to engraft this characteristic upon the second category of enterprises.